Destined for War with Graham Allison

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这个播客由Wharton商业电台提供。来自宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院校园的《市场幕后》将为您带来商业电台的节目。欢迎您收听沃顿商学院主办的商业电台《市场幕后》。我是您的主持人Jeremy Schwartz，智库研究总监，也是ETS的赞助商，我的共同主持人是沃顿金融学教授Jeremy Segal，《长期走势股票》和《投资者的未来》的作者。本周教授正在智利度假，与家人一同旅行，所以很遗憾今天不能与我们在一起。请注意，我代表的是四方基金服务。今天的讨论与投资产品办公室无关。嘉宾的观点属于他们自己，与我们智库或关联公司无关。

We've got a really special show for you today, and it's very, very timely. The politics is all the rage, talks between North Korea, South Korea taking place. There's the goal of easing tensions over there in Korea, and we've really got one of the foremost experts on both nuclear situations, missiles, as well as just generally the rise of the Asian superpowers, China versus the U.S., the goals, the tension that's creating.

今天我们为您带来一场非常特别的节目，而且非常及时。政治问题正处在热议之中，朝韩对话正在进行中。目标是缓解朝鲜半岛的紧张局势，我们确实邀请了两个核问题、导弹问题以及亚洲超级大国崛起（中国与美国）等领域最杰出的专家，谈论这些问题的目标和产生的紧张关系。

Our guests for the first half of the show would be Graham Allison. He's a Douglas Dolan, professor of government at Harvard University of Kennedy School of Government. He's a leading analyst on all national security defense policies, and he also has a great new book that I've been talking about a lot with people on what is the most important issue for us over the next decade, China versus the U.S., destined for war. Can America and China escape through Citi's trap?

我们节目上半场的嘉宾是格雷厄姆·艾里森。他是哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院的道格拉斯·多兰政府教授，是所有国家安全和国防政策的主要分析家，他还有一本备受关注的新书，我一直在与人们谈论着这本书，讨论的是未来十年对我们来说最重要的问题，中美之间的对抗和命定的战争。美国和中国能否避开困境逃脱呢？

On the second part of the show, we're talking with Perth Tolle, who's the founder of Life and Liberty Indexes, and Perth has a background, have grown up in Beijing and in China, and it has a lot of experiences from her background there, and we're talking to her about the indexes she's created.

在节目的第二部分，我们将与Life and Liberty Indexes的创始人佩思·托尔进行交谈。佩思在北京和中国长大，拥有丰富的背景经历。我们将与她讨论她所创建的指数。

But for the first part of the show, Graham, welcome to our program. Thanks for joining us to talk about your book and your views and all of the research you've done.

在节目的第一部分，Graham，欢迎来到我们的节目。感谢你加入我们，谈论你的书籍、观点和你所做的所有研究。

Thank you so much for having me. So you have been involved in policy on the key issue of the day, so maybe we could sort of talk at a very high level, but maybe sort of talk about your personal experiences and where we get into a lot of the different dynamics of the current situation, but maybe we could talk what your reading of the situation is, you have this book, Destin for War, talk about maybe the high level U.S. versus China and what got you down this path of researching the book, Destin for War.

非常感谢你邀请我。所以你一直参与当今关键问题的政策制定，也许我们可以从一个非常高的层面来谈，但也讨论一下你个人的经历，我们可以涉及当前局势的各种不同动态，也许我们可以谈谈你对局势的看法，你写了这本《命运战争》，也可以讨论一下中美之间的高层次对抗，以及你为什么选择研究命运战争这本书。

Well, it's a long story, but sure of it is, I've been a student of international security and American national security for all of my career. I've written a book on the Cuban Missile Crisis many years ago, but I've studied nuclear weapons. I was part of the old Cold War and the Soviet Union, but over the last dozen years of various of my former mentors, including Lee Kuanyu, who was the founder and builder of Singapore, and Henry Kissinger, who's my old professor, and then my colleague, you know, in the years since, kept saying, you should look more at China. You should look more at China. So the last dozen years I've been looking at the subject, and in the course of that came to the realization that what we're seeing in the rise of China and its impact on the U.S. is a version of a pattern that's really as old as history, as a pattern that was identified by the father and founder of history, fellow men, Thucydides. And he wrote about classical Greece and the occasion when the rise of Athens impacted Sparta and produced a catastrophic war.

