Good afternoon, everyone. Thanks so much for coming. It's awesome to see 10 to 50 more than packed for such a wonderful reason. A tremendous honor to have Dr. Morris Chang back with us at MIT today. Dr. Chang, not only being an MIT alum. That's even before the formal introduction. Not only the MIT alum, but in my opinion, one of the most important innovators and industry leaders of the past 50 years, if not more.
Dr. Chang, speech today is part of our manufacturing and MIT distinguished speaker series. This event hosted in partnership with the School of Engineering and Dean Anantha Chandra Kossen. And now to make the formal introduction, please welcome Professor Cindy Barnhart, Provost of MIT. Thank you, John.
I'd like to welcome you all to MIT's manufacturing at MIT distinguished speaker series. Today's lecture by Morris Chang promises to be illuminating and inspiring. Welcome back to MIT Morris. We're honored to have you here. This is the fifth event in manufacturing at MIT's speaker series, which has included U.S. undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, Haidishu, Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger, Pennsylvania governor, Tom Wolf, and Ford of CEO Jim Lico.
I'd like to start by talking about Morris's deep ties to MIT. And then I will talk about his role as founder, informer chairman, and CEO of Taiwan semiconductor manufacturing company, also known as TSMC, the largest chip manufacturer in the world. Morris earned bachelor's and master's degrees from MIT, both in mechanical engineering, after transferring from Harvard. We're very proud of that move. After leaving MIT, a moment that he said was pivotal, he went on to pursue a career in industry and earned a PhD in electrical engineering from Stanford University.
Morris has called his time at MIT the most important part of his formal education and has said that it had a profound impact on his life. As with many success stories, it may have been failure that ultimately drove Morris's future triumphs. In a recent interview with the New York Times, Morris said, the greatest stroke of luck in my life was failing to be admitted to MIT's PhD program. It was then that he decided to try his luck in industry.
His first job out of MIT was at Sylvania, and later, Morris moved to Texas Instruments where he stayed for 25 years, eventually assuming the role of the chief executive in charge of the company's worldwide semiconductor business. While at Texas Instruments, he foresaw Asia's potential to excel at advanced manufacturing. So he founded TSMC in 1987, just as the industry was looking to outsource its manufacturing to Asia.
TSMC quickly became one of the most profitable chip makers, and today is the largest manufacturer of the world's most advanced chips and serves some of the largest global companies. Today, TSMC is a $500 billion business that produces chips for cars and iPhones and supercomputers. Chances are right now, you have TSMC technology in your backpack or your pocket or your hands.
In founding TSMC, he transformed the semiconductor industry by pursuing a simple yet revolutionary concept to focus purely on manufacturing. Starting from the competitors and creating its foundry-like platform and its heavy investments in R&D, TSMC became a destination for the industry, and Morris became a titan of semiconductors. Morris, you've been a part of the semiconductor industry since the very beginning, and it's incredible to see you still at the center of it today.
And fortunately for MIT, you're also central to our community. Morris became a member of the MIT Corporation in 1999, and today serves as a life member emeritus. In 2016, MIT reopened the doors of Building E52 after a renovation funded by a generous gift from Morris and his wife Sophie. The building, which houses MIT's Department of Economics and the Sloan School, is now known as the Morris and Sophie Chang Building, where future leaders come together to learn and to shape the future.
MIT researchers have greatly benefited from access to advanced silicon fabrication technology through the TSMC University Shuttle Program, and TSMC has been active in collaborating with MIT and new devices memory and AI systems. For MIT, Morris is an extraordinary example of the lasting impact of our alumni, the lasting impact our alumni have on the legacy of innovation at the Institute.
Today, Morris will discuss his path in building TSMC, how the company continues to produce chips on the cutting edge of technology, his assessment of the US chips industry and TSMC's investments in new fabrication facilities in Arizona. He's a pioneer who envisions the future and gets right to work making transformative, industrial change a reality. We're inspired by your example and eager to learn from your experiences. So without further delay, I'll turn this program over to you, Morris. Thank you again for being here with us today.
Thank you, Cindy, for introducing me. And thank you, Suzanne and John, for inviting me to give a talk here. Ladies and gentlemen, this is a privilege and a pleasure to be back at MIT to give this talk. And I face the largest gathering of faculty that I ever faced at lunch today. And I was telling them that memories simply fell into the back at me this morning after I arrived here. I lived in several dormitories in the early 50s. I was here. I was at MIT between 1950 and 1955. And I lived in several dormitories, including the graduate house, Baker house, and a few other whose names I don't even recall now. And a lot of distinguished professors.
