The Israel-Hamas War — and What It Means for the World | Ian Bremmer | TED
发布时间 2023-10-10 00:27:44 来源
Hello, everybody. Two days ago, on October 7, the Palestinian Sunni Islamic fundamentalist organisation Hamas attacked Israel, overrunning two military bases, occupying territory, killing hundreds of Israeli citizens and taking dozens more as hostages. It was the most significant breach of Israel's borders since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The attacks were clearly long and well planned, and they sent shockwaves of fear and panic through the region and the world.
大家好。两天前的10月7日，巴勒斯坦逊尼派伊斯兰基本组织哈马斯袭击了以色列，占领了两个军事基地，控制了领土，杀害了数百名以色列公民，并将数十人作为人质。这是自1973年赎罪日战争以来对以色列边境最重大的一次突破。这些袭击显然经过了长时间的精心计划，它们在该地区和全世界引发了恐惧和恐慌的冲击波。
Obviously, it's two days later, it is way too soon to understand all of the ramifications of these attacks, but we can try to understand how we got here and the implications of this awful moment. So we asked our community to share their questions and to answer them, I am joined by Ian Bremmer, President and Founder of Political Risk Research and Consulting firm Eurasia Group.
显然，时至今日已经过去两天，要完全理解这些袭击事件的所有影响还为时过早，但我们可以试图了解我们是如何到达这里以及这个可怕时刻的含义。因此，我们请求我们的社群分享他们的问题并回答这些问题。我邀请政治风险研究和咨询公司"亚欧集团"的总裁兼创始人伊恩·布雷默与我们一同参与。
Hi, Ian. Hi, Ian. Great to be with you. All right, so let's get right to it. We've had a number of our community who really want you to explain the very simple question of how we got here. So can you share the historical context for this moment and if you'd like, give us a bit of a Gaza 101?
嗨，伊恩。嗨，伊恩。很高兴能和你在一起。好的，让我们直入主题吧。我们社区中有很多人都非常想让你解释一个非常简单的问题，就是我们是如何到达现在这个地步的。所以你能分享一下这一时刻的历史背景吗？如果可以的话，给我们讲一点加沙基础知识吧。
Well, I mean, Gaza, we've got a population, a Palestinian population of just over 2 million, 0.2 million, exceedingly poor, and without sovereignty, without statehood, and a part of the Palestinian occupied territories, also the West Bank, more people, 3.5 million, the West Bank run not very well by the Palestinian Authority, which recognizes Israel's right to exist. Gaza run really badly with very little resources run by Hamas, which does not recognize Israel's right to exist.
嗯，我的意思是，加沙，我们有一个人口，巴勒斯坦人口只有略超过200万，其中20万贫苦至极，没有主权，没有国家地位，并且是巴勒斯坦被占领领土的一部分，也包括约350万人口的约旦河西岸，由不太有效地管理以承认以色列的存在权。加沙受哈马斯管理非常糟糕，资源极度匮乏，哈马斯不承认以色列的存在权。
Now, we've been talking about a two-state solution for a very long time for the idea that the only way you end up with stability between the Israelis and the Palestinians is if the Palestinians have some ability to govern themselves, have some control over their economic trajectory, over their foreign policy, over their borders. That is not where we stand right now. And indeed, the idea of a two-state solution has kind of lost the collective interest, imagination, traction for two reasons.
现在，我们讨论了很长时间关于两国解决方案的想法。这个想法是为了实现以色列和巴勒斯坦之间的稳定，巴勒斯坦人需要有一定的自我治理能力，对自己的经济发展轨迹、外交政策和边境有一定的控制权。但目前我们还没有达到这种情况。同时，由于两个原因，两国解决方案的想法似乎已经失去了集体的兴趣、想象力和支持。
First, because the Middle East has moved on. A bunch of countries around the region have found that they are interested in developing direct relations, some formal, some informal, with Israel, and that they're willing to do that irrespective of resolving the Palestinian question, the Palestinian problem. And we've seen that with the Abraham Accords under the Trump administration, where the UAE, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco all directly established diplomatic relations with Israel.
首先，中东地区已经前进了。该地区的一些国家发现，他们有兴趣与以色列建立直接关系，无论是正式关系还是非正式关系，并且他们愿意这样做，而不考虑解决巴勒斯坦问题。这一点在特朗普政府领导下的亚伯拉罕协议中得以体现，阿联酋、巴林和摩洛哥都直接与以色列建立了外交关系。
If you go to Dubai or Abu Dhabi today, you will see Israeli tourists like you wouldn't imagine. And they're having a great time. And they're spending money, and they're taking in the sites. And they're very welcomed by the Emirates. Unimaginable, that was going to happen 10 or 20 years ago. In fact, Saudi Arabia was very close, not within weeks. It was an imminent, but certainly within months of signing a deal with Israel that would allow for them to open diplomatic relations. And there's already been a number of high-level diplomatic relations informally between Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
如果你今天去迪拜或阿布扎比，你会看到以前难以想象的以色列游客。他们玩得很开心，花钱，观光，在阿联酋备受欢迎。这在10年或20年前是不可想象的。事实上，沙特阿拉伯曾与以色列签署一项允许它们建立外交关系的协议即将发生，这已经非常接近，几乎只有几周的时间。在穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼和内塔尼亚胡总理之间，已经存在了一些高层非正式的外交联系。
So in other words, across the region, you had Israel, frankly, in the strongest geopolitical position that they've been in decades. They've been surrounded by enemies. Well, now they're increasingly surrounded by countries they can do business with. In fact, just a couple of weeks ago, there was an announcement of a deal where the United Arab Emirates was investing massively into solar power for Jordan, which would then be given to Israel in return for desalined water processed by Israel. Even five years ago, inconceivable a deal like that could happen.
换句话说，在该地区，实际上以色列处于几十年来最强大的地缘政治地位。他们一直被敌人包围。然而，现在他们越来越多地被可以开展业务的国家所包围。事实上，就在几周前，有一个消息公布，阿拉伯联合酋长国正在大规模投资于约旦的太阳能电力，然后以色列将以处理过的淡化水回报。即使在五年前，这样的协议都是难以想象的。
So the Israelis, technologically very sophisticated and advanced industrial economy, are only standing to make more money by doing business with all of these countries. What's been happening with the Palestinians? Nothing. The answer is nothing. They're not benefiting economically. And all of these deals for Israel have happened without any consequences, any contingencies for the Palestinians.
以色列是技术上非常先进和发达的工业经济体，通过与这些国家做生意，他们只会赚更多的钱。而巴勒斯坦人呢？什么都没有。答案是什么都没有。他们在经济上没有受益。而且，所有这些涉及以色列的交易都没有对巴勒斯坦人产生任何后果或附带条件。
And indeed, in Israel, you know, the headlines, even a lot of headlines, Israel's made a lot of news this year, but not because of the Palestinians. Israel has made news because of their own domestic constitutional crisis and effort by the Prime Minister Netanyahu and his right wing coalition to engage in judicial reform, a an Israeli judiciary, which is very independent, which has in the context of democracy is a very surprising amount of authority over making, but also interpretation of laws in Israel. What can and what it cannot be considered a reasonable law to be executed.