嗯，这是一个很长的故事，但肯定的是，我在整个职业生涯中一直致力于国际安全和美国国家安全的学习。多年前，我曾写过一本关于古巴导弹危机的书，但我一直在研究核武器。我是冷战时期和苏联的一部分，但在过去十几年里，包括李显龙和亨利·基辛格在内的我以前的导师们一直告诉我，你应该更多地关注中国。你应该更多地关注中国。所以在过去的十几年里，我一直在研究这个课题，而在研究的过程中意识到，中国的崛起及其对美国的影响是一种历史上一直存在的模式，这种模式是由历史之父、历史学家修昔底德所确认的。他写过古希腊的经典案例，描述了雅典的崛起对斯巴达产生了灾难性战争的影响。

So in this book I look at the last 500 years. I find 16 cases, one, six, in which a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. Twelve of them in and more, four of them in and without war. So to say that war between a rising China and a ruling U.S. today is inevitable would be a mistake. That's not correct. But to say that the odds are not good would be right. And Thucydides reminded us in particular that in this dangerous dynamic between a rising power and a ruling power, the principal danger arises from third party actions, third party provocateurs in effect, who take an action not desired by either of the primary competitors, but to which one of the other feels compelled to respond, which then leads to a cycle of actions and reactions that in somewhere people don't want to go. And the great candidate for that today in the current scene is Kim Jong-un and what's happening on the Korean Peninsula.

在这本书中，我研究了过去500年的历史。我发现了16个案例，其中有16种情况，新兴大国威胁到统治大国的地位。其中有12种情况下发生了战争，还有4种情况没有发生战争。因此，说当前崛起中的中国和统治中的美国之间必然会发生战争是错误的。这是不正确的。但是，说胜算不大是正确的。修昔底德尤其提醒我们，在新兴大国和统治大国之间危险的互动中，主要的危险是来自第三方的行动，其实就是第三方的挑衅者，他们采取了一种既不是主要竞争者所期望的行动，但其中一个竞争者觉得自己不得不做出回应，然后引发一系列的行动和反应，这会带来人们并不想要走向的结果。在当前的局势中，朝鲜半岛上发生的事情成为了一个可能的主要候选人。

Yeah, no, that was the obvious thought pattern of what you were developing there is that that sounds early like the situation we have today. And so through that lens of what's happening in North Korea, how much is that the biggest risk? We see that every day in the news with Trump and Kim Jong-un. Is that going to be, is that something you're worried about? And how do you see that playing out here?

是的，不，你正在开发的那种明显的思维模式是，听起来很像我们今天所面临的情况。所以通过这种角度来看朝鲜的局势，这是否是最大的风险？我们每天在新闻中都能看到特朗普和金正恩之间的争议。你是否担心这个问题？你认为这将如何在这里发展？

Well, if Thucydides were, if we could consult Thucydides, he would say, this is the pattern that we've seen before. So in the case of Athens in Sparta, there was a quarrelsome ally of Sparta's component, which is the city state, and it got into a tangle with another party, Coursera, and then one thing led to the other and the two parties found themselves at war. One of the more chilling analogy is 1914. So there the assassination of an archduke, who didn't really matter at all, became the spark that produced a fire that burned down the hall of Europe, and at the end of which all of the great nations of Europe had been laid low.

如果我们能够咨询修昔底德的话，他会说，这是我们曾见过的模式。就像雅典和斯巴达一样，其中一个斯巴达的盟友，也就是城邦，与另一个团体库斯拉发生了争执，接着事情就一发不可收拾，两个团体最终陷入了战争。其中一个更令人不安的类比是1914年。在那里，一个并不重要的大公爵被暗杀成为导火索，引发了一场燃烧整个欧洲的大火，最终导致了所有伟大的欧洲国家的衰落。

So basically in the North Korean case today, we have with Kim Jong-un, almost, you know, if you were doing this in Hollywood, central casting couldn't do better for a provocateur, who is determined to have an ICBM that can deliver a nuclear weapon against San Francisco or Los Angeles. And now enter Donald Trump as his sort of competitor, who says, never is this going to happen on my watch. If the only way for me to prevent Kim Jong-un from completing the next set of ICBM tests and being able to attack San Francisco is for me to attack him, I'll do it.

