Marc Andreessen | Investment Conference 2024 | Norges Bank Investment Management

Hi, Mark. Good to see you again. Hello. Good morning. How's everybody? We are really well. Thank you. Now, Mark, where are we going to make money going forward? Well, so in our business, the theory is relatively straightforward, which is we make money on technological disruption. So we make money when these new upstart startups form and either try to go take down a big incumbent or try to create some kind of new market. And so that's what we do. I think for the world at large, the challenge is just that there's a fundamental supply-demand balance between the amount of capital, the seeking productive economic investment opportunities, and then the number of those opportunities. I think there's a very large macro problem on making money in the economy. And tech and venture capital can only be a small part of that answer, but hopefully we will be a part of that answer.

嗨，马克。很高兴再次见到你。你好。早上好。大家好吗？我们真的很好，谢谢。那么，马克，我们未来要如何赚钱呢？嗯，在我们的业务中，理论相对简单，就是我们在技术颠覆上赚钱。当这些新兴初创公司成立并试图挑战大型传统企业或创建新市场时，我们就可以赚钱。这就是我们的做法。我认为对于整个世界来说，挑战在于资金寻求生产性经济投资机会与这些机会的数量之间的供需平衡。在经济中赚钱存在一个非常大的宏观问题。科技和风险投资只能是这个问题的一小部分解决方案，但希望我们可以成为解决方案的一部分。

Yeah. Well, you are sitting in the middle of Silicon Valley and you kind of invented the Internet. So kicking off the AI question, just how will the AI raise pan out here? Yeah, so the theory and the hope, certainly that we're betting against and investing hard against, is that AI, and specifically these new breakthroughs are on AI, like generative AI, represent a new platform. And in the tech industry, that's a sort of very powerful concept, because the idea of a new platform. And the tech industry is sort of a new foundational technology that you can then imagine reinventing thousands and thousands of application categories on top of. And the tech industry historically has been fueled by these platforms. The original one was the mainframe computer that then led to many computers, client server computers, personal computers, mobile computers. And every time there's a platform shift, there's an opportunity to reinvent the industry and reinvent basically the entire ecosystem and all the different ways that people use technology and create an entirely new generation of companies. And so we certainly believe that AI is a new platform shift. We believe that AI is one of the really big platform shifts. We think this, you know, the possibility exists that this is on par with a microprocessor. And so, you know, we think there's an opportunity to take a very broad perspective here and invest in many different, both core technologies and also use cases of AI.

是的。嗯，你坐在硅谷中心，你有点发明了互联网。所以关于人工智能的问题，这里人工智能会如何发展？是的，所以这个理论和希望，当然我们在这方面进行了大力投资，就是人工智能，具体来说是这些人工智能的新突破，比如生成式人工智能，代表了一个新平台。在科技行业，这是一个非常强大的概念，因为新平台的概念。在科技行业中是一种新的基础技术，你可以想象在其之上重新发明成千上万种应用类别。科技行业历史上一直被这些平台推动。最初的是大型计算机，然后是许多计算机，客户端服务器计算机，个人电脑，移动计算机。每当出现平台转变时，就有机会重新发明行业，重新发明基本上整个生态系统以及人们使用技术的各种方式，并创造一整代公司。因此，我们确实相信人工智能是一个新的平台转变。我们认为人工智能是一个非常重要的平台转变。我们认为这种可能性是与微处理器相媲美的。因此，我们认为有机会采取一个非常广泛的视角，在许多不同的核心技术和人工智能的用例上投资。

Where is the kind of fight going on just now? What is it about chips, money, or people, or electricity? What exactly is it? Yeah, so the most dramatic thing about this sort of AI shift is that it's what I call an 80-year overnight success. And so the original paper on neural networks, which are the foundational technology of AI, was actually written in 1943. And then you had over the course of the last 80 years, you had entire generations of researchers who basically tried to make AI work and for the most part weren't able to do it. In fact, when I was in school, you know, 35 years ago, AI was a discredited field because there had been an AI boom in the 80s that didn't pan out. And so it's an energy sector that's sort of been in search of working products for a long time. Essentially, what happened was the breakthrough moment was in 2022, and it was the chat GPT moment. And so it was, you know, actually 79 years into the technology. But it was a breakthrough moment, and then it was a breakthrough moment of it went basically from not working to working incredibly well in one step. And, you know, the technology is not perfect yet. There's still a lot of work to be done. But fundamentally, you know, these products are just incredible already in what they can do. And they're far better out of the gate than the microprocessor was or the internet was. And so it's this kind of rare situation where you have this dramatic leap in functionality happening extremely quickly.