实际上，在以色列，你知道，即使许多头条新闻，以色列今年制造了许多新闻，但并非因为巴勒斯坦人。以色列因其国内的宪政危机和总理内塔尼亚胡及其右翼联盟为进行司法改革而成为新闻焦点，以色列的司法机构非常独立，在民主背景下具有令人惊讶的权力，不仅可以制定法律，还能够对其进行解释。什么可以以及不可以被认为是合理的法律来执行。
And for a country that doesn't have a constitution, not surprising, perhaps the judiciary is so powerful. And Netanyahu facing corruption charges and with a very weak right wing coalition relying on far right extremist right party as part of that coalition was pushing for these these reforms.
对于一个没有宪法的国家来说，司法的权力如此强大或许并不令人惊讶。尤其是在内塔尼亚背负着腐败指控，且执政联盟弱势、依赖极右翼极端主义政党的情况下，他推动这些改革。
Now, why am I talking about that? Because for the last six months, there have been unprecedented demonstrations across Israel, peaceful demonstrations, but bringing out the entire country because they were concerned about a constitutional crisis, kind of an irony for a country without a constitution.
现在，为什么我要谈论这个呢？因为在过去的六个月里，以色列爆发了前所未有的示威活动，示威活动是和平的，但却动员了整个国家，因为人们对一个缺乏宪法的国家的宪政危机感到担忧，这有点讽刺。
If Netanyahu persisted, went ahead with these reforms, no one was talking about the Palestinians. And indeed, large numbers of troops that had been in the south were moved to the West Bank as the Netanyahu government was expanding the settlements in that territory and responding to Palestinian reprisals against those settlements. So they weren't focused on the issue. They took their eyes off the ball. Israel had other priorities, and the Palestinians were in a position not only to lose their friends around the region, but also increasingly an afterthought for the Israeli government and the Israeli people. That is the backdrop for where we are today.
如果内塔尼亚胡坚持并继续进行这些改革，没有人会谈论巴勒斯坦人的问题。而事实上，内塔尼亚胡政府在扩大该地区的定居点并对巴勒斯坦对这些定居点的报复做出回应时，大量部队被转移到了约旦河西岸。因此，他们并没有专注于这个问题。他们忽视了当前的重点。以色列有其他优先事项，而巴勒斯坦人则不仅可能失去周边地区的朋友，也越来越成为以色列政府和以色列人民关注的边缘问题。这就是我们今天所处的背景。
So let's dig in a little bit into the idea that you bring up of the kind of the the the troubles that have been roiling Netanyahu and the Israeli government themselves. So I think one of the things that has been brought up is the massive failure of intelligence and defense systems in Israel that that allowed this attack to happen. What happens next? Like, do you do you see Israel uniting around Netanyahu? Do you see like, do you see this fracturing even even worse with anger at what happened and the lapses in defense and intelligence insights? Or what happens next?
那么，让我们稍微深入挖掘一下你提出的，即以色列总理内塔尼雅胡和以色列政府所面临的麻烦的想法。有人提出的一个问题是，以色列的情报和国防系统出现了巨大的失误，导致了这次袭击事件的发生。接下来会发生什么呢？你觉得以色列会团结在内塔尼雅胡周围吗？您是否预见到，由于对这次事件和国防和情报失误感到愤怒，导致更加严重的分裂？或者接下来会发生什么？
Well, the first point I should make is just for everyone to understand what has just happened to the Israeli consciousness. It is unimaginable that certainly someone in a developed country could have any understanding of what the Jewish people in Israel are presently going through. This feeling that after the Holocaust and the land being provided to them to have a safe haven to create an independent Israeli state and the need to defend their borders, the historic fights they've had with their neighbors, the war in 1973 when a number of Arab nations decided to fight against them. And you know, the continual sense of beseegement with missiles from Hezbollah, for example, terrorist operations. This is not like a bolt from the blue when the United States experienced the 9-11. Israel's 9-11 is both massively greater in the impact on Israel, but also comes for a country that was supposed to be prepared for this. I mean, Israel represents the gold standard on border security around the world, not like the United States, where you've got, you know, all sorts of people running across and build the wall becomes a clarion call precisely because nobody understands how to defend the border. No, and also intelligence collection, surveillance, digital surveillance, human intelligence collection on the ground, especially in the occupied tarsies. This is what they do. And the fact is that right now, today, Netanyahu's legacy will not be anything that he has done today. It will be this failure and how he responds to it, period, end of story, nothing else is close.
嗯，我首先要提醒大家了解以色列国民所经历的事情。在一个发达国家中，很难想象哪里会有任何人能够理解以色列的犹太人当前所经历的困境。在经历大屠杀后，为了给他们提供一个安全的避风港来建立一个独立的以色列国家并保卫自己的边境，他们与邻国的历史战斗，以及1973年阿拉伯国家联决定与他们对抗的战争，比如来自真主党的导弹持续对他们构成困扰，以及恐怖袭击等。当美国经历了9/11袭击时，这并不像突如其来的打击。以色列的"9/11"对以色列影响非常巨大，而且这个国家本应该做好准备。我的意思是，以色列在世界范围内代表了边境安全的金标准，不像美国，你知道，各种人横穿边境，修建边境墙成了呼声，这正是因为没有人知道如何保卫边境。而且情报收集、监视、数字监控、地面人员情报收集，特别是在占领区，这是他们做的事情。事实上，现在，今天，内塔尼亚胡的遗产不会是他今天所做的任何事情，而是这次失败以及他如何应对它。总而言之，没有其他事情能够与之媲美。
So what that means for Israel is that all of the issues that have roiled this country over the past year, all of the political polarization, and it's not a two-party country. It's a many, many-party country. You know, the joke is you get three people together in Israel and, you know, you form a new political party. And if you go to the coffee houses and the rest, everybody's talking politics. Everyone reads the newspapers. This is a highly politically literate and divided population. But as of right now, priority one, two, and three for the entire Israeli people is to respond to these attacks, these terrorist attacks.
所以对于以色列来说，过去一年中激化了国家内部的所有问题，包括政治极化，不是一个两党制的国家，而是一个有很多许多政党的国家。你知道，有一个笑话说，在以色列只要三个人聚在一起，就可以组成一个新的政党。而且，如果你去咖啡馆或其他地方，每个人都在谈论政治。每个人都读报纸。这是一个高度政治素养且分裂的人口。但是，就目前而言，以色列人民的首要任务一、二和三是应对这些恐怖袭击。
And how are they going to respond to them? Well, number one, they've got to find a way to get their people back. They're 100 plus and we don't know the exact numbers right now, hostages that are being held in Gaza, most of whom are civilians. And they will do everything to get them back and they may well have direct American support in trying to accomplish that. And then it will be to go into Gaza to remove the leadership of Gaza, to disarm the militias in the territory of Gaza, and to do everything they can to try to ensure that this cannot happen again. And making that happen is a very, very tall order. It might be a taller order than the Israelis can accomplish. And certainly the knock on consequences will be grave even for just Gaza. And that is before we talk about any potential expansion of the war. But for now, the Israeli people will stand together.
他们将如何回应呢？首先，他们必须找到办法将自己的人带回来。目前我们不知道确切的数字，但在加沙被扣押的人数已经超过100人，其中大部分是平民。他们将尽一切努力让这些人平安归来，而且他们可能会得到美国的直接支持。接下来，他们将会进入加沙，除掉加沙的领导层，解除加沙地区的武装组织，并尽一切可能来确保不再发生类似事件。这是一个非常艰巨的任务，可能超出以色列人的能力。而且即使只是对加沙来说，后果也将是严重的，更不用说这场战争可能扩大的话题了。但目前，以色列人民将会团结一致。
And there is already talk of a government of national emergency that would bring together Netanyahu with the leader of the Israeli opposition and for the purposes of fighting this war so that everyone in Israel is together collectively ensuring the national security of the people of Israel.