基本上来说，在今天的朝鲜案例中，我们有金正恩，可以说如果你将这个拍成好莱坞电影，人选定装配不出这样一个挑衅者，他下定决心要有一枚可将核武器投放到旧金山或洛杉矶的洲际弹道导弹。而现在登场的是特朗普，他可以说是金正恩的竞争对手，他表示，在我的任期内绝不会让这种情况发生。如果我防止金正恩完成下一系列洲际弹道导弹试验并能够攻击旧金山的唯一方式是攻击他，那么我会这么做。

But as we see these two trains sort of moving down a path to what will inevitably be a conclusion, sorry, a collision, we are now hoping that somehow against hope, Kim Jong-un can stop, we is now, and we cannot attack him, and we'll find some resolution. But I would say this is like the situation that one saw in 1914, and indeed like a pattern that one sees repeatedly in the book with the 16 cases.

但是正如我们看到这两列火车沿着一条不可避免的道路前进，抱歉，是一场冲突，我们现在希望Kim Jong-un能以某种方式停下来，我们是现在这样希望的，我们不能攻击他，并且我们会找到解决方案。但是我要说这就像在1914年看到的情况，实际上就像在这本书中反复出现的16个案例中看到的模式。

So what do you think is Kim Jong-un's ultimate end goal through all these fighting with the US and sort of the provacitation is what's he looking for? What does he think he can sort of blackmail the US into? And then what do you see as China's reasons for sort of helping to defend essentially North Korea and a lot of this?

那么，你认为金正恩通过与美国的所有这些斗争和挑衅活动，最终目标是什么？他希望通过什么方式来讹诈美国？而你认为中国有什么原因来帮助捍卫朝鲜？

Well, two good questions. So I think basically Kim Jong-un's motives are clear enough. We keep trying to make them more obscure than they are. He wants to survive, and he wants his regime to survive, and he's noticed that there's a dangerous country called the US, which from time to time attacks countries like Saddam's Iraq or Gaddafi's Libya, and overturns the government and kills the leader. And he doesn't want to be one of those. And he thinks that if he has nuclear weapons that can threaten the US, that there's no way the US will attack him. And I would say as much as I despise that logic, I think it has a certain credibility.

好的，两个很好的问题。所以我认为基本上金正恩的动机已经很清楚了。我们一直试图让他们变得比实际情况更难以理解。他想要存活下去，他想要自己的政权存活下去，并且他注意到有一个危险的国家叫做美国，它会不时地攻击像萨达姆的伊拉克或卡扎菲的利比亚这样的国家，推翻政府并杀害领导人。他不想成为其中的一个。他认为如果他拥有可以威胁美国的核武器，美国就不会攻击他。我要说，尽管我鄙视这种逻辑，但我认为它有一定的可信度。

On the other hand, we have a China, which doesn't care that much about Kim Jong-un and North Korea, even though it's been its traditional ally, but does care a lot about not having a unified Korea that's an American military ally on its border. So Korea abuts China in 1950 when the North Koreans provoked the war by attacking South Korea and the Americans came to the rescue as we marched north to unify the country, and what would have been a unified country, China entered the war, and most of the Americans that were killed in the Korean War, of whom there were about 50,000, and most of the Chinese were killed in that war, of which there were hundreds of thousands, and millions of Koreans were killed by Americans and Chinese fighting each other.

另一方面，我们有一个中国，对金正恩和朝鲜并不那么在意，尽管他们一直是传统盟友，但是却非常在乎不让一个与美国结盟的统一的朝鲜位于其边界上。所以在1950年，朝鲜攻击韩国并引发了战争时，中国与韩国接壤了。当美国军队向北进军以统一国家时，中国参与了这场战争，大部分在朝鲜战争中丧生的美国人有约5万人，而大部分在这场战争中丧生的中国人有几十万，数百万的韩国人则因美中两国的战斗而丧生。

So, if it's hard to imagine that a little country like North Korea could take actions that at the end of the action-reaction cycle, you have two nations, the US and China, and more, we should look and look again at the first Korean War, and notice they already did this once before.

所以，如果很难想象像朝鲜这样一个小国家会采取行动，结果最后在行动和反应循环的结束时，你会有两个国家，美国和中国，以及更多其他国家，那么我们应该再次回顾第一次朝鲜战争，并注意到他们已经曾经这样做过一次。

What about the other situation that's been brewing, the situation with Taiwan, and how that interaction with China? Is there any risk of Taiwan being also one of the cattle? I'm everybody talking about North Korea every day.