And at lunch, one of the professors asked me whether there was anything at TSMC, the company that I started, whether TSMC, I had anything that I wished to do over again. And I said no. Nobody asked me whether at MIT there was anything I wanted to do over again. If anybody did ask me that I would have said yes, I wanted to study harder. And Cindy, I think just pointed out that I failed the PhD horrifying exam price, which was the maximum that they allowed me to fail, of course. And I think that in retrospect, later in life, I said that was the luckiest thing that ever happened to me because I changed myself, changed the course of my life after I failed the exam. But at the time, I really didn't think it was lucky at all.
Anyway, let me start this talk by telling you the history of the topic. This is the final version. Nothing is alive in chips manufacturing from Texas to Taiwan. But actually, it has gone through several changes. My first version was alive in chips manufacturing from Texas to Taiwan. Then my second version was alive in chips manufacturing from Texas to Taiwan via Japan. I'll cover that story a little later. And then the final version is what you see here. But I really regret the addition of lessons. I mean, lessons, too many lessons. We can do with fewer lessons, frankly, at least I can do with fewer lessons. Well, anyway, but I had already sent the topic to Suzanne today to share. Let me start. I need to first be a lawyer. Frank, that I had hip joints surgery just two and a half years ago. And I never recovered completely from it. If anybody, if your doctor tells you that you can recover from a hip joint surgery, well, he may be right if you're young. But if you're a 90-year-old like I was for a head surgery, he was lying. I want to first talk a little bit about the pervasiveness of chips. And then some highlights in the history of chips. And then I want to talk about the foundry business model. And then Taiwan's advantage is in chips manufacturing and then some lessons.
Pervasiveness of chips, I think we all know that. I should say that when I first went to Taiwan to start TSMC 38 years ago, it was 1985. And chips weren't nearly so pervasive as they are now. So I was told to give a few speeches to the Taiwan business circles and to the public sometimes. So I started to talk about semiconductors. I said, well, I said if you, there was no cell phone at that time. There were computers, but usually the computers were owned by companies, big businesses, and not by people, not by individuals. So I said, semiconductors, if you have a watch, if you have a digital watch, then you are not carrying a semiconductor with you. Well, very few people even had digital watches. So anyway, but the situation has completely changed in the last 40 years. And the semiconductors are very pervasive now. And in the National Defense, you know, drones, missile guidance and so on, industry in commerce, computers, daily life, smartphones, and cars, even washing machines. In the developed world of approximately two and a half billion people, nearly every person uses chips, chips products in their day-to-day life.
Highlights in the history of chips. Well, just if you point a common knowledge, I guess, the conductivity of semiconductor lies between conductors such as metals and insulators, such as wood, hence the term semiconductors. Conductors of certain properties, which remains largely unexplored until 1947. Well, actually, you know, the word semiconductors, which I think virtually everybody understands now, but only when I first arrived in the United States in 1949, I bet you that only the scientists, probably the physicists and some chemists knew what a semiconductor was. I mean, that word was largely unknown until 1947.
What the seven, sharply, body, and pertain, invented the transistor, which was based on semiconductors. And they invented it in Bell Labs, and that was worth a Nobel Prize. AT&T then began the experimental fabrication of Genesis. Not anybody else, just AT&T for five years. In 1952, AT&T decided they were quite unselfish. And, you know, they decided that the transistor was too important to keep it to AT&T. So the license changes the technology to various companies. Those companies included the big ones, well-known ones, well-known at that time, like RCHE, IBM, and also unknown ones, like Texas Instruments. Texas Instruments was very small and unknown at that time in 1952. And various companies began to produce, and those companies that got the license began to produce transistors.
All right, now jumping ahead, in 1958, Jack Kilby, he joined Texas Instruments in 1958. With me, we joined together. Well, not one of the same day, but only the same man, in the same man. May of 1958. In 1958, well, he invented the Indiegler circuit a few months after he joined Texas Instruments. And Robert Neuss, at Fairchild, the two separately, in a man's Indiegler circuit, almost the same time. And that was another Nobel Prize, the two of them. But actually, only Kilby got in the Nobel Prize, because by the time Kilby got in the Nobel Prize, Bob Noisher died. I think it was 2000, and Bob Noisher died. Bob Nois died in around 1990, I believe. And Kilby was the only one that got the Nobel Prize because of Indiegler circuit. And Kilby did say in his acceptance speech that if Bob Nois were still alive, he would have shared the Nobel Prize with him.