当前发生的这种争论是关于什么？是关于芯片、金钱、人或者电力？究竟是什么？是的，关于这种人工智能转变最引人注目的事情是，我称之为80年的一夜成功。神经网络的原始论文，这是人工智能的基本技术，实际上是在1943年撰写的。在过去的80年里，有整整几代研究人员试图使人工智能工作，但大多数情况下却无法做到。事实上，当我上学的时候，35年前，人工智能是一个不受人尊敬的领域，因为上世纪80年代曾有一场人工智能繁荣，但并没有结果。所以这个领域长期以来一直在寻找行之有效的产品。本质上，突破性的时刻是在2022年，那就是聊天 GPT 的时刻。实际上是技术发展79年后的突破时刻。这是一个突破性时刻，然后它从一个阶段到另一个阶段基本上从未工作到非常有效地工作。这项技术还不完善，仍需做很多工作。但从根本上讲，这些产品已经非常令人难以置信地强大。它们比微处理器或互联网推出时更加优秀。这是一种罕见的情况，即功能性出现戏剧性飞跃，速度非常快。

As a result of that, basically every part of the tech ecosystem is trying to react and trying to figure out how to incorporate AI. You're trying to build on AI. You're trying to basically compensate, you know, figure out how to compensate for weaknesses in AI. Every single sector of the tech industry is reacting right now. There is a massive chip, you know, shortage. It's the biggest supply demanded balance in ships that we've ever seen as an industry. And so there's a massive fight happening there. There's a massive, you know, wave of data center innovation development. There's actually power. A lot of people are now trying to figure out how to power and cool these giant data centers. There's actually a resurgence of interest in nuclear power around these data centers. And then there are basically fights happening up and down the software stack. You know, the fight gets probably the most publicity at the moment is the fight between the software companies building the so-called foundation models. And so, and there's sort of a big fight between a view of the world in which there will be a few big models that basically win everything. And then an alternate view of the world in which this is more like the microprocessor. And there will actually be, you know, many, you know, thousands of different models running on billions of devices, you know, of many different shapes, sizes, descriptions, customised in various ways. And actually that latter thesis is the thesis we're investing against very aggressively.

因此，基本上科技生态系统的每个部分都在尝试反应，并试图找出如何整合人工智能。你正在尝试基于人工智能来构建。你正在尝试基本上弥补，你知道，找出如何补偿人工智能的弱点。科技行业的每个部门现在都在做出反应。有着大规模的芯片短缺。这是我们作为一个产业所见过的最大的供需平衡问题。因此在那里发生了一场巨大的战斗。有一大波数据中心创新开发。实际上，目前有很多人正在尝试找出如何为这些巨大的数据中心供电和冷却。实际上，围绕这些数据中心，核电再次引起了人们的兴趣。然后，在软件层面上，基本上是一系列的斗争。你知道，目前最受关注的战斗可能是软件公司在构建所谓的基础模型方面的斗争。所以，在这里存在着一个大的分歧，一种观点认为世界将只有几个能够获得所有的模型胜出。另一种世界观认为这更像是微处理器。实际上，将会有许多不同的模型运行在数十亿台各种形状、大小、描述方式不同、定制化的设备上。实际上，我们正在非常积极地投资前者的理论。