还有另一种正在酝酿的情况，那就是台湾的局势，以及与中国的互动。台湾会不会像朝鲜一样成为“牛群”之一，存在风险吗？每天大家都在谈论朝鲜。

One of the chapters in the book is called From Here to War, and the purpose of the chapter is to say, here are five paths in which it's not required to stretch, just easy steps, when the current trajectory of events at the end of which you could have a war between the US and China, and Taiwan is a very good candidate, just as you said, so that's a good point.

书中的其中一个章节名为从此到战争，这一章的目的是说，这里有五个路径，无需努力，只需简单的步骤，即可导致当前事件轨迹最终可能发生美国和中国之间的战争，而台湾是一个非常有可能的候选者，就像你所说的那样，所以这是一个很好的观点。

So, basically, for anybody that watched what happened in October at the party Congress in which Xi Jinping, the leader of China, was not just reelected for another five years, but he was really coronated, like a 24-century emperor, with no successor in sight.

所以，基本上，对于任何看过十月份党代会上发生的事情的人来说，中国领导人习近平不仅被重新选举连任五年，而且他被像24世纪的皇帝一样加冕，而无人看到其继任者。

In that, he asserts clearly in the program that he outlined at the party Congress that China is not about to become a democracy, as Westerners think of it. It wants to be a party-led state in which the party dominates everything and in which citizens live within a party framework.

在此，他明确表示在党的大会上所规划的计划中，中国不会成为西方所理解的民主国家。中国希望成为一个党领导一切的国家，公民在一个党的框架下生活。

Well, in Taiwan, you now have 25 million people who have developed a democracy and who have a market economy and who live their lives the way they would like to do.

在台湾，现在有2500万人拥有发展成熟的民主制度和市场经济，他们可以过上自己想要的生活方式。

So, the formula that is the ambiguous umbrella that's managed to prevent this issue from coming to a head has been the fiction that both Taiwan and China subscribe to and we endorse, which is really there's one country and two systems.

所以，能够阻止这个问题爆发的那个模糊公式，一直以来都是台湾和中国均订阅并得到我们认可的虚构故事，即一个国家、两种体系。

It just happens they both disagree about which the country is. The Taiwanese think it's a country that would be in effect a reflection of Taiwan, and the Chinese think it's a China that will incorporate Taiwan.

恰好他们俩对于这个国家的定义存在分歧。台湾人认为这个国家实际上是台湾的倒影，而中国人则认为它是一个将包括台湾的中国。

So, there's no question, whatever, in anybody's mind, that if Taiwan would have tried to establish itself as an independent country, China will fight it and prevent that from happening. And if the US should be supporting Taiwan, then it would find itself in the world with US.

因此，毫无疑问，任何人都明白，如果台湾试图建立自己的独立国家，中国将会与之对抗并阻止其实现。如果美国应该支持台湾，那么它将发现自己置身于与中国对立的世界中。

We're talking with Graham Allison, author of a book, Destin for War, basically the discussion of China versus US and the rise of China and how that's threatening the US in some ways and how this is through CitiD's trap, the example of 16 times in history, this led to this rising power versus the established country.

我们正在与格雷厄姆·艾利森进行对话，他是《注定战争》一书的作者，这本书主要讨论了中国与美国之间的对抗以及中国的崛起，以及这在某种程度上对美国构成了威胁，同时通过“修昔底德陷阱”的例子，以16次历史中的崛起大国对抗已建立国家的情况来说明。

Graham, when you think about just China's rise, what's impressed you the most? You had a huge section in the book talking about just the huge growth rates of China and how it's come along to be really one of the already one of the leaders for the global economy.

格雷厄姆，当你思考中国崛起时，什么给你留下了最深刻的印象？在书中，你有一个很大的章节专门讲述了中国巨大的增长速度，以及中国如何成为全球经济中的一员，并已经成为全球经济的领导者之一。

Maybe talk about, were you talking about the sort of concept of the purchasing power of how much they can buy for their military, where their economy is on a PPP basis compared to just the general way we talk about them as a second largest economy in US dollars?

也许谈论一下，你是在谈论他们军队的购买力概念，也就是他们经济在购买力平价基准上相对于我们普遍以美元讨论的作为第二大经济体的方式之间的差异。

Talk about what's impressed you the most about China and where you see that economy going.