Now, fast forward to 1965, got a more prediction that, got a more, who was a close colleague of Bob Nois. He predicted that the number of geniuses in Indiegler circuit doubles every 1.5 to 2 years. The prediction was later known as Moore's Law, and remained valid for 50 years. And this was almost a miracle that something like this could be valid for 50 years. And Nobel Prizes are not given to engineers. But it was worth an IEEE Medal of Honor, which is often considered the equivalent of Nobel Prize for electrical engineers. IEEE, of course, stands for Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
The exponential increase of transistor on chip, and the corresponding decrease of cost of transistor allowed an ever wider range of applications. Chips started to become pervasive. Well, I will just give you an example. I looked it up. An example of how Moore's Law would work for a baby's network. Let's say your son is born today, and you give him a dollar. One dollar. Well, if that dollar follows Moore's Law, it doubles every year and a half to 2 years. Your son will become a business near by the time he's 50 years old, a billionaire in 50 years. And, well, he's been 50 years old. He's still well able to enjoy his wealth, okay? But let's say he lives longer. And by the year he, by the time he reaches 70, he will have become a trillion there. That's how Moore's Law works. You can verify what I just said. It's Wikipedia. You can look up Wikipedia, or you can do the calculation yourself. It's a pretty simple calculation in logarithm.
Up to the 60s, almost all chips were bipolar. That's an important development. Up to the late 60s, almost all chips were bipolar. And US companies dominated the manufacturing of bipolar chips. And European Japanese companies played less than those, but they also made bipolar chips. But the US companies dominated. Now, the important development was MOS. MOS was developed in the late 60s. And it enabled smaller transistors than bipolar technology did. Moore's Law would not live for very long if it weren't for MOS, because when Moore predicted his Moore's Law, MOS had not been developed yet.
It was just bipolar. And bipolar, the density of transistors in bipolar was limited. And it was MOS that allowed Moore's Law to be valid for 50 years. And MOS was developed in the late 60s, after Moore's Law. So, in a sense, Gordon was a little lucky, you know. And it was smaller transistors than bipolar. And thus, Moore transistors per chip. Roughly, the maximum number of transistors on bipolar chip, say one square centimeter.
That's a fairly typical chip size, one square centimeter. The maximum on bipolar was about a thousand, ten to the third. I know that, because I tried it. I tried to put 10,000 transistors on a chip by bipolar and it failed. And actually, Intel, at the same time, tried it. I'm not sure they failed too, you know. That's why they, when the MOS, we all, when the MOS dropped. But the maximum number of transistors on MOS chip started at ten to the third in 1970. The same time that we found out bipolar was limited to ten to the third. MOS started at ten to the third in 1970 and has now increased to ten to the tenth.
That's where the trillionaire and the billionaire stuff, you know, that I just told you came about, you know, in 2023. In this day, now, right now, the most dense chips that TSMB makes, TSMB makes, has almost 20 billion transistors in all one chip, 20 billion. That's, that's, that's two times ten to the tenth. MOS displays bipolar in the 70s and 80s. And as chips became more complex, technologies began to move from chip manufacturing to chip architecture and design. And that's an important development too, very important, you know.
The first generation semiconductor people were mainly physicists and chemists, chemists and electrical engineers who worked on processing, how to make transistors or integrations. The later generation, the second generation, I mean, they don't, they don't work on how to make integrations anymore. They work on how to design, how to architecture, integrate that. So the later generation semiconductor people, I'm the first generation. I mean, I mean, when started in the semiconductor industry, you know, design's been simple. They only, it's thousand transistors on a chip, how complicated it can get, you know, it's thousand transistors. So, I, I didn't want to do simple things like that.
I worked on how to make them, how to make them more complex. I'll make them all all right. Then somebody had to design the architect, the complex circuits. And that's the second generation. That's, that's when, you know, the microprocessor, the Intel people that invented the microprocessor came along. That's when, you know, all the Qualcomm people and Qualcomm, you know, I mean, they are no longer a part of people. They are computer scientists. And they, they think, they think at home. They don't have to work in the factory. The first generation like me had to work in the factory. These people, you know, sure, they come to the office sometimes. But, but they, well, they can't. Anyway, they can mainly, you know, work at home.
