Hello my friends, today is March 30th. Happy Easter weekend, this is Markets Weekly. So this week was a pretty quiet weekend markets. We only had four trading sessions, but the S&P 500 didn't manage to make a new all-time high. From my perspective, though, it looks like the NASDAQ is running out of momentum, so it would not surprise me if we just kind of, you know, consolidated here for a little bit and and gave other people the chance to join the party. So today I want to talk about three things. First, I want to talk about the tremendous challenge facing Japanese policymakers because it looks like they're about to lose control of the Japanese yen.
Secondly, I want to talk a little bit about this new research from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco that sheds interesting light on the surge in early retirements during the pandemic. And lastly, I want to discuss hyperinflation during Revolutionary France and what we could learn from it. Okay, starting with the yen. Now, just to level set a little bit, over the past few years, the Japanese yen has depreciated significantly against all major currencies. And the reason for the depuriation is obvious. Now, over the past few years, all the major central banks were raising rates aggressively to try to come back to inflation while Japan kept interest rates negative and only recently hiked them to zero.
So this huge interest rate differential drove a rapid depreciation of the Japanese yen. You can think of it as maybe you're a Japanese investor. You're seeing that you're getting zero interest rates at home. You could get 5% in the US, so you sell yen by dollar assets. Or you could be a foreign speculator and funding your investments in yen. In any case, the Japanese USC JPI exchange rate right now is bumping up against 151 which over the past few years has seemed to be a soft ceiling.
Now, when you're in this situation as a policymaker, you have three options. First, you can do verbal intervention and try to talk the speculators down. Secondly, you can actually intervene. So actively sell foreign currency and buy your domestic currency. Or three, you could adjust the Santa Montre policy and make it less attractive for speculators to sell your currency. Now, over the past week, we've seen Japan come out and do some serious verbal intervention.
Their top currency official goes is going around saying that he thinks that the depreciation in the yen is not driven by fundamentals, but in speculation, he doesn't like it. He wants it to stop. Now, over the past few years, I think they were happy with the depreciation in the yen because it helped them get inflation up by increasing imported costs. And of course, it was also good for exporters, but it looks like depreciation has gone too far for them. And so they're trying to talk it down. Now, I'm not sure what fundamentals the policymakers looking at, but if you look at say, even real interest rate different shows, it does seem to justify a weaker yen. But in any case, it doesn't seem to be working because it looks like USD JPY is still hovering around that 150 soft ceiling.
Now, the second thing a policy maker could do is to actually intervene. So they would have to go use their foreign reserves, sell them and buy back their domestic currency. So Japan is a country with a major current account surplus. So they've accumulated tremendous amounts of foreign reserves. According to official filings, Japan has about $1.1 trillion in foreign reserves. Not all of it is going to be in dollars. As a major trading nation, I'm sure they have reserves in euro and R&B and other currencies as well. But I'm guessing, let's say the bulk of it is. So maybe they have say $700 billion of that is in US dollars. So they definitely have the firepower to intervene if they want. But here's the problem with that.
Now, they actually already intervened in late 2022 when USD JPY was pushing against 150. And their intervention led to the yen to strengthen significantly. But now we're back here at 150. So it looks like the dips in USD JPY just get shallower and shallower. The market, it doesn't seem to be as effective and the market seems to be less scared. What they would do if they were to intervene is they would probably burn, say, tens of billions of dollars and they would buy time. And maybe, in a few months, maybe the US get some soft data, market prices in, more fed cuts, and maybe the yen get some reprive. But then again, maybe that doesn't happen. So it's not super clear if that's the best course of action. The last thing a policy market could do is they could adjust the sense of monetary policy. So in this case, that would be to hike interest rates, let's say 250 basis points, or even 100, and narrow the interest rate differential from their side.
Now, this would go some ways towards making it less attractive to short the yen. But again, even if you hike it by 50 basis points, I don't know, the interest rate derivative is still quite wide. And also, Japan has been struggling with disinflation for some time. I'm not sure they want to have such an aggressive hiking cycle. So that seems very unlikely to me. Their best bet is probably just to intervene and hope for the best. But if they don't do that, though, if the market breaks through this soft ceiling of say 150, 151, you could easily have momentum build and have some surges to the upside. So they are, I think they are in a kind of a tricky position now. And it's going to have to get resolved really soon. So they're going to have to put up or shut up.
