And you're exactly right, that's what's happening right now. So at the end of the day, at a high level, what matters is to buy and demand. And as we know, the US Treasury is basically going to issue 1.5 to $2 trillion worth of debt every year for the foreseeable future. And we've never issued that much ever consistently. So you got to look at what the demand is.
Now, demand doesn't look good, especially from those people we would traditionally think as buying. So until recently, the marginal buyer of Treasury debt was the Fed, obviously, doing NASA QE and the commercial banks actually, they were buying hundreds of boons of dollars. But then they all stepped away last year. So who was the marginal buyer after them? It was actually the hedge fund community. They were buying hundreds of boons of surgeries as part of a cash futures basis trade. And from my research, it looks like they're not buying anymore either.
So who's going to step into this vacuum? And the problem is, I don't really think there is anyone. And that's why yields are drifting higher. Now, traditionally, as you know, we would think of people like pension funds or insurance companies that might potentially step in. After all, those guys have a lot of money and they like conservative investments, right? But when you actually look at the data, you'll see that they have never been very big investors in Trejories, even before the great financial crisis, when Treasury yields were pretty high.
Those guys have actually preferred very different assets. If you are a pension fund, you actually strangely enough buy a lot of equities. Now, as we know, if you look at the public pension funds, they are seriously underfunded. And so I think they have been buying a lot of equities and private equities and alternative assets, not a lot of Trejories. The life ensures another big pool of potential buyers. They buy almost entirely fixed income, but not Trejories, very, very low Trejories. They buy a ton of corporate bonds. And I think the reason is that at corporate bonds, you know, we see Trejories, the 10-year goal up towards 5%. But if you're buying a corporate bond, you can get another 2% on top of that. It still always makes more sense by these spread products rather than Trejories. And that's what they do.
So I think we're in a very dangerous period, because I don't see any clear margin of buyers stepping up. And I think there's a really good chance that we would retire and maybe, maybe, get a spike higher like the repo market in 2019. So the implications of all of this, if I'm, you know, either a normal investor or just a normal consumer, you know, I'm already seeing higher mortgage rates, higher financing costs for, if I want to purchase a vehicle for everything, right? So what does this mean? What are the implications then if you don't have these buyers coming in to buy Trejories, what then is the ceiling for yields?
So I, so that's the question right now. I think what will happen. Well, first of all, the implications directly is that as yields go higher, that's going to be pretty negative for the economy and for the rest of the financial assets. Now, as yields go higher, we can think of as people maybe instead of buying cookies, maybe they'll buy some fixed income. And of course, as yields go higher, if you are someone buying a house, your mortgage rates are going to stay very high. If you're a company that eventually wants to refinance instead, you're going to have to pay higher rates too. So I think that's going to be a drag on the economy and eventually push us towards recession sometime in the second half of next year.
Honestly, I think yields top when the Fed steps in because there really is no other buyer available to buy all these coupon Trejories and other than the Fed. Now, you can have some big accident in the markets forcing a big risk off-play, but longer term speaking, I think the only the only game in town is the Fed as someone that is more active in the markets. Maybe something along the game along the lines of like the Bank of Japan. We're not there yet, but I think that is the ultimate end game for monetary policy here.
So this is really interesting, Joseph. So what you're saying is it's not the yield stop going up when the Fed stops raising rates. That's been something that people talk about. It's when the Fed actually comes in and starts buying Trejories again? I believe so, yes. I think that so just, okay, so like I said, I look at things for the lens of supply and demand. And from my analysis, the demand is really maxed out at this point. But the supply is for all intents and purposes, infinite, because we have a significant fiscal deficit that only grows larger. So eventually, I think yields start topping out when there's more active involvement by the Fed, not by cutting rates, but actually being actually involved in the Treasury market as a buyer.
And so do you think then that the consensus at this stage seems to be indeed that the Fed's going to start cutting rates, maybe in the second half of next year, that's something that Dotplot has seemed to gesture at as well. You think it's more likely that they will come in and do this kind of action versus a straight-up cut or would they come sort of in tandem?
I think they'll view these two actions as separate. I think that when they go in, perhaps by Trejories or even stop quantitative timing, I think they will view it as more of a market functioning aspect. As in, there's some technical matter, maybe we have to go in and fix it and it will be okay. So much of what they did with the repo market in 2019, so repo rates spiked tremendously. And they added some facilities and added some liquidity and thought the problem would go away.
When they're actually adjusting the overnight rate, like you mentioned, that's changing the stance of monetary policy. I think they'll proceed that to be something separate. And yes, I agree that they will be cutting rates sometime next year as the economy slows and as inflation gets under control. But I would view purchases in the treasury markets as separate from changing the stance of monetary policy.