谈谈你对中国最印象深刻的地方以及你认为中国经济的发展方向。

I spend five days in China just coming back the day before Christmas, talking because everybody in China is very interested in the argument about CitiD's trap, since Xi Jinping talks about it a lot. Every time we go to China, you have to be blown away.

我在中国度过了五天的时间，就在圣诞节前一天刚刚回来。我们之间的对话主要是关于CitiD的陷阱问题，因为中国的每个人都对此非常感兴趣，习近平也经常谈及此事。每次我们去中国，都会被深深震撼。

As I say in the book, I have a first chapter called The Rise of China. Most people in the US haven't been watching, but never before as a country risen so far, so fast, on so many different dimensions. I quote former Czech president, Bakhov Havel's good line says, things have happened so fast, we haven't yet had time to be astonished.

正如我在书中所说的，我有一个叫做中国崛起的第一章。大多数美国人并没有关注，但从来没有一个国家在如此多个领域上崛起得如此迅速，如此高远。我引用前捷克总统巴哈夫·哈维尔的一句好话，他说，事情发生得如此之快，我们还没有时间感到惊讶。

So one dramatic example I can see you looking at my office in Harvard right now is a bridge that goes across the river between the Kennedy School where my office is in the business school, across the Charles River.

一个戏剧性的例子我可以看到你正在看我的哈佛办公室，在肯尼迪学院和我的办公室所在的商学院之间，有一座横跨查尔斯河的桥梁。

That bridge has been under renovation for now 48 months, it's not yet over. It's three times over budget, it's been delayed four times. There's a bridge I drove across in Beijing last week called a Sunyun Bridge. It's got twice as many traffic lanes as the bridge, the Harvard Bridge.

这座桥已经进行了48个月的翻修，但尚未完工。这个项目的预算已经超支了三倍，也经历了四次延期。上周我在北京开车经过了一座被称为"孙运桥"的桥。它有两倍于哈佛桥的车道数量。

They decided to renovate it the same way Harvard is doing in 2015. How long did it take for them to complete the project? Me interest 43 hours. So you can go to YouTube and actually put in a 43 hour China bridge and see the video speed it up of this project.

他们决定按照2015年哈佛大学的方式进行翻新。他们花了多长时间来完成这个项目？我感兴趣的话可以花43个小时去YouTube搜索“43小时中国桥梁”，观看这个项目加速的视频。

So everything from the airport to the roads, to the subways, to the ports, to the hotels, to the skyscrapers, to the behaviors of the companies. When you were seeing this, anybody who hasn't seen China in its face and in its space has either not been looking or they should wake up.

所以从机场到道路、地铁、港口、酒店、摩天大楼、企业的行为，你看到的一切。如果有人没有亲身看到中国的变化，要么是没去过，要么需要醒醒了。

The US we talk about an infrastructure package that maybe Trump will get behind, but the infrastructure you talk about, how many high speed rail lines that they have in China being more than the rest of the world.

我们谈论的是一个基础设施项目，或许特朗普会支持，但你提到的基础设施，中国拥有的高速铁路线数量超过世界其他国家的总和。

We have one high speed rail line that we've been building since 2010. It goes from San Francisco to Los Angeles, 500 miles. It was supposed to be done in 2017. They then said, no, how about 2029? And many people that will never happen.

我们有一条自2010年开始修建的高铁线路。它从旧金山到洛杉矶，全长500英里。最初计划在2017年完工。然后他们说，不，2029年怎么样？很多人认为这永远不会发生。

How many miles of high speed rail that China lay in that same 10 years when we didn't finish the 500 miles? The interest 16,000.

在我们未能完成500英里的高铁铺设的同样10年间，中国铺设了多少英里的高铁？ 利益颇多，达到了16,000英里。

If we had a high speed rail going from Boston to Washington, I could get on the train and go at 180 miles an hour and be in Washington in an hour and 40 minutes.

如果我们有一条从波士顿到华盛顿的高速铁路，我可以乘坐火车以每小时180英里的速度前往，仅用1小时40分钟就能到达华盛顿。

So just the whole conception is in the course that I give to people, I give a short version in the book. It says, when could China become number one? And I have 46 indicators, key indicators, but in the book I just give a dozen.