Okay, the second thing I want to talk about is this brand new research from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. That shed some interesting light on the surge in early retirements we saw during the pandemic. So to level set a little bit during the pandemic, of course, everything shut down. Everyone stayed at home, labor force participation dropped significantly across all age cohorts. But as the economy opened up again, a lot of people went back to work. Basically, everyone went back to work, except those age 55 and above labor force participation for those age 55 and above dropped during the pandemic and just never recovered. Now, this led to an basically shortage of labor compared to pre-pandemic estimates. The labor force was smaller by 2 million people. And that shortage of labor was part of the reason behind the labor scarcity and surging wages.
Now, this new data from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco further breaks down that cohort of 55 plus and has an interesting finding. That is, the only thing that stood out was that there was a serious break in that there's a structural shift in behavior for those age 55 and above without college degrees. So the unexpected surge in early retirements really just comes down to this cohort of people age 55 and above without college degrees. And now that's kind of a puzzle here. It could be of health concerns. It could be maybe they, you know, just had enough savings, had enough wealth. It's not super clear. And I think that's more of a sociology question.
But I also think that it relates to other issues. So if you are someone who's 55 and above without a college degree, you're probably in the trades. Maybe you are a truck driver, maybe you are a plumber, something like that. And that goes along when explaining all the anecdotal reports we've been hearing around that time where it was very difficult to find someone to come and, you know, basically do more manual labor. It seems like that was founded upon this huge surge in early retirements. Now, as a corollary to that, it seems like a part of the reason why things seem to have gotten better could be because we have such a huge surge in low skilled immigrants over the past year. Now, the CBO estimates that immigration last year was about 3.3 million, most of it illegal. Now, we do have some interesting studies on the skills competition of these people. And, you know, as we hear that they're not really sending their best, they're not college grads. It seems like more like middle school in Spanish. So, but these guys are probably able to do a lot of the labor intensive jobs that we seem to need to be done.
And so that might go long ways in explaining, I guess, the disinflationary trend we've seen in wages, which continue to be high, but are no longer accelerating and seem to be gradually decelerating. One other thing that I'll note is that, so if you have a surge in the supply of labor to try to tem down on labor inflation, that's great when you have a lot of demand. But ultimately, one day, when demand falters, and you continue to increase the supply of labor and Sid, probably do on Twitter, made this good point, then you'll just have higher unemployment rates, which, of course, would argue from the Fed's perspective for easier monetary policy. So there's a lot of things happening in demographics right now that might be making these models that people usually rely on to be less reliable.
The last thing I want to talk about is hyperinflation in revolutionary France. Now, this topic came to me by looking at a post by copy that featured writings by Eric. Now, Eric, I had heard him recently on the Market Huddle podcast. He had managed African portfolio for a number of years, and he was discussing his experience with hyperinflation in Zimbabwe. But he also then posted this article about hyperinflation in the meantime of revolutionary France. So let's say 1780, 1790s. I thought this was fascinating. So I went and dug a little bit deeper, looking at some research by Professor Andrew White of Cornell University written in 1912, and also some recent podcasts on the subject on macro musings, where you had two scholars looking at this from a monetary policy perspective. I thought it was so interesting that I just had to talk about it.
So the hyperinflation in revolutionary France was ultimately a fiscal problem. At that time, France was highly indebted, so much indebted that about 15 of government revenues were to pay interest. So obviously, that was unsustainable. So what do the policymakers decide to do? Well, they decided to create a new currency called the Asignan, which was which they would use to pay off their debts. Now, of course, you know, they have a, they're not just going to create money out of thin air. So they wanted to make people have confidence in their new currency and decided to back it by real estate. So back then you had different power centers in France, you got our stocker see, you know, you have the crown, you have the clergy and the clergy was just not as powerful. And so everyone decided to confiscate their lands. And they were the largest landholders in France, just confiscate their lands and issue Asignans against them.