有关紧急全国政府的讨论已经出现，该政府将集合内塔尼亚胡与以色列反对党领导人，旨在共同对抗这场战争，以确保整个以色列国家的国家安全。
And I think that for the course of the coming months, and let us remember, this is not just an attack against Israel and now they respond, it is very likely there are Hamas operatives on the ground inside Israel right now that the Israeli government has to find and neutralize. It is also true that you're still actively expected that there are going to be additional attacks, whether those are missile attacks, or whether those are direct incursions, nobody knows. But given the level of planet that was required by Hamas to make these strikes over the weekend, which nobody in Israel thought was possible, no one expected it right now that level of concern would be higher than anything else on the political agenda.
我认为在接下来的几个月里，让我们记住，这不仅仅是针对以色列的攻击，以色列作出了回应，目前很有可能哈马斯的行动员就在以色列境内。以色列政府必须找到他们并消除威胁。同样的，我们正在积极地预计还会发生其他袭击，无论是导弹袭击还是直接入侵，没有人知道。但鉴于哈马斯在周末发动这些袭击所需的计划程度，没有人在以色列认为这可能发生，没人预料到当前的紧迫程度将超过政治议程中的任何其他问题。
And again, that will not move for the foreseeable future. So I want to talk more about all of that and expand this to obviously the broader geopolitical implications of this. But I want to just play out the 9-11 reference a little bit if you can, because obviously 9-11 happened some time ago with the attack on the United States. But we know with retrospect, with hindsight that some of the decisions that were made after that were misguided, that were misjudged, they actually led to terrible harm.
而且，这种情况在可预见的未来不会改变。因此，我想更多地谈论所有这些，并将其扩展到显然更广泛的地缘政治影响。但是如果可以的话，我想稍微谈谈关于9-11事件的参考，因为显然9-11事件发生在一段时间之前，针对美国的袭击。但我们可以从回顾和追溯的角度得知，当时作出的一些决策是错误的，是错误判断，实际上导致了可怕的伤害。
How and who is going to make sure that these types of decisions are not made? And how can Israel avoid making decisions that will be bad?
如何以及由谁来确保不会做出这些类型的决策？以及以色列如何避免做出错误的决策？
这两个问题都涉及到决策的质量和监督机制。对于第一个问题，确保这些类型的决策不会被做出需要建立一个良好的决策过程和相应的监管机构。这个过程可以包括以下步骤：
1. 透明度和问责制：确保决策过程的透明度，包括公开讨论、听取各方意见和建议，并及时向公众和相关利益方提供信息。同时，建立明确的问责制度，确保决策者承担责任。
2. 多利益相关者参与：确保各利益相关方参与到决策过程中，包括政府、民间组织、专业机构和公众等，以确保多元视角和充分讨论。
3. 专业评估和建议：通过专家的评估和建议，提供基于科学和实证的分析，为决策提供参考和指导。
4. 独立审查和监督：建立独立的审查机构或者独立的专家团队，对决策进行评估和监督，确保决策质量和程序的公正性。
对于第二个问题，避免做出错误的决策需要以下措施：
1. 数据驱动决策：依靠科学和实证数据，借助专家意见和分析，制定决策，避免基于主观判断或政治考量做出错误决策。
2. 风险评估和预警机制：建立有效的风险评估和预警机制，提前发现和应对潜在风险，减少决策错误的可能性。
3. 监测和评估制度：建立后续的决策监测和评估制度，对决策的实施效果进行跟踪和评估，及时纠正错误，吸取经验教训。
总之，确保决策质量和避免错误决策需要建立透明、问责、多元参与和科学评估等机制。此外，培养和加强决策者的专业素养和能力，也是避免错误决策的关键。
As someone who was in New York on 9-11 and saw the second tower go down, and saw how the city rallied together, how the country rallied together, President Bush over 90 percent approval in the country a couple of months after 9-11, how the world came together to support the United States, the coalition of the willing well beyond NATO. I mean, poor countries that had no business caring about what the United States was up to, providing troops on the ground and support for the Americans. Russia, Putin's Russia, calling up Bush and offering, you know, the former Soviet Soviet republics in Central Asia as bases to support for logistical operations for the war in Afghanistan.
作为一个在9/11事件中身在纽约并亲眼目睹第二座塔楼倒塌的人，我看到了这座城市和整个国家如何团结在一起，我看到了总统布什在9/11事件几个月后在全国范围内获得超过90%的支持率，我看到了世界联合起来支持美国，不仅是北约成员国，还有愿意联合的国家。我指的是，一些本来与美国无关的贫困国家派遣军队和提供支持，俄罗斯，普京的俄罗斯，打电话给布什并提供前苏联中亚共和国作为基地，为阿富汗战争提供后勤支援。
I mean, the level of support for the United States after 9-11 was singular. And there's no question that the outpouring of concern, I mean, when I saw in Berlin shining on the Brandenburg Gate, the Israeli flag with the star of David in Germany, in Berlin, in Germany, and given the history and given what that means, and given the alternatives for Deutschland, doing well in Eastern all of that, I mean, this is a singular moment in the relationship between Germany and Israel, the European Union suspending aid to the Palestinians, the support for Israel is extraordinary. Narendra Modi in India, it is not universal for every country, but it is absolutely wide ranging.
我的意思是，911事件后对美国的支持是独特的。毫无疑问，人们的关切迸发出来，就像我在柏林看到的一样，勃兰登堡门上闪烁着以色列国旗和大卫星。考虑到德国的历史和现实情况，以及德国在东方问题上所取得的成就，这是德国和以色列关系中的一个独特时刻。欧盟停止对巴勒斯坦的援助，对以色列的支持是非同寻常的。印度的纳伦德拉·莫迪，虽然并非所有国家都一致如此，但这种支持范围绝对广泛。
And I got a readout. I spoke to several of the folks involved in the emergency security council meeting at the United Nations this weekend, the condemnation of these attacks, everyone but Russia. And again, so that in that regard, this is very, very similar to 9-11.
我得到了一份记录。我与本周末参加联合国紧急安全理事会会议的几位相关人士交谈，他们对这些袭击表示谴责，除俄罗斯外。在这方面，跟911事件非常相似。
Now, the broader question that you're asking, Helen, which I'm also very sensitive to, is in 2023, looking back on 9-11, the Americans made some horrible, horrible, long lasting mistakes. And some of those mistakes were in the United States.
现在，海伦你提出的更广泛的问题，我也非常敏感，就是在回顾911事件时，美国人犯下了一些可怕、持久的错误。其中一些错误发生在美国国内。
I mean, if I think about how much money was spent and wasted in the Department of Homeland Security, on personal security and safety in the airlines, how much money was wasted, how much economic inefficiency as a consequence of overstating the terrorist threat in the US, everything else secondary to that, but also the rights that were stripped back for, in some cases, all Americans in terms of surveillance and the Patriot Act, but also targeting Muslim Americans across the country. And so much mistreatment of American citizens as a consequence of that.