You said last year that we should just stuff AI into everything we do. Like weapons, cars, everything in order to beat the Chinese. What do you, could you tell us about it? Yeah, there's sort of two policy debates happening around AI. You know, somewhat for sure in the EU, but for sure in the US. And there's sort of one policy debate, which is, you know, AI is sort of weird and scary and we should regulate it and we should kind of prevent it from happening in different ways. And, you know, the EU has put them in place these kind of very onerous regulations. The UK has followed and then there's a big fight happening in US politics around this. And so this is sort of an inward looking, you know, kind of domestic policy viewpoint and people have all these fears around AI. There's a completely different conversation, which is the geopolitical conversation. And that's the conversation of basically, you know, geopolitical competition with China. And of course, you know, the minute you get in that conversation, it becomes very clear that we need to win. And specifically, the reason we need to win is we need to win the AI race of China, you know, sort of a very analogous way that we want the sort of algae race with the Soviet Union, you know, in the previous century, which is, you know, we have two basically dominant, you know, mindsets regimes of, you know, Western democracy and Chinese communism.

去年你说过，我们应该把人工智能应用到我们所做的一切事情中。像武器、汽车，所有的东西，为了击败中国。你能告诉我们一些关于这个问题的看法吗？是的，关于人工智能存在着两种政策辩论。在欧盟可能是有些，但在美国肯定存在。一种政策辩论认为，人工智能有些奇怪和可怕，我们应该对其进行监管，并阻止它以不同的方式发生。欧盟已经制定了这些繁重的规定。英国跟进了，而美国政治界也正在发生一场激烈的争论。这是一种内向性的国内政策观点，人们对人工智能存在各种恐惧。另一种截然不同的对话是地缘政治对话。这是一种基本上是关于与中国的地缘竞争的讨论。当然，一旦涉及到这种对话，很明显我们需要赢。具体来说，我们需要赢得中国的人工智能竞赛，这在某种方式上类似于我们在上个世纪与苏联进行的“藻类”竞赛。也就是说，我们有两种基本上占主导地位的思维制度：西方民主和中国共产主义。

You know, they both have aspirations to transform the world. You know, both of those are supported by major nation states. Both of those are supported by major militaries. Both of those are supported by major economies and both of those are supported by major tech industries. And if you look at the president of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the reason the West won was because of sort of a triangle of technological superiority, economic superiority, and then national security, military, intelligence superiority. But, you know, we decided we wanted to win and we won. Right? And by the way, our victory ended up actually being great for the people of Russia, right? It was actually really great for the Soviet Union to fall and, you know, people in Russia are much better off today. And so, you know, I think this is very straightforward. Like, we need to win. We need to win by being better technologically, better economically and better militarily. AI has been identified as the core technology for the future of the nation state by both U.S. military planners, by the Pentagon, as well as by, you know, the Chinese planners. And so it will be one of the main areas in which these, you know, these kind of two hemispheres compete. And I think it's important that we win. Where do you think the West is now relative to China?

你知道，他们两个都有改变世界的愿望。你知道，这两者都得到了主要国家的支持。这两者都得到了主要军事力量的支持。这两者都得到了主要经济力量的支持，这两者都得到了主要科技行业的支持。如果你看看冷战时期与苏联的总统，西方获胜的原因是因为技术优势、经济优势和国家安全、军事、情报上的优势。但是，你知道，我们决定要取胜，我们取得了胜利。对吧？顺便说一句，我们的胜利实际上对俄罗斯人民来说是件好事，苏联解体后，对俄罗斯人来说实际上是一件好事。因此，我认为这很简单明了。我们需要取胜。我们需要通过在技术、经济和军事上取得更好的表现来取胜。美国军事规划者、五角大楼以及中国规划者都将人工智能视为未来国家核心技术之一。因此，这将是这两个半球之间竞争的主要领域之一。我认为我们取胜很重要。你认为西方相对于中国现在处于什么位置？

So the West has, I would say, all of the advantages and disadvantages of a decentralized system and a market economy and a sort of a system in which governments don't control everything. And, you know, the huge advantage of that is innovation and entrepreneurship. The disadvantage of that is, you know, it's very difficult for our systems to plan. You know, there is no top-down American technology strategy. There is no top-down European technology strategy. Those concepts are kind of, you know, antithetical to our systems. And so we're very robust and dynamic in general, but, you know, we're very messy.