I almost skipped over my contributions. As chips, well, I was on, on that, on the second pair with chips became more complex. Technologists began so on. I talked, talked about that already. In the 70s, 80s, Japanese companies mounted a charge for leadership in chip manufacturing. A fizzled in the early 90s. Why did fizzled? Various reasons were given. But one of the most important reasons, I think, was that, was the PASA accord. PASA accord. This was reached in 1985. The same year that I went to Taiwan. There's no connection between the two, but it was just happening at the same time. The other accord made the Japanese yen up raise. The exchange rate was almost doubled in two and a half years. 1985, you look up the record. 1985, the Japanese yen, $20. I think, $250 or something like that. $250 yen to $3,000. Two and a half years later, it was $100 something to $1,000. That's, the Japanese had to fold up with an exchange rate twice. There were other reasons. But anyway, the Japanese onslaught fizzled in the early 90s, actually in the late 80s and in the early 90s.
Now, in 1987, Morris Chan founded Taiwan Seminary Family Broadcasting Company based on an innovative business model. It dedicated a semiconductor boundary. Again, this was not worth a Nobel Prize, but it was worth an IEEE Medal of Honor. Thank you. Since the 90s, for three decades now, Taiwan and South Korea have taken on an increasing role in chip manufacturing, while the U.S. retains a dominant role in chip architecture and design. And in some other things like equipment, manufacturing equipment for chips, U.S. has a dominant role. Of course, that role is shared by the Japanese equipment manufacturers and lately by the Dutch Holland manufacturers. But still, the U.S. has a very important role in other aspects than just chip design and architecture. In chip design and architecture, the U.S. role is more than dominant. It's almost unquestionably dominant. All right.
Now, I mean, I fool around with the stegwim for so long. I eventually tried of it. I decided to just already explain it to you. If you will, if you will, just delete the red line for a moment. Delete in your mind. Just don't look at the red line. Don't see the red line. So what you have left now is just the back line. That was the old business model of semiconductor manufacturing. The same company will do R&D on design. And most of them will do their own design tools. But of course, companies like Cadence and Synops, well, I'm looking at the red line. Don't forget about it. Okay. And these are so-called IDM integrated device manufacturer. They're integrated because they do everything. All the back boxes. After designing the IC, they do the way for fabrication. They do the packaging and testing. And then they sell them. The only thing that TSMC did was to impose the red line. And just look at the red line enclosure. Wave of fabrication, research on the wave of packaging, and advanced packaging. And TSMC took that. Of course, later on, people would start to say, well, that's the heart. That's the heart of our IDM business. Well, at the time, it wasn't really considered to be the heart. But after TSMC took it and succeeded with that business model, well, people began to be a little ambious about it. Anyway, that's what the Foundry business is just the red enclosure.
Now, we did it in Taiwan. What were so special about Taiwan? Taiwan's advantage in chip manufacturing. Terrence, substantial supply of high quality in dedicated. I underlined technicians under all of them because they were all very important. Not just engineers. Not just engineers, but technicians, operators. And actually, day after tomorrow, I'm going to have a dialogue on the subject of education in the Asia society. And I'm going to say that when we talk about education, we usually emphasize education of the elite. Like the kind of education the MIT gives. MIT students get. That's the education of the elite. But why is TSMC successful in Taiwan? Because TSMC also gets good, well-trained technicians and even well-trained operators from a lot of trade schools in Taiwan. Trade schools. There are 10,000 miles away from schools like MIT or Harvard. There are students only aspire to make a good living as technicians. And even operators. Well, we don't really. Taiwan doesn't really have schools for operators, but operators, but they're willing operators. I mean, they don't turn over. They don't leave their job as soon as something better, something that pays more. They're almost like Japan.
I'm not going to have time to talk about the life in chips manufacturing from Texas to Taiwan. I'm not going to have time to talk about the Vietnam part. But in Japan, you know, when I was running Texas Instruments, Japan plants plants, the operators, first of all, we had our major plants, we had our huge dollars. And when I walked into the factory, all the operators started looking at me, a new visitor. Curious. But when I walked into a Japanese plant, no operator ever looked at me. And then I asked, what is the hotel where I asked the manager? What is the hotel where they are? These are young women, the operators. They don't leave unless they get married. A turnover rate is like 2% a year, whereas in Texas, it was like, you know, 15% when there was a recession. A recession meant fewer jobs available. And 25% when the times were good, you know, I mean, they all leave when there's a better paying job available somewhere else. Well, anyway, and that's deadly because it takes about three months, at least, to train and operate. And we have a 25% turnover rate. You can't do it. You can't do any manufacturing.