所以在我向人们提供的课程中，整个构思就在于此，而在书中我只给出了简略版本。它说的是，中国何时能够成为第一？我有46个关键指标，但在书中我只列举了十几个。

So the largest middle class, the biggest producer of smartphones, the fastest supercomputers, the largest national economy. And so students have to guess in the course they have to write down which year, 2030, 2040, not in my lifetime. Then I show them a second slide, which is already, all those things already happened.

所以中国拥有最庞大的中产阶级、最大的智能手机生产商、最快的超级计算机和最大的国民经济。因此，学生们在课程中必须猜测他们需要记录的年份，2030年、2040年，还是在我有生之年。然后，我向他们展示了第二张幻灯片，那些事情已经全部发生了。

Most people missed the fact that the big takeaway from the IMF World Bank meeting in 2014 was that China now has the largest economy in the world measured by what? Both the CIA and the IMF regard as the best single yardstick for measuring the size or comparing the economies, which is purchasing power parity. So if you're buying airplanes or drones or bridges or subways or airports or whatever, using the currency of China in China today, you can buy more stuff than you can buy in the US.

大多数人忽视了2014年国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行会议的重要前提，即中国现在拥有世界上最大的经济体，按照什么标准来测量呢？美国中央情报局（CIA）和国际货币基金组织（IMF）都认为，购买力平价是衡量经济规模或比较经济体的最佳单一标准。因此，如果今天您在中国使用人民币购买飞机、无人机、桥梁、地铁、机场或其他商品，在中国的购买力要高于在美国购买的商品。

Yeah, you talk a lot about destined for war. There's obviously more than just military types of warfare. And one of the examples in the book you gave is they have the fastest supercomputer around cyber warfare is another hot topic of the day and also the protection for cyber security. Any sense of it, do you think the cyber warfare is a much higher chance to break out than sort of actually military shooting wars or the other topical political discussion is trade wars with Trump and is he going to become more protectionist and that may be sort of a catalyst for further work at any commentary on those two types of cyber war.

是的，你说了很多关于注定发生战争的事情。显然，战争不仅限于军事形式。你提到的书中的一个例子是他们拥有最快的超级计算机，网络战争是当今的另一个热门话题，也是网络安全的保护。你觉得网络战争的爆发机会比实际的军事战争要高吗？另一个当前的政治讨论是特朗普的贸易战，他会变得更加保护主义，这可能成为进一步研究的催化剂。你对这两种类型的网络战争有何评论？

Cyber war is ongoing. That is, if you take it, if this includes cyber theft as I described in the book, in the Chinese theft of US electoral property is the greatest theft ever, theft ever in history. So basically, several trillion dollars worth of electoral property have been stolen. And in the Chinese mode of operation, you know, what we call R&D research and development, they call R-D-N-T. And the T stands for theft. So if I can steal the design for an F-35, the American advanced fighter, whether they invest in research and development, I start with a great advantage. And actually, if you look at the rollout of the Chinese version of the F-35, they're almost able to deploy the plane faster than we can. So basically, I can not only steal the stuff, but because I make things faster, I can produce them. So I would say you're seeing that across the spectrum.

网络战正在进行中。也就是说，如果你接受这个事实，如果这包括我在书中描述的网络盗窃，在中美选举财产盗窃中，是有史以来最大的盗窃。因此，价值数万亿美元的选举财产已被盗窃。而在中国的操作方式中，你知道，我们称之为研发（Research and Development），他们称之为R-D-N-T。而T代表的就是盗窃。所以，如果我能窃取F-35这种美国先进战斗机的设计，无论他们投资于研发与否，我都将占有巨大的优势。而事实上，如果你看看中国版F-35的发布情况，他们几乎能比我们更快地部署这款飞机。所以，基本上，我不仅能窃取东西，还因为生产速度快，我可以制造它们。所以我可以说，你可以在各个领域看到这种情况。