因此，西方有着分散系统和市场经济的所有优点和缺点，以及一种政府并不控制一切的体制。你知道，其中的巨大优势就是创新和企业精神。缺点是我们的系统很难制定计划。你知道，没有自上而下的美国技术战略。没有自上而下的欧洲技术战略。这些概念在我们的系统中有点相悖。因此，总体上我们非常强大和充满活力，但是混乱不堪。

The Chinese have both the advantages and the disadvantages of a centralized system, much like the Soviet Union did. You know, they have a command and control system where the Communist Party, you know, owns and controls everything and they can direct their private companies to do whatever they want, which they're doing right now, you know, with sort of increasing force. And then they have all the disadvantages of a centralized system, which is, you know, they have a command system. You know, they're actually in the process of trying to crush their entrepreneurial system right now.

中国既有中央集权制度的优势，也有劣势，就像苏联那样。他们有一套命令和控制系统，共产党拥有并控制着一切，可以指导他们的私营公司做任何他们想做的事，他们目前正在这样做，而且力度越来越大。然后他们也有中央集权制度的所有劣势，就是他们有一个命令系统。你知道，他们实际上正在试图镇压他们的企业家精神。

They're, you know, they're trying to basically drive their entrepreneurs, you know, out of, you know, in many cases, out of business, in many cases, out of the country. And so it's just like the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It's an asymmetric situation. Each side brings strengths and weaknesses. And then I would say, you know, each side is tempted to embrace the model of the other side to try to get the advantages.

他们试图基本上逼走他们的企业家，许多情况下甚至是逼走他们的企业家，甚至是逼走他们的企业家。所以这就像是与苏联的冷战一样。这是一种不对称的情况。双方各自带来优势和劣势。然后我会说，你知道，双方都想要采纳对方的模式，以获取优势。

So the Chinese have kind of this fake entrepreneurial system, you know, that they kind of try to foster. And then we have this sort of, you know, sort of not very effective, you know, central planning function, you know, in NDC and in Brussels, you know, that doesn't work very well. And at least I would argue we should lean into the strengths of our system, and, you know, and try to benefit from the fact that we should have a much more dynamic economy. We should have much more entrepreneurship. And hopefully that's what we'll do.

所以中国有一种类似假冒企业家体系的东西，他们试图培养这种体系。而在我们这里，中央计划部门并不是很有效，在国家发展改革委员会和布鲁塞尔的情况也是如此。我认为我们应该发挥我们体系的优势，努力从我们应该拥有更具活力的经济和更多创业精神这一事实中获益。希望我们能做到这一点。

Talking of dynamism, when we met you also talked about the importance of investing in American dynamism, and I guess that also goes for European dynamism. What do you mean by that? Yeah, so, you know, look, this is sort of part of the challenge for the geopolitical conflict as well as our domestic issues. And so, you know, look, both the US and EU, I mean, we're the result of the Industrial Revolution, right? We're a result of the first Industrial Revolution of things like steam power, we're the result of the second Industrial Revolution, you know, with things like electricity, we're the result of the computer age, you know, the west represented by the US and Europe is where, you know, most of these technologies over the last, you know, 300 years were developed.

谈到活力时，我们见面时也谈到了投资于美国活力的重要性，我猜这对欧洲的活力也同样重要。你是什么意思？是的，你知道，这在一定程度上是地缘政治冲突和国内问题的挑战之一。美国和欧盟，我们都是工业革命的结果，对吧？我们是第一次工业革命的结果，如蒸汽动力等，我们是第二次工业革命的结果，如电力等，我们是电脑时代的结果，你知道，美国和欧洲所代表的西方是过去300年里大部分这些技术发展的地方。

And historically, our society has benefited enormously by this. You know, we have the highest standards of living. You know, our children over time have, you know, have done the best, and generally it's been a very synergistic, positive process. You know, in the last 50 years, I think both American society and EU society has sort of lost faith in the idea of technological progress and lost faith, frankly, in the idea of economic progress and, you know, decided to become, you know, I don't know, much more cautious, much more risk-averse, much more, you know, sort of unwilling to think of changes as a positive and exciting thing.