The way this would work is that they would pay off their debts with this newly issued currency. And then they could sell the clergy's land, but only accept payments in either gold or Asignans. So this link between, say real estate and gold and Asignans was able to give confidence in the value of this newly printed currency. Now, first they printed $400 million worth of it. And then a few months later, the government ran into trouble remembered what a great idea it was to print Asignans and they printed $800 million. And later on, they printed more, but they're realizing that this was getting out of hand and they would promise everyone, no, this is the last time we'll do this. We won't do this anymore. And but they would promise that and, you know, a few months later, they would print more again. When all the senate done by 1797, they would have printed $45 billion worth of Asignans. And as you can see, the price of Asignans against gold basically crumpled such that by the end of 1797, they were worth nothing and ultimately cancelled.
Now, I thought, okay, first of all, that's what happened. But let's talk a little bit about the economic and social political implications of this. So by and large, the first issuance of $400 million was widely what was very positive. Everyone was happy. All this money went through the system. People felt richer. People were buying. Economic growth was good. Everyone felt richer. But that seemed to be temporary. And soon after, that sudden surge would fade. And subsequent printings of Asignans didn't seem to have the same impact. In fact, later on, the more they printed, you didn't actually get that surge in economic growth anymore. All you got was inflation. And that had some interesting qualities to it.
Now, when prices began to rise, a lot of the businesses and so forth, they felt unsure about what was going on in the economy. So they began to have less investment. They began to be more cautious. And that also meant that there was less demand for labor. And so ultimately, what you ended up was some kind of economic stagnation with rising prices. And the people at the time, they were complaining that everything was expensive. They couldn't buy anything. There wasn't enough money. And so they would complain to the government who in turn would respond by just printing more money, which never seemed to solve the problem.
Now, at that time, I think it's worth noting that, all the talking heads, all the luminaries, all the newspapers would go around telling people that, you know, actually, inflation is a good thing. It's good for business. Or when people were unhappy about inflation, they would tell them that, you know, this is because you have all these people from England who are counterfeiting the currency, those bad foreigners, which actually did actually happen. But they would also point to things like, you know, these greedy, rich people, bad government, and so forth. But they would never actually talk about the root cause, which was they were just issuing too much currency.
And as times became tough, the government would roll out all sorts of measures to try to contain this. They would go towards traditional measures, say price controls, which is, of course, whatever government does in response to inflation, that would try to control, you know, let's say basic necessities cannot be exceed this price. If you are a merchant, you can only make this much profit. Or if you were shipping stuff, you could only have this much charge this much per mile and so forth. And these price controls really didn't seem to make things better. In fact, because the price control levels were set so far below market, many merchants simply couldn't make a profit and just, you know, just stop doing business.
Now, throughout through this period, what I found was most interesting was that basically the price of everything from real estate to basic necessities and socks all crashed up. Everything except the price of labor. Because as business stagnated, there was just less demand for labor, basic supply and demand, you know, that kit wages low, such that wages basically were unchanged during the period, even as the price of everything soared. And a lot of the working class ended up having to live on government rations.
So at the end of the day, at the end of the period, you know, no one, everyone suffered, the labor suffered, the merchant class suffered, and even the rich suffered as well. The only people who really did well during this period were the speculators. Now the speculators, those who are a bit more savvy, understood what was happening, and they began to buy all sorts of real assets, stocks or real estate and so forth. And they made out like bandits. And in this time period, since the only people who did well were the speculators, everyone took to speculating because of that was how you wouldn't make your fortune.
People stopped believing and working hard, stopped believing in thrift, they just went out and speculated because of that was how you would could make it. Ultimately, of course, this all became unsustainable, crash down, and I ultimately was fixed when, you know, people lost confidence in the government and Napoleon took over. Now, I say this not because I think hyperinflation or anything like that is going to happen here.
But I think it's interesting to note that when you have significant, let's see, mismanaged fiscal policy, at the end of the day, you will get inflation, you will get inflation in asset prices. And at the end of the day, I think it's the ordinary people who suffer the most unless they are aware of what's happening and then they could protect themselves. And we are early in this process, but it's just something to keep in mind. This is something that happens over and over again in history.
All right, that's all I prepared for today. Thanks so much for tuning in. If you're interested in my thoughts, check my blog out at FedGuy.com, where I post weekly commentary. And of course, check out my courses at Central Banking 101. If you want to learn more about financial markets, talk to you all soon.