And now, in the economic realm, again, economic conflict or war is a vague term. Do we have an effect on ongoing competition between the US and China in the economic realm? Yes, we do. And are the terms of trade or the China one as mercantilists and protectionists on a national economy as it can get away with, yes, it does. And in fact, if you look at the program that Xi Jinping laid out at the 19th Party Congress, by 2025, so they set like a business, they set specific objectives on specific dates. By 2025, they mean to dominate 10 key industries that they identify, which include advanced information industries, including quantum computing, AI, and big data. By 2035, they mean to be the leader in innovation in every domain. And by 2049, they mean to be the global superpower, that the plan they lay out. Now, again, between here and there, there are lots of potential slips and a lot of obstacles, a lot of challenges. And that's what we say, well, okay, well, I don't really believe this is going to happen. I hope that's not going to happen. If you look at the performance of China in the 21st century, the slowest year of growth they had after the great financial crisis in 2027 and 8, the slowest year of growth was more than twice the fastest year of growth of the US economy. So basically, this is a, this is a, as I quote, Lee Kuan Yew in the book, he says, Americans are going to find this extremely difficult because China is destined to be the largest player in the history of the world. Four times as many Chinese as there are Americans. So if they're only one quarter as productive, they'll have an economy as big as ours. And why should they only be one quarter as productive? No, absolutely.

现在，在经济领域中，经济冲突或战争是一个模糊的术语。我们对美国和中国之间的经济竞争有影响吗？是的，我们有影响力。中国作为一个国家对贸易条件的要求是重商主义和保护主义的，他们在国家经济上可以为所欲为。实际上，如果你看一下习近平在第19届党代表大会上提出的计划，到2025年，他们制定了具体的目标和日期，意在主导包括量子计算、人工智能和大数据在内的10个关键产业。到2035年，他们意在在各领域成为创新的领导者。到2049年，他们意在成为全球超级大国，这是他们的计划。当然，在此之间，会有很多潜在的失误和许多障碍、挑战。这就是我们所说的，好吧，我不认为这会发生。我希望这不会发生。如果你看一下中国在21世纪的表现，经历了2007年和2008年的金融危机后，他们最慢的增长年份也比美国经济最快的增长年份多出两倍。所以基本上，正如我在书中引用李光耀的话所说，美国人将会发现这极为困难，因为中国注定会成为世界历史上最大的参与者，中国人口比美国多四倍。如果他们的生产力只有我们的四分之一，他们的经济规模将与我们一样庞大。他们为什么只能有四分之一的生产力呢？不，绝对不能。

So, I mean, you, we can go on for a very long time with us. And I know we have you for a limited amount of time. Given the seriousness of these issues in terms of just, you're such an expert on the US Cuban Missile Crisis as well and the amount of times that we got perilously close to that nuclear war actually breaking out, but by accident, it didn't happen. What are, you know, you talked about there's 16 times that the city's trap occurred. 12 of them led to war. Four of them didn't. What are these four situations that you think, you know, the leaders were able to do that kept them away? Do you see any of those signs that were able to draw in lessons? Or do you think it's more like that 75% of the time? What should we learn from?

那么，我的意思是，我们可以用很长时间一起继续。我知道我们只有有限的时间。考虑到这些问题的严重性，你对美国古巴导弹危机也非常精通，我们曾多次险些爆发核战争，但幸好没有发生。你提到过16次陷阱事件中有12次导致了战争，而另外4次没有发生战争。这四种情况中，你认为领导人所采取的措施有何特点使他们避开了战争？你是否能看出这些特征作为我们吸取的教训？或者你认为在这75%的时间里更多的是什么？我们应该从中学到什么？

Well, I'm, I mean, the purpose of the book is to lay out a pretty stark diagnosis of the situation in order for us to recognize danger because if you know that you're going into a danger, or going into a dangerous domain, or terrain, then you should change and adapt your behavior. So extremely dangerous conditions require extreme imagination and extreme adaptability. Two cases of this, of the four success stories that I think often offer good lessons for us are first the lives of the US to challenge Britain at the beginning of the 20th century.

嗯，我的意思是，这本书的目的是为了给我们提供一个相当严峻的诊断，以便我们认识到危险。因为如果你知道自己即将进入一个危险的领域或地域，那么你应该改变和调整自己的行为。所以极端危险的条件需要极端的想象力和适应能力。其中有两个案例，我认为经常给我们提供了很好的教训，就是20世纪初期美国挑战英国的生活经历。

So as Germany was rising closer to home to challenge Britain in the decades before 1914, so to under Teddy Roosevelt was the US rising to become first dominant power in our atmosphere and then ultimately beyond. So in that case, the British were brilliant in adapting to a necessity. And in particular, in adapting, they distinguished between what they thought was vital for them on the one hand and what they thought was simply vested or the way things had been in the past on the other.