在历史上，我们的社会受益匪浅。你知道，我们拥有最高的生活水准。我们的孩子们随着时间的推移，表现最出色，总的来说，这是一个非常协同、积极的过程。在过去50年里，我认为美国社会和欧盟社会都对技术进步的想法失去了信心，对经济进步的想法失去了信心，开始变得更加谨慎，更加避险，更加不愿意将变革视为积极和令人兴奋的事情。

And, you know, you actually see that, I would say, in America right now, you know, the relationship between industry and the government is at a 50-year low. It's, you know, actually quite a large amount of hostility between government and industry, and the same is certainly true in Europe. And so, again, you know, our view is like, look, you know, we need technology. We need technology. We need innovation. We need markets. We need these things to function. Why? Because we need growth. You know, we want our societies to be growth societies. We want people to think that there's opportunity. We want people to be able to think in positive some terms.

并且，你知道，实际上可以看到，在美国，我会说，目前工业和政府之间的关系处于50年来的低点。实际上，政府和工业之间存在相当大量的敌意，同样在欧洲也是如此。因此，我们的观点是，我们需要技术。我们需要技术。我们需要创新。我们需要市场。我们需要这些东西来运转。为什么？因为我们需要增长。我们希望我们的社会是增长型社会。我们希望人们认为有机会。我们希望人们能够积极地思考。

You know, we don't want people to think in terms of, like, for me to get something, I have to take it away from somebody else. We want to, you know, think about our society as societies that can grow and flourish, where our children will do better than we do. And so American Dynamism is sort of a very direct investment program that we have, you know, focused on injecting a lot more technological energy into a lot of the sectors of the economy that the governments are involved in. And certainly, defense and intelligence are a big part of that, but also energy and law and education and healthcare are also big parts. And all of these sectors, you know, frankly, they just, they, I think they're really suffering from a lack of technological change and innovation, and they could really use it.

你知道，我们不希望人们认为，要得到某物，就必须从别人那里拿走。我们希望，你知道，思考我们的社会作为可以成长和蓬勃发展的社会，让我们的子女比我们做得更好。因此，美国动力是一个非常直接的投资计划，我们专注于向政府参与的许多经济领域注入更多的技术能量。当然，国防和情报是其中的重要一部分，但能源、法律、教育和医疗保健也是很重要的部分。坦率地说，所有这些领域，我认为它们真的缺乏技术变革和创新，并且确实有待提升。

Well, it would be the key to get Europe to become more dynamic. I mean, not that we are not dynamic in Europe, but, you know, compared to Silicon Valley, we seem to be like a bit behind here. Yeah, so look, if you, you know, if you did a rank order of the top 50 technology companies 30 years ago, a large percentage of them were European. I think it was about 40%. If you did a rank order today, I think it's one out of 50. And so, you know, Europe has really fallen off. And I guess the way I would describe it is it seems, at least from the outside, it seems to be almost entirely choice, which is it seems like it's been a choice to sort of prioritize regulation and risk aversion and the precautionary principle over, you know, the most acute version of that, obviously, is the energy sector, you know, with a sort of sort of voluntary stand-down of energy development, which, you know, I think has led to real geopolitical stresses with respect to Russia.

嗯，这将是让欧洲变得更有活力的关键。我的意思是，并不是说欧洲缺乏活力，但是，你知道的，与硅谷相比，我们似乎在这方面有点落后。是的，看，如果你，你知道的，如果你三十年前对前五十家科技公司进行排名，其中很大一部分是欧洲公司。我想大约有40%。如果你今天进行排名，我想可能只有一家是欧洲公司。所以，你知道的，欧洲确实已经走下坡路。我想我会描述为，至少从外部来看，这似乎几乎完全是出于选择，就是似乎选择了优先规范和风险规避和预防原则，而不是，你知道的，的最严重的例子显然是能源部门，你知道的，有一种自愿放弃能源发展的倾向，这，我认为已经导致了与俄罗斯之间的真正地缘政治压力。

And so, you know, I, look, I think it's been a choice. I think the political leadership class in Europe has decided that they want this. The voters so far have supported them in wanting it. You know, it has consequences. I think the consequences are becoming clearer. I think, you know, fundamentally, it's a choice at a societal level. And, you know, the voters will either step up or they won't, and the leaders will either step up or they won't. But I think the results of the current approach are in, and I don't think they're very good. Any reflections on your responsibility as a venture capitalist or venture capital investor at a time where technology is becoming so integrated into the race between the superpowers, and, you know, Elon Musk with Starlink, you know, suddenly being key in Ukraine and someone. What do you, how do you think about it?