我的意思是，如果我想一想在国土安全部、航空公司人身安全方面花费和浪费了多少钱，以及作为夸大美国恐怖威胁的结果导致了多少经济低效，那么其他一切都是次要的。还有，还剥夺了一些情况下所有美国人的监控和《爱国者法案》所赋予的权利，还有对全国各地的穆斯林美国人的针对性打击。因此，这导致了对美国公民的大量虐待。
But that's nothing compared to the mistakes made internationally. A war of choice in Iraq responding to 9-11 with trillions of dollars wasted and lives, millions of lives destroyed. Afghanistan, 20 years on a failed war with the Taliban returning to power and a failed state.
但与国际上所犯的错误相比，这算不了什么。伊拉克的选择性战争回应了9-11事件，造成了数万亿美元的浪费和数百万人的生命摧毁。阿富汗则经历了20年的失败战争，塔利班重新夺回权力，使该国成为一个失败的国家。
Yes, Bin Laden was killed. And I think people around the world cheered that not just in the United States. And Al Qaeda was destroyed at the highest levels. And in many cases uprooted completely. But no one can look back on the 20 plus years since 9-11 and say that the American response with the war on terror was successful. You can't do that.
是的，本拉登已经被击毙了。我认为全世界的人都为此欢呼，不仅仅是美国。至于基地组织，它已经在最高层面被摧毁，很多时候也被彻底铲除。但是没有人能够回顾自911事件以来的20多年，说美国对恐怖主义战争的反应取得了成功。这是无法否认的。
And Israel is not the United States. The Americans have extraordinary strength and resilience in its national security capabilities and the size of its economy, also in where it's located geopolitically. Israel certainly has the military strength in the region. But the country is small. The territory is small. And certainly it is not in a geopolitical space that is comfortable.
以色列和美国不同。美国在国家安全能力、经济规模以及地缘政治位置方面拥有非凡的实力和韧性。以色列在该地区确实拥有军事实力，但该国相对较小，领土狭小，并且所处的地缘政治环境并不舒适。
And so I think the danger here is that as the Israelis respond against Hamas as they should and as they must and as they work to destroy the leadership of that terrorist organization and disarm the militants that are involved in the attacks against Israel and pose an ongoing threat. But that is certainly not the only knock on consequences of Israel's decision-making.
因此，我认为这里存在的危险是，随着以色列对哈马斯做出应对，如他们所应该、所必须的，并努力摧毁这个恐怖组织的领导层，解除参与对以色列的攻击并构成持续威胁的激进分子的武装。但这当然不是以色列决策的唯一后果。
And the potential for this to become a broader war that would envelop the Middle East in conflagration and that ultimately could even end Israel, Israel, in a way that the war on terror could not have threatened the United States, existentially. And I, as a consequence, I certainly believe that a unity government will make it less likely that the Israelis overreact in that way. I certainly believe that the United States in providing very strong and committed support, but also notes of caution in what can be done and what should not be done, will hopefully restrain the worst impulses.
这段话说的是，这场战争可能演变为一场更广泛的战争，波及整个中东地区，并最终甚至可能导致以色列的灭亡，这样的情况下，以色列的生存将受到威胁，这是恐怖主义战争所无法对美国构成的威胁。因此，我相信组建一个联合政府将减少以色列过度反应的可能性。同时，我相信美国提供强有力的支持，并在可做和不可做之间提出注意事项，有望抑制最严重的冲动。
And in the early moments, again, we all understand why Israel would feel the need to react in the harshest possible way. But I certainly worry when I see the Israeli Defense Minister refer to the attackers as inhuman animals and announce a siege on the entirety of Gaza, which means no food, no electricity, no water. And this is a territory that already has 50% poverty, already has fewer than half of its population with access to clean water. I worry about what that is going to mean for the Palestinian people, as well as for Israel long term.
在最初的时刻，我们都能理解为什么以色列会感到有必要以最严厉的方式作出反应。但是当我看到以色列国防部长将袭击者称为非人类动物，并宣布对加沙地带实施封锁时，我确实感到担忧。这意味着没有食物、没有电力、没有水源。而这个地区已经有50%的人口生活在贫困中，不到一半的人口拥有清洁水资源。我担心这对巴勒斯坦人民以及以色列长期来说会意味着什么。
I think it was gold in my ear who says, I won't hate you for killing our children. I will hate you for making me kill your children. Ultimately, the Israeli population is most threatened by what the terrorists of Hamas unleash from Israel.
我认为有个声音在我的耳边说，"我不会因为你杀了我们的孩子而恨你，我会因为你让我杀了你的孩子而恨你"。最终，以色列人民最受到哈马斯恐怖分子从以色列释放的威胁。
So do you think that was part of the incentive for Hamas in doing this? Because surely they knew that the response would be swift. And surely they knew that the world would rally around such atrocities. So what do you think was their motivation? And do you think that they miss the misunder estimated what might happen?
那么，你认为这是哈马斯这样做的一个激励因素吗？因为他们肯定知道反应会很迅速。而且他们肯定知道全世界会对这种暴行表示谴责。你认为他们的动机是什么？你觉得他们是否低估了可能发生的事情呢？
Oh, I don't think they underestimated what might happen. But it's a very it's a compelling question. It's really hard to put yourself in the mindset of someone like a Hamas leader. But you know, I had to do that just a few months ago, when Yevgeni Pragoshin was marching with his Wagner forces on Moscow and people were asking me what is going through this guy's mind? Because he's gonna it's clear he's gonna get killed. Right? I mean, you turn against the Kremlin and Putin, you're not walking away from that. And when he cut the deal, and everyone said, Oh, you know, he cut a deal. And he's dead man walking. Like that literally that was the reality.
哦，我不认为他们低估了可能发生的事情。不过，这是一个非常引人入胜的问题。很难把自己置身于哈马斯领导人这样的人的思维方式中。但你知道，就在几个月前，当叶甫根尼·普拉戈辛和他的瓦格纳部队向莫斯科进军时，我不得不模拟他的思维过程。人们问我，这个家伙的脑子里在想什么？因为很明显，他注定要死。对吧？你背叛克里姆林宫和普京，你不可能逃脱。当他达成协议的时候，所有人都说，哦，你知道，他达成了协议。但他注定会沦为行尸走肉。这实际上就是现实。
And as soon as the Hamas leaders decided that they were going to commit these atrocities against Israeli civilians, they're dead. There is no future for these for these people. So I think there are two different things going on.
当哈马斯的领导人决定对以色列平民进行这些暴行时，他们注定要付出生命的代价。这些人没有未来可言。所以我认为两件不同的事情正在发生。
The first and this this is analogous to Pragoshin is that Hamas felt themselves in an increasingly untenable environment that they were losing their support in the region. And even the Saudis were about to normalize their relationship with Israel. They had no influence in ability to get anything done, no leverage with the Israeli government, which was only becoming farther and further line against them. And in that regard, they were increasingly in a corner.