Can't do any manufacturing. And I still remember, you know, Jack Kilby, I was talking about, Jack Kilby and I joining Texas Instruments almost at the same time. I just, I can't remember, I mean, he, after he invented the, the Indigo Circuit, they told him to run an Indigo Circuit department. All right, so when he was doing that, and I was running a transistor department, and we were too walking towards the cafeteria to have our lunch. And then a bunch of ladies operators, you know, just Russia had because, you know, only 30 minutes was allowed for lunch at Texas Instruments. A bunch of lady operators, Russia had overtook us. And Jack Kilby said to me, well, I mean, these operators, do you realize Morris, the, some of them have never made a single good Indigo Circuit in her life? Well, because, you know, the turnover is so rapid and there's not enough training. Well, anyway.
All right. I covered the low turnover rate and geographical concentration. You know, Taiwan is a relatively small island, but they are, we do have major facilities, factories in three cities in Taiwan. And however, they are all connected, all three cities are connected by fast trains, high speed trains. And at any time, including now, there will be a thousand or more engineers, not operators or technicians. A thousand or more engineers assigned to another city, another city other than his home city. They, we provide dormitories, TSMC provides dormitories. So they live in their dormitories. They go there from their home with the, on the rubber train. And they go there Monday morning and they live in the dormitories Monday night, Tuesday night, Wednesday night, Thursday night. And then Friday afternoon, they go home. At any time, they are over a thousand engineers doing that. Well, I mean, it's not fun life, really, but, but it's, it's effective for the company. And, and they are willing to do it. So, your record, your web ago country, and by the way, you know, learning curve theory. And I'm not going to explain you probably know it anyway, but it works. The learning curve experience curve theory. It works only when you have a common location and the common people. It doesn't work if you have a lot of branches or all the place. Learning is local. Learning curve works only locally. All right. All right.
Okay. Large community experience. Yeah. All right. Oh, yeah. And the chip ecosystem has been built over the last three decades. Off-stream, misstream, and important global semiconductor equipment manufacturers such as ASML, or primary teams, and amateurs, or having service centers, training centers, and labs in Taiwan, and downstream packaging and testing companies. So, I think, yeah, we, yeah. Lessons. Well, if they, if they are in the lessons, the susceptibility of a country to chip manufacturing seems, this is my opinion, seems to be related to the status of economic development of that country. Frankly, the advantages that Taiwan enjoys today, those that I spend some time to discuss today, they were enjoyed by the U.S. in the 50s and 60s, because I saw them. I witnessed them. In the 50s and 60s, I mean, I was first in Pennsylvania in Boston. Look, look, one 28. Yeah, woven, woven. And then in 1958, I moved to Texas. And so, what we see in Taiwan, we saw in the U.S. back then. 50s and 60s. And I think for Taiwan, they enjoy the advantage now, but I think they will lose advantage. They will lose it to another country. I don't know who may be in there. Maybe Vietnam, maybe Indonesia, in another 20 or 30 years. The economic model we have been following, free market, free trade, globalization, all those are really in the past now for chips anyway. No globalization, no free trade, no free market. Well, I shouldn't say it absolutely. I do some left, no, some free market, free trade over there. But a lot of it, a lot of free market, free trade over there is already gone. And that's the most efficient and resilient model. Deviations from it, industrial policy, subsidization, self-shoring will make the world chip industry less efficient and less resilient. Less resilient? How? Why? Well, you look at in the Cold War period, Soviet Union, they follow the planned economy model. They always have shortage of things that people really need. Because it's planned economy and nobody can plan the economy wisely. And the government cannot plan it. So the resilient way is the free economy, free market. The pervasiveness of chips due to value due to supply and trade efficiency, chip costs in Greece, its pervasiveness, will lessen. However, after having said all this, I need to agree with everybody, I think, that national security consortium, of course, overripe everything. And you cannot get away from that. I mean, heck, without national security, we lose everything. Everything that we value. So that's by all means avoid even a Cold War, if we can. Anyway, this is my message. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. APPLAUSE Go.