所以，你知道，我觉得这是一个选择。我认为欧洲的政治领导阶层已经决定他们想要这样。迄今为止，选民们支持他们想要的方向。你知道，这是有后果的。我觉得后果变得更加清晰。我认为，基本上，这是一个社会层面的选择。你知道，选民们要么站出来，要么不会，领导者要么站出来，要么不会。但我认为目前假设的结果已经出来了，而且我认为并不是很好。在技术正成为超级大国之间竞争的关键时刻，您作为风险投资家或风险投资者的责任有何反思？你如何看待埃隆·马斯克的星链在乌克兰和其他地方变得如此关键？你对此有什么想法？

Yeah, so I would describe it as we're 100% on the side of the United States, and we're 100% on the side of the West. And so we know we never, as a firm, for example, had an investment program in China. We never, you know, we always knew that there would be difficulties from that, which, you know, for a long time, you know, looked like a mistake, but I think is now, you know, increasingly clear. So we're 100% on the side of the U.S. and the West. As a firm, we don't have our own foreign policy. We have basically the foreign policy of the U.S. State Department. And so we're, you know, we're sort of in complete lockstep with our government. You know, we, all of our programs that involve anything involving national security will be based, you know, on the U.S. government's view of friends and allies.

是的，我会描述我们百分之百站在美国一边，百分之百站在西方一边。所以我们从未作为一个公司在中国投资过。我们始终知道这会带来困难，长期来看可能看起来像一个错误，但我认为现在越来越清楚。所以我们百分之百站在美国和西方一边。作为一个公司，我们没有自己的外交政策。我们基本上遵循美国国务院的外交政策。因此，我们与政府完全一致。我们所有涉及国家安全的项目都将基于美国政府对友邦和盟国的看法。

You know, I would say this, you know, this was a controversial position, basically up until Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And so up until Russia's invasion of Ukraine, basically there was a prevailing ethos in Silicon Valley that national security is somehow bad or undesirable, or the tech companies should not want to, you know, be involved in it. And there was this famous incident where Google had this program with the U.S. Department of Defense that their, you know, their employees basically rioted on campus and forced them to cancel. At the same time that Google actually had, you know, an AI lab in Beijing that by definition is, you know, anything in China is sort of connected to their security state.

你知道，我要说的是，这个立场在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之前一直存在争议。在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之前，基本上硅谷有一种主导的思想，即国家安全在某种程度上是不好的或不可取的，或者科技公司不应该参与其中。有一个著名事件，就是谷歌和美国国防部有一个合作项目，结果谷歌的员工在校园里闹事，逼使他们取消合作。与此同时，谷歌在北京有一个人工智能实验室，必然是与中国的安全体系有所关联。

And so, you know, there was a fair amount of, I would think, internal dissension division in Silicon Valley in terms of what the right role is, you know, between the valley and the U.S. government. Basically what we've observed is the minute Russia invaded Ukraine, it was, you know, it was obviously a catastrophe for Ukraine and a terrible thing. And I wish it hadn't happened, but it caused sort of an instant sort of re, I don't know, like a depolarization of this issue, certainly in the U.S. and in the valley where all of a sudden people who historically had been very averse to tech involvement in defense, all of a sudden became very in favor of it. And, you know, the most vivid example, there was this company, Andrew All, that was a very politically controversial company, you know, our new defense contractor, you know, building all these automated defense systems. It was a very controversial company in the valley, basically right up to the day, Russian vated Ukraine, and ever since everybody loves it, you know, which the founder of that company points out, you know, there's some, you know, some irony to that, because the company's doing the same things. But, you know, I think the Russian vated Ukraine really highlighted for a lot of people, including a lot of people on the political left in the U.S. that actually national security really matters. And there are actually bad people in the world, and there are, you know, going to be invasions, and there are going to be bad things that happen. And the Western democracies need to be able to respond and need to be able to be state of the art, being able to cope with these situations.