第一点和这一点与普拉戈辛相似的是，哈马斯感到自己在一个越来越难以为继的环境中，他们正在失去地区的支持。即使沙特阿拉伯也准备与以色列正常化关系。他们没有影响力，无法完成任何事情，也没有与不断远离他们的以色列政府保持联系的筹码。在这方面，他们越来越被压在了墙角中。
Their options were increasingly all bad. And, you know, we know that people that find themselves only with horrible options frequently do irrational things. And I would not underestimate that in driving the decision of Hamas to take that action. It's kind of like, why would 77% of a Gaza population in the last elections they had, which was some time ago, why would they vote for an organization like Hamas? Well, I mean, they wouldn't if they had economic opportunities, they wouldn't if they had education, they wouldn't if they could, you know, come and go from Gaza as they please. But the worst the situation gets, the more they are willing to vote for an organization that is prepared to burn it all down. And by the way, there's a lesson in that, even for those of us in very wealthy, very stable countries. So I think that's one set of motivations.
他们的选择越来越糟糕。你知道的，我们知道那些只有可怕选择的人经常会做出非理性的事情。我不会低估这一点，因为这也推动了哈马斯采取这一行动的决策。就像为什么在上次选举中，加沙的77%的人口会投票给哈马斯这样的组织呢？嗯，如果他们有经济机会，有教育，或者可以随意进出加沙的话，他们是不会的。但是情况越糟，他们就越愿意投票给一个准备把一切都毁掉的组织。顺便说一下，这其中也有一个教训，即使对于我们这些生活在非常富裕、非常稳定的国家的人来说也是如此。所以我认为这是一种动机。
But another set of motivations certainly is an ideological effort of Hamas to insert themselves as more dominant in the conversation to radicalize the Israeli population, to undermine the Palestinian authority in the West Bank. Because if this fight, you know, gets the Israelis to kill huge numbers of Palestinian civilians. And and by the way, Hamas will facilitate that. Right. I mean, Hamas is absolutely going to be engaged in operations, you know, in residential buildings. They do that intentionally. They're not going to make it easy for Israel to take them out. They want to make it bloody. They want to paint the Israelis as just as bad as Hamas, if not worse. They will take human shields to they they ID the IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces, usually gives warnings about when they're about to attack a building. They ask the civilians to leave what Hamas tells those civilians that that's disinformation.
但另一组动机肯定是哈马斯的意识形态努力，试图在辩论中变得更加主导，以激化以色列人口，破坏巴勒斯坦权威在西岸的地位。因为如果这场战斗导致以色列杀死大量巴勒斯坦平民。而且顺便说一句，哈马斯会促成这种情况。对，我是说，哈马斯绝对会参与行动，比如在住宅建筑中。他们故意这么做。他们不会让以色列轻易消灭他们。他们想要让这场战斗血腥。他们希望将以色列人描绘成与哈马斯一样恶劣，甚至更糟。他们会采取人类盾牌，以色列国防军通常会在他们要袭击建筑物之前提出警告。他们要求平民离开，但哈马斯告诉这些平民，这是虚假信息。
They do everything they can to make the Israelis seem complicit with the kind of indiscriminate attacks against civilians that Hamas engages in themselves. They want to bring the Israelis to their level. And they also want to radicalize the Palestinians in response, not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank. And they want to radicalize the Arab street. They want people across the region to be, you know, in uproar against Israel and in solidarity with the Hamas cause and in solidarity with the destruction of Israel. They want Arab leaders to be saying what the Iranian Supreme Leader was posting on social media this weekend, calling essentially for a genocide against the Zionist regime. That is that is ideologically what Hamas is trying to accomplish. And and again, Israel must do everything in its power, not to allow Hamas to drag them there.
他们尽力让以色列人看起来与哈马斯自己参与的针对平民的无差别攻击有牵连关系。他们想把以色列人拉到他们的水平。他们还想激化巴勒斯坦人的反应，不仅限于加沙，还包括西岸。他们想激化阿拉伯大街。他们希望整个地区的人们都反对以色列，并与哈马斯事业以及摧毁以色列保持团结。他们希望阿拉伯领导人像伊朗最高领袖上周在社交媒体上发表的言论一样，基本上呼吁对犹太复国主义政权进行种族灭绝。这正是哈马斯试图实现的意识形态。因此，以色列必须竭尽全力，不让哈马斯将他们拉到那种地步。
It's interesting in your in your talker in Vancouver this year at Ted 2023, you were talking about the rise of different orders. And I do just get the sense that everything is connected. You have Russia, you have Ukraine, you have Iran. There are these ideological battles that are now becoming real world wars. And so I wonder if you can, especially the mention that Iran, I don't think it's confirmed yet the the intervention of Iran in this, but certainly the journal was reporting that Iran had been involved, deeply involved in setting up these attacks.
今年在温哥华举行的2023年Ted演讲中，你讲到了不同秩序的崛起，这让人觉得很有趣。我有一种感觉，所有事物都是相互联系的。你提到了俄罗斯、乌克兰和伊朗，这些意识形态上的战争正在变成现实世界的战争。所以我想知道你是否能详细说明一下，尤其是关于伊朗的提及。我认为有关伊朗干预这一事情还没有得到确认，但是这份报纸刊登了有关伊朗深度参与策划这些袭击的报道。
What does this mean? What does this mean for the for the world at large? And then I also have a follow up question, which is what do you think the US should do? So let's talk in terms of the world at large and starting with Iran, certainly that Wall Street Journal piece over the weekend drove an enormous amount of news. It was saying, Hey, the Iranians basically planned this. I will tell you, that was a very lightly sourced piece, relying on Hamas. And I would not have gone to print with that. If I had been the journal, the journal is usually quite.
这是什么意思？这对全球意味着什么？然后我还有一个后续问题，你认为美国应该做什么？所以让我们从整个世界的角度来谈，首先从伊朗开始，上周末《华尔街日报》上的一篇文章引发了大量的新闻报道。它说，伊朗人基本上是计划了这件事。我告诉你，那篇文章的消息来源非常有限，依赖于哈马斯的说法。如果我是该报的编辑，我不会发表那篇文章。该报通常相当谨慎。
Yeah, the US is not confirmed that at all. No, in fact, the US has actually said that there is not hard evidence at this point, that that fingers Iran as having directly orchestrated or ordered these attacks. Now, let's be very clear.
是的，美国根本没有确认这一点。事实上，美国实际上表示，目前没有确凿的证据证明伊朗直接策划或下令发动这些袭击。现在，让我们非常清楚地说明一下。
The Iranians have publicly expressed strongest possible support for Hamas. The Iranians have historically funded and provided military support directly for Hamas. So I mean, they clearly are not innocents in this. And I would be surprised to learn that the Iranians had no idea that this was going to happen. I suspect that they were aware, but awareness and orchestration are two very different things.
伊朗公开表达了对哈马斯的最坚决支持。历史上，伊朗一直直接资助并提供军事支持给哈马斯。所以我的意思是，他们显然并非无辜。如果得知他们对此事一无所知，我会感到惊讶。我怀疑他们是有所察觉的，但意识到和策划是两种完全不同的事情。
Now, since the attacks occurred, Hezbollah, which of course is also very much aligned with Iran and gets a lot of direct military support and training from the Iranians, they have, I say only, but in this context is only, they've only engaged in some missile strikes, some rocket strikes against an Israeli military, not base, but military and soldiers outposts. And the Israelis in response immediately engaged in strikes back against Hezbollah. That's it. If the Iranians were behind this and wanted to be seen as behind this, Hezbollah would be involved in these attacks. They are far more capable than Hamas.