因此，正如德国在1914年之前几十年中逐渐崛起来挑战英国一样，美国在西奥多·罗斯福的领导下也在崛起，首先成为了在我们的领域中占主导地位的国家，最终超越了其他国家。在这种情况下，英国在适应这种必然性方面非常出色。特别是在适应上，他们区分了一方面对他们来说是至关重要的事物，而另一方面则是他们认为只是既得利益或者是过去的事物。

So vital to Britain was Canada as part of the Empire, which was crucial to Britain. So they, the son of the empire in which the sun never set was Canada, India and South Africa and Britain's other colonial holdings. So they were very concerned that the US not threatened Canada, but when Teddy Roosevelt threatened war over a territorial dispute in Venezuela, they thought, is that really something that we want to fight about? Are we that concerned? No, and so they adapted and they adjusted. And they did so so adroitly that when World War I eventually came because of the German British competition, the Americans immediately became the lifeline for Britain, first the supply line and the finance line and then ultimately the ally. So there's a lot of lessons there.

对于英国来说，作为帝国的一部分，加拿大至关重要，这对英国至关重要。因此，作为帝国之子，加拿大、印度和南非以及英国的其他殖民地非常担心美国对加拿大的威胁。但是，当泰迪·罗斯福在委内瑞拉领土争端上威胁要发动战争时，他们想，这真的是我们想为之而战的事情吗？我们是否那么担心？不，所以他们进行了适应和调整。他们做得如此娴熟，以至于当第一次世界大战最终因德国与英国的竞争而爆发时，美国立即成为英国的生命线，首先是供应线和财务线，最终成为盟友。其中有很多教训。

The second case is very instructive. The Cold War. So the Cold War is worth studying carefully. There you had a writing Soviet Union, which hardens it is to believe now, appeared to people in 1955 or 60 or 65 or 70 about to overtake the US. So they had a searching economy under their command and control system.

第二个案例非常有启示意义，那就是冷战。因此，冷战值得仔细研究。在那个时候，苏联是一个强大的国家，很难现在相信，但在1955年或1960年或1965年或1970年左右，它似乎即将超过美国。所以他们拥有一个集中指挥的经济体系。

If you, as I say, it's so hard to believe that I quote in the book Paul Samuelson's economics introductory economics textbook, the 1964 edition in which he says, in the 70s, the Soviet Union's going to overtake the US economy. So in any case, in those conditions, rather than war, the US invented a strategy for so-called Cold War. There was a complicated strategy. It emerged over about four years of fits and starts, but it included containing the Soviet expansion, included deterring in the attacks upon us. And it included undermining the Soviet Union by basically encouraging the contradictions within the form of government that they had. And we persisted with that strategy for four decades until the point of victory.

如果你相信我说的话，不禁让人难以置信我援引的是保罗·萨缪尔森在他的经济学入门教科书中的话，那是1964年的版本，他在书中说，在70年代，苏联将超越美国的经济。所以在任何情况下，与其发动战争，美国发明了一种所谓的冷战战略。这是一个复杂的战略，经历了大约四年的反复尝试，但它包括遏制苏联的扩张，包括威慑对我们的攻击。它还包括通过鼓励苏联政府内部的矛盾来削弱苏联。我们坚持了这个战略四十年，直到取得胜利为止。

So again, I think there's a lot of lessons to be drawn from that example, mainly of the extent of imagination and adaptability that was reflected in what ultimately became the Cold War strategy that was been followed by Democrats and Republicans alike over this, you know, four decades.

所以，我认为从这个例子中可以得出很多教训，主要是从民主党和共和党在这四十年的冷战战略上所展现的想象力和适应能力的程度。

Well, we appreciate you spending time with us. I hope the government is listening to you and that you are advising them and taking your research in books seriously, thank you so much for joining the show. Again, Graham Allison is the author of a book, Destin for War, Can America and China Escape? The City's Trap. Professor Allison, thanks for joining us in the program today. Thank you so much for having me.

嗯，我们很感谢您与我们共度时光。我希望政府能倾听您的意见，并且您能认真借助书籍进行研究，非常感谢您参加这个节目。再次感谢作者格雷厄姆·艾里森（Graham Allison）的参与，他的书《注定开战：美国和中国能否摆脱陷阱》（Destin for War, Can America and China Escape? The City's Trap）非常值得一读。艾里森教授，感谢您今天参加我们的节目。非常感谢你能邀请我。