因此，你知道，在硅谷内部存在相当多的分歧，我认为是关于硅谷与美国政府之间的正确角色。基本上，我们观察到俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的那一刻，显然是乌克兰的灾难和可怕的事情。我希望它没有发生，但这引起了这个问题的一种瞬间重新，我不知道，就像是这个议题在美国和硅谷之间的去极化，所有历史上对技术参与国防非常不情愿的人突然就变得非常赞成。最生动的例子是，有一家公司安德鲁奥尔，这是一家非常有争议的政治公司，我们新的国防承包商，建造所有这些自动防御系统。在硅谷，这是一家非常有争议的公司，基本上一直到俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的那天，自那时以来，每个人都喜欢它。这家公司的创始人指出，这有一些讽刺意味，因为公司在做同样的事情。但是，我认为俄罗斯入侵乌克兰真的让很多人，包括美国政治左派，意识到国家安全真的很重要。世界上确实有坏人，确实会发生入侵，确实会发生糟糕的事情。西方民主国家需要有能力做出回应，并且需要能够处于最先进的状态，能够应对这些情况。

And then of course, you know, the attack in Israel, you know, is a sort of a second, again, another terrible thing, but a second kind of factor that has caused people to say, okay, we need to make sure that Western democracy is going to be able to respond. And so, you know, the fundamental challenge of the country is that the international democracies are actually armed up. Yeah, yeah. Mark, finishing up on a completely different tack here. In one minute, how can we become better investors? Because that's the theme of the conference. Yeah, so I think the question always, I think the question from sort of large institutional investing, the question is, you know, deployment of large amounts of capital, there just are not that many places in the world to get growth. And so, I think the question is, what are the best ways to talk to deals with is, you know, most of the capital that they invest, you know, just kind of by definition can't go into high growth sectors, just because there aren't that many high growth sectors. They're actually, you know, quite hard to find. And so there are basically a small number of places in the world that have growth. There are a small number of people who are starting the kinds of companies and trying to build the kinds of industries that are going to be able to deliver growth. And so, you know, you know, and generally speaking, you know, Western investors are quite supportive of this. And so, you know, I think that your capital is quite well funded, but, you know, I think focusing in on that specifically the places and the people who are going to be able to generate growth. And then quite frankly, the other thing is, you know, it's very helpful when these investors also weigh in more broadly than just with money and also weigh in with their influence and, you know, with their level of authority and their level of persuasive capability and so forth in their societies. You know, the growth is something that we should be aspiring for and that is actually good, not just from an investment standpoint, but from a societal standpoint. Fantastic. Well, a big thanks for sharing your thoughts with us and, you know, all the best of luck going forward. Great. Thank you very much. It's great to hear what you guys are.

然后当然，你知道，在以色列的攻击，你知道，又是一种可怕的事情，但是却导致人们说，好吧，我们需要确保西方民主能够做出回应。因此，你知道，这个国家面临的根本挑战是，国际民主实际上正在武装起来。是的，是的。马克，在这里完全换一种方式来总结。在一分钟内，我们如何成为更好的投资者？因为这是会议的主题。是的，我认为大型机构投资的问题总是，资本的大量部署，世界上并没有那么多地方可以获得增长。因此，我认为要谈论的重要话题是，大部分他们投资的资本，从定义上来说无法进入高增长行业，只因为高增长行业并不那么多。它们实际上相当难以找到。因此，世界上只有少数几个地方有增长。只有少数几个人正在创办各种公司，并试图建立各种行业，以能够提供增长。因此，你知道，通常来说，西方投资者对此非常支持。因此，我认为你的资本融通度相当丰厚，但是，我认为应该专注于那些特定的地方和人们，他们将能够实现增长。然后坦率地说，另一件事是，当这些投资者不仅仅投入资金，而且还以广泛的影响力、权威水平和说服能力等方面介入时，这对他们的投资是非常有帮助的在社会层面上，增长是我们应该追求的，并且从投资角度而言确实是好事。太棒了。非常感谢你与我们分享你的想法，并前程似锦。非常感谢。很高兴听到你们的看法。