现在，自从发生这些攻击以来，真主党（Hezbollah）当然也与伊朗密切合作，并从伊朗那里获得大量直接军事支持和培训。他们只进行了一些导弹袭击，一些火箭袭击以回击以色列的军事力量和士兵哨所。以色列立即做出反击。就这些。如果这是伊朗所为，并且他们想被认为是幕后主使，真主党会参与这些袭击。他们比哈马斯更有能力。
The Iranians have claimed that they have had no role, that this was an autonomous Hamas operation. And indeed, Iran has been doing better geopolitically of late. The Chinese facilitated a breakthrough in Iranian relations with the Saudis. The Iranians have engaged with the United States and $6 billion of Iranian assets are set to be unfrozen, have not been unfrozen yet, but are set to be transferred to Iran. Five American civilians that were held unjustly as hostages in Iranian jails have been released and sent to the United States. The Iranians have reduced the top level of uranium enrichment and some of their stockpiles allowing inspectors in. Now, this is not a return to the Iranian nuclear deal, the JCPOA. But certainly, on the basis of all of that, and even some high level discussion that the Iranians might be willing to engage directly with the United States diplomatically through the good offices of Oman, none of that seems aligned at all with the Iranians pulling the trigger on an attack against Israel that would almost certainly lead to massive retaliation once the Israelis found that out. So I am sitting here saying I am, I would be surprised, not with a high level of confidence. And, you know, the Iranian regime has a very old Supreme Leader who is also dealing with internal instability and a transition that is coming. So never say never, but I would be quite surprised if we found out that the Iranians directly ordered this.
伊朗人声称他们没有参与其中，这是哈马斯的自主行动。事实上，最近伊朗在地缘政治上表现得更好。中国为伊朗与沙特之间的关系提供了突破。伊朗与美国进行了接触，价值60亿美元的伊朗资产即将解冻，尽管尚未解冻，但准备转移到伊朗。被非正当关押在伊朗监狱中的五名美国公民已被释放并送回美国。伊朗人减少了铀浓缩的顶级水平，并允许检查员进入一些储备。现在，这不是回到伊朗核协议（JCPOA）的情况。但基于这一切，甚至有一些高层讨论称伊朗可能愿意通过阿曼的斡旋直接与美国进行外交接触，这一切似乎与伊朗对以色列发动攻击的行动完全不符，因为一旦以色列发现了，几乎肯定会导致大规模的报复。所以我现在坐在这里说我会感到惊讶，虽然不是非常有信心。伊朗政权有一个非常老的最高领袖，同时还面临内部不稳定和即将到来的权力过渡。所以永远别说永远，但如果我们发现伊朗直接下令这样做，我会感到相当惊讶。
Now, it is useful that the United States has both sent to fleet off of the Israeli coast to show stalwart support and will be providing a level of at least military coordination and operational intelligence may well do much more than that. We can get to that when we talk about the United States, but is also very publicly saying we do not yet have any evidence that the Iranians are involved. In other words, the message from the United States is very clear.
现在，美国派遣舰队到以色列海岸展示坚定支持，并将提供至少军事协调和作战情报等级是非常有用的。我们可以在谈论美国时详细讨论这一点，但同时也公开表示尚没有证据证明伊朗有牵涉。换句话说，美国传达的信息非常明确。
Do not expand this war into Iran because the consequences of that are $150 crude at a minimum. The consequences of that is the world goes back into global recession. The consequences of that are our conflagration in the region. And I think that I do believe that the Israeli government is quite aligned with the United States in not wanting to go there.
请不要将这场战争扩大至伊朗，因为最起码会导致原油价格达到150美元的后果。而这样的后果将使全球陷入经济衰退。而此举的后果则是我们陷入该地区的火药桶。我相信以色列政府也非常与美国保持一致，不希望走向那样的局面。
It just I keep coming back to the human cost of this because the reality is that people are suffering, people are being killed and many more people are likely to be killed. If indeed Hamas has kind of hijacked this story with extreme extremist action, I wonder what you see from the Palestinian side of kind of a more moderate type of push towards trying to get understanding, trying to get peace in this nation or trying to get peace in this in this area.
我一直都关注这场冲突对人类的代价，因为现实就是人们正在遭受痛苦，人们正在丧生，而更多的人可能会失去生命。如果哈马斯确实通过极端行动操纵了这个故事，我想知道你如何看待巴勒斯坦方面更温和的推动，试图获得理解，试图在这个国家或这个地区实现和平。
That's the most tragic piece of this is the ability of Hamas to successfully hijack big pieces of the political spectrum for the Palestinians. I mean, there are so many people in the West right now that view the Palestinians as equivalent to Hamas. And nothing could be further from the truth. But but that reality, that perception is going to make life so much worse for the people that have suffered the most. They are the powerless. The Palestinians are the stateless. They lack resources. They lack a proper military. They lack the capacity to defend their own territory and to defend themselves.
这就是最可悲的地方，哈马斯成功地夺取了巴勒斯坦政治领域的大部分份额。我的意思是，现在有很多人在西方认为巴勒斯坦人等同于哈马斯。然而，这与事实相去甚远。但是这种现实、这种看法将让那些最为受苦的人们的生活变得更加糟糕。他们是无权无势的。巴勒斯坦人是无国籍的。他们缺乏资源。他们没有适当的军队。他们没有能力保卫自己的领土和自己。
And we've already seen even over this most tragic weekend for Israel that the number of deaths and casualties for the Palestinians are almost as much as they were for the Israelis. And when you go back over the past 20 years, who've had the most deaths, who've had the most casualties, consistently, it's been the Palestinians, who's going to suffer the most going forward consistently will be the Palestinians who suffered the most from the US war on terror.
我们已经看到，在这个对以色列来说是最悲惨的周末里，巴勒斯坦人的死亡和伤亡人数几乎与以色列人一样多。而在过去20年中，谁的死亡和伤亡人数最多，一直都是巴勒斯坦人，而在未来，谁将持续遭受最多的痛苦，也将是那些在美国的反恐战争中最受伤的巴勒斯坦人。
It was, of course, the Iraqis and and all of the tribes in Afghanistan. This is should not surprise anyone. But it is the unfortunate reality that, of course, Hamas leadership will be destroyed. But the biggest damage that they will have done would have been to their own people, to the Palestinian people, who now will face almost unfathomable deprivation. And there's very little, there's very little that the rest of the world is going to do with that.
当然，伊拉克人和阿富汗各个部落都参与其中。这并不应该让任何人感到意外。但不幸的现实是，哈马斯领导层当然会被摧毁。但他们所做的最大损害将是对自己人民，对巴勒斯坦人民造成了几乎无法想象的剥夺。而且世界其他地方在这方面几乎没有什么作为。
Do you see a movement within Palestine to step up if Hamas is done? I certainly believe that the Palestinian Authority will try to see this as an opportunity to push for more international engagement from the region to take seriously a cessation of illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, a rolling back of the territory that is presently occupied, and a revival of peace talks that would bring about a two state solution where the Palestinians less land than perhaps they would have gotten in the days of, you know, Arafat and ravine. But nonetheless, something that feels sustainable, a country that one might be able to raise children with a sense of hope.
你是否看到巴勒斯坦内部出现一种动向，如果哈马斯被解决了，这种动向会增强？我相信巴勒斯坦权力机构将试图把这看作是一个机会，推动该地区更多的国际参与，认真对待在西岸非法定居点的停止、对目前被占领地区的撤退，并重新启动和平谈判，以实现巴以两国解决方案，其中巴勒斯坦可能会得到比阿拉法特和拉文时代更少的土地。但尽管如此，这个解决方案应该是可持续的，一个国家，人们可以在其中培养孩子们带有一种希望感。
There is no one in occupied the occupied territories of Palestine that could say that for themselves, for their children today. So I think that is the hope. But, you know, clearly right now is not the time for that, not because we don't want it, but because events will overtake it immediately and have already overtaken.
在巴勒斯坦的被占领区域中，没有人能够为他们自己或他们的子女说出这样的话。因此，我认为这就是希望所在。但是，你知道，显然现在不是做到这一点的时机，不是因为我们不希望，而是因为事件将立即超越，并已经超越了。
Now, now the hope is that the violence that will spread in the West Bank can be contained, that we do not see a war in Gaza become a war in the West Bank, that we do not see an occupation of Gaza become an occupation of the West Bank. That is, I think, the priority. You have to know sometimes when you actually have a trajectory for peace and when you have to do your best to avoid war expanding. We do not have a trajectory for peace right now. We are at war. There were plenty of opportunities over the past years to take off ramps, to engage more seriously. They were ignored. And it is precisely that reality that has brought us to a point where we now are on defense, where we are hoping that this does not get much, much worse. That is the story of the Middle East today.
现在，希望的是能够控制即将在西岸蔓延的暴力，不让加沙的战争变成西岸的战争，不让占领加沙变成占领西岸。这是目前的优先任务。有时候你必须了解何时真正取得和平进展，以及如何尽力避免战争扩大。我们现在没有实现和平进展的路径。我们处于战争之中。在过去几年里，有很多机会可以采取措施、更加认真地参与。但都被忽视了。正是这种现实带我们进入了现在这个防御的位置，我们希望情况不会变得更加糟糕。这就是今天中东的故事。
Do you think Israel will annex Gaza? I think the Israelis don't know. Again, don't underestimate the shock, the emotional shock, that all of the Israelis are facing today. They are not making long-term strategic decisions right now. They are making immediate short-term decisions. What can we do to make sure the country is still defended? What our borders are still secure, that terrorists are not, you know, right now running around in our midst, planning further atrocities. That is priority number one. And very close to it, is getting those hostages back and safe. I'd say unharmed. They've already experienced a lot of harm. That's beyond the realm of possibility right now. There will be in the coming weeks. And there's also some shock in awe, some Netanyahu immediately posting some buildings getting demolished in Gaza and saying we are at war. That is, I mean, they've engaged in these sorts of airstrikes before, and we already know of families that have gotten killed, entire families, in some cases of nine of 13 people, lots of children, this sort of thing. We will see that. But in terms of what's the nature of the long-term objectives, the occupation, the Israelis are not close to making that decision.
你认为以色列会吞并加沙吗？我认为以色列人并不知道。再次强调，不要低估今天所有以色列人所面临的震惊、情绪上的震惊。他们现在没有作出长期战略决策的能力。他们在做的是即时短期决策。我们能做些什么来确保国家继续被保卫？我们的边界仍然安全，恐怖分子不会在我们当中四处闲逛，计划进一步的暴行。这是第一优先事项。接近这个优先事项的是让那些被扣为人质的人平安回来。我敢说是无伤害地回来。他们已经遭受了很多伤害。这是不可能的事情。未来几周会有这样的事情发生。还有一些震惊和敬畏，Netanyahu立刻发布了一些加沙地区被摧毁的建筑物，并宣称我们处于战争状态。这意味着他们已经进行过这种类型的空袭，我们已经知道有家庭被杀害，整个家庭，在某些情况下有9到13个人，很多儿童，这种情况。我们将会看到这样的事情发生。但就长期目标的性质、占领方面而言，以色列人并没有接近做出那种决定的程度。
And I also think that other countries that Israel trusts and Israel needs will have some ability to have influence over Israel in making that decision. And I'm not just talking about the U.S. now. I'm also talking about countries in the region that Israel would like to maintain relations with. So there needs to be very active multilateral diplomacy behind the scenes, quietly, high level, with the Israeli government in the coming days and weeks.
我还认为，除了现在的美国之外，以色列信任并需要的其他国家将对以色列在做出这个决定方面产生一定的影响力。我不仅仅在谈论美国，还在谈论以色列希望与之保持关系的该地区的其他国家。因此，在接下来的几天和几周里，需要有非常积极的多边外交干预，低调而高层次地与以色列政府交涉。
I want to talk a little bit about the media coverage of the attacks and of what is happening right now. A lot of the people who had written in with questions for you are really confused by the rhetoric that they're seeing. They're not sure what to trust, who to trust, what to believe. And I want to get your sense. You're a very online person. And so what is your take on this? And how can we think about how to understand what's happening, especially in such a real-time situation?
我想稍微谈一谈有关袭击事件和现时状况的媒体报道。很多人通过提问表达了对目前出现的辞令感到困惑。他们不确定要相信什么，相信谁，相信什么。我想知道你的看法。作为一个非常活跃在线的人，你是如何看待这个问题的？在如此实时的情况下，我们又该如何理解所发生的事情呢？
Well, first of all, there's always the fog of war. There's always disinformation from both sides actively trying to promote a narrative that is more effective for them, that they're doing better than they otherwise are. And if the other side is engaged in greater atrocities than they actually are, you see lots of that. Lots of immediately fake videos putting out of buildings that are being destroyed, people that have been killed, people that are providing support for kill all the Jews and kill all the Palestinians that actually came from previous conflicts, not from the present one. There's plenty of that.
首先，总会有战争中的战争迷雾。双方都会故意发布虚假信息，试图宣传对他们更为有利的叙述，让人们觉得他们的表现比实际上好。如果对方的暴行比实际情况严重，你会看到很多这样的情况。有很多虚假视频，展示被摧毁的建筑物、被杀害的人们以及支持杀光犹太人和杀光巴勒斯坦人的人们，这些视频实际上来源于以前的冲突，而不是当前的冲突。这样的虚假信息有很多。
This time around, there's also so much more hatred. There's on social media especially. There's so much more willingness to promote algorithmically opinions that you would never hear in your family, that you would never hear in your community in your school, but it's being bombarded. This is very different from the so-called mainstream media, whether it's the BBC or the Deutsche Weiler or it's Fox News or CNN. No, no, social media has become a far more greatly polarized and hate-filled space.
这一次，仇恨更多了，尤其在社交媒体上尤为明显。人们更加愿意推广那些你在家庭、社区或学校从未听说过的、由算法主导的意见，而这种推广被不断强化。这与所谓的主流媒体（无论是BBC、德国威尔或是福克斯新闻还是CNN）是非常不同的。社交媒体已经变成了一个更加极端和充满仇恨的空间。
I've received at least 30 death threats over the last 48 hours from complete randos. A few people that I actually could track if I really needed to, most anonymous accounts, but clearly people that are writing me directly, some of whom are really, really pro-Israel, some of whom are really, really pro-Palestine, and some of whom are probably just trolling for the lulls, as they like to say. It is increasingly very hard to navigate this space without becoming incensed and deranged.
在过去的48小时里，我至少收到了30条来自完全陌生人的死亡威胁。其中有几个人我确实可以追踪到，但大多数都是匿名账户，显然是直接写信给我的人，其中一些人非常、非常支持以色列，一些人则非常、非常支持巴勒斯坦，还有一些可能只是出于恶作剧而写这些话。在这个领域中，越来越难以保持冷静和理智。
Having said that, as much as I find Twitter slash X, a space antithetical to civil society, I also know as someone who does analysis that some of the best real-time information from sources on the ground is being passed through on X and is not found in other places. It will not come through in mainstream media. The average person, you need to spend a lot more time filtering and figuring out where to go and who to follow, but it still is the one place that you can go. It really does.
也就是说，尽管我认为Twitter（X）是一个与公民社会对立的空间，但作为一名分析人士，我也了解到一些来自实地消息源的最好的实时信息通过Twitter（X）传递出来，并且在其他地方找不到。这些信息在主流媒体中不会出现。对于普通人来说，你需要花更多的时间来筛选和确定去哪里，并关注谁。但它仍然是你唯一可以去的地方。确实如此。
The whole thing profoundly worries me because when you're in an environment that you can no longer know what is truth, what is real information, it is really hard to maintain a society that is human. When you have people that are saying that all Israelis are X and all Palestinians are Y and that is where much of social media, a strong majority of social media is there right now, you cannot have dialogue, you cannot have solutions, and you can very easily tilt into war, into radicalism, into fascism. This is something we all need to be guarded against.
整个事情让我深感担忧，因为当你身处于一个你无法再了解真相、真实信息的环境中时，很难维持一个人性化的社会。当有人声称所有以色列人是X，所有巴勒斯坦人是Y，并且这种观点占据了社交媒体的绝大多数，对话变得不可能，解决方案变得不可能，而进入战争、极端主义和法西斯主义的危险是非常容易的。这是我们都需要警惕的事情。
I truly believe that the social media companies need to be regulated on this. They are acting as if they have no responsibility for what's on their sites. It's just like the phone company that if you and I, Helen, are having a conversation about blowing something up, well, we're responsible for that, but the phone company is responsible. I accept that. Helen, if you and I are having a conversation about blowing something up, and then the phone company takes that conversation, identifies everyone else that might be interested in blowing something up or is considered it and takes that conversation and promotes it to them, then you, the phone company, are responsible. You are liable. You should be taken down.
我真心相信社交媒体公司需要接受监管。他们表现得好像他们对自己网站上的内容毫无责任感。这就像电话公司，如果你和我，海伦，讨论炸毁某物的事情，那么我们对此负有责任，但电话公司并不负责。我可以接受这一点。但是，如果你和我讨论炸毁某物的事情，然后电话公司获取了这段对话，找出了其他可能对炸毁某物感兴趣或正在考虑的人，并将这段对话推荐给他们，那么电话公司就要负责。他们应该承担责任，应该被查封。
We are in a war right now and the social media companies are actively fanning the flames. They are spraying fuel on the flames and they're doing it globally, globally, so much so that countries like China that are authoritarian and control their media space actually have sort of an intrinsic political stability advantage in information warfare over open societies that should be the most resilient. That's crazy and we can't keep going down that path. The ironies are writ large.
我们现在处于一场战争中，社交媒体公司正在积极加剧矛盾。他们在全球范围内煽风点火，以至于像中国这样控制媒体空间的威权国家在信息战中具有某种固有的政治稳定优势，超过了应该是最具韧性的开放社会。这太疯狂了，我们不能继续走下去。讽刺的是，这种情况十分明显。
Okay, so we are coming on our time, but I wonder if you can leave us with a sense of what should we be watching for next? What should we be looking for? First, we need to look for Lebanon. This is the issue of Hezbollah, which so far has been the dog that has not barked. Is that going to continue? It is the place that you are most likely to see tipping point escalation if it were to occur. And you have Hezbollah operatives of many different stripes. They are loosely organized. They're well trained, but that doesn't mean that they're all following marching orders from one direct leader.
好的，那么现在是我们的时间了，但我想知道你是否能给我们一种感觉，我们接下来应该关注什么？我们应该寻找什么？首先，我们需要关注黎巴嫩。这是真主党的问题，迄今为止，它还没有发声。这种情况会持续下去吗？如果有的话，这可能是引发危机升级的地方。而真主党的成员有很多不同派别，他们组织松散，受过良好训练，但并不意味着他们都听从一个直接领导者的指令。
The potential that this could, you could see escalation with some Israeli farmers getting killed and then the Israelis respond. And before you know it, you're in a much bigger firefight. Lebanon's involved. Hezbollah's involved. And then it knocks onto Iran. That is sort of the gateway drug in the Middle East, even if nobody wants that fight. I would worry that's one thing to watch.
这可能会导致以色列农民丧命，然后以色列人做出回应，很可能会升级。之后，局势会变得更加恶劣，引发更大规模的战斗。黎巴嫩也会卷入其中，真主党也会参与其中，接着可能会牵扯到伊朗。尽管谁都不希望卷入这场战斗，但这可能成为中东地区的导火索。我担心这是一个需要关注的问题。
Second thing to watch, of course, imminently is what happens with these hostages. Do the Israelis get them back? Historically, that has always been the top priority. And it is today. But Hamas has control over that. And you know, if the Israelis are not prepared to negotiate with Hamas to release militants presently in Israel presence, and it's very hard to imagine in today's environment, they would be willing to do that.
当然，下一件要关注的事情就是这些人质的命运。以色列人是否会把他们带回来？从历史来看，这一直是最重要的事情。而且现在也是如此。但是哈马斯掌控着这一切。而且要知道，如果以色列人不愿意与哈马斯谈判，释放目前在以色列境内的武装分子，就很难想象他们会愿意这样做，尤其是在当今的环境下。
Well, how exactly do they get them back? And how many of them can they actually free? Again, you know, the Israelis and the Americans have far, far better trade craft on the ability to get these hostages out than Hamas have to take them. But Hamas has exceeded expectations over the past 48 hours. And I would worry very much about that. That would be the second thing I'd watch most closely right now.
嗯，他们具体是如何把人质解救回来的呢？他们实际上能解救出多少人？再次强调，你知道，以色列和美国在解救人质方面有非常出色的技术，而哈马斯在劫持人质方面并没有那么擅长。但过去的48小时里，哈马斯超出了人们的预期。我非常担心这一点。这会是我现在最关注的第二个事情。
And then finally, the nature of the Israeli government itself. Do we have success in putting together a unified national emergency government, in which case we will have more stability in governance and decision making that comes from Israel? And I think and also greater willingness to consider longer term engagement with those Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, to start at least that might be looking for a more constructive path now that they are back on the agenda.
然后，最后一个问题是以色列政府自身的性质。如果我们成功组建一个统一的国家紧急政府，我们将在以色列国内获得更多的稳定性、更好的统治和决策能力。我认为这样做也会更愿意考虑与巴勒斯坦人长期合作，尤其是在约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦人，他们或许现在寻求一条更具建设性的道路，因为他们又回到了议事日程上。
I don't have a high amount of optimism that that's going to happen. But you asked me for something hopeful that would be something.
我对这件事情发生持有的乐观态度并不高。但是你找我希望我给你提供一些积极的东西，那就是一件。
Ian Bremmer, we are so grateful for your time and for your insight. Thank you so much for joining us. Stay well. My protocol.
Ian Bremmer，非常感谢您的时间和洞察力。非常感谢您的加入。保持健康。我的协议。