At its peak, China's H&A Group presided over an estimated $170 billion of assets across the world. The conglomerate was a big shareholder in Deutsche Bank in Hilton hotels. They owned airports and other real estate in Germany, China and the United States. And they had the third largest aircraft leasing business in the world, owning over 900 planes. With amazing of all, H&A bought virtually all of this in just a few years. By the time the party ended in May 2017, the company was doing at least one multi-million or even billion transaction each month. And then as fast as it came up, it all came crashing down.
In this video, we're going to talk about one of the biggest and craziest implosions in corporate history. But first, let me talk about the Asianometry Patreon. Many access members get to watch new videos and see selected references for them before they release to the public. They help support the videos since views are so volatile, I appreciate every pledge. Thanks and on with the show.
Chinese companies are infamous for their murky early histories and opaque ownership structures. The southern Chinese island of Hainan is about as large as Taiwan but has a much smaller population of about 9 million people. While 1988, the island was a special administrative region within the Guangdong province. But in 1988, the central government made Hainan into its own province and designated it as a special economic zone to try and generate more investment. The new Hainan provincial government had a formidable task ahead of it. Much like Taiwan, Hainan was a historical backwater, a hotbed for bandits in the 1920s. How were they going to get people to come?
At same year, the central Chinese government began deregulating its airline industry. It restructured its former national airline monopoly into six individual airlines across the country. Another measure of that was to allow private public partnerships between provincial governments and private companies to allow these provinces to establish regional airline carriers of their own. So the Hainan government contributed 10 million RMB of start of capital to start Hainan provincial airlines. But the company did nothing with it after that, never acquiring an airplane or even a civil license.
Tan Feng was the son of Communist Party officials and served in the People's Liberation Army Air Force. After that, he worked in China's Civil Aviation Regulator, the CAAC. There he met a variety of people who would go on to also work at H&A Group, including co-founder Wang Jian. Tan then moved to China's National Air Regulations Bureau and won a scholarship to study air transportation logistics at a school in Germany. But when he came back, he found the bureau abolished.
So he worked at the Agricultural Investment Trust of China and then the World Bank Loan Office in Haikou, Hainan's capital city. It is worth noting that the powerful Wang Tersang anti-corruption czar and Xi Jinping ally served as the Agricultural Investment Trust of China's chief executive while Tan was there. Rumors exist of a deeper connection, of course, but there is nothing solid here. Wang was only there for a year after all.
Anyway, while Tan was at the Loan Office, a former colleague of his from the Civil Aviation Regulator then recruits him to manage this airline at the time bogged down with little progress. Ten million RMB or about $1.4 million is nowhere near enough to run an airline or even biplane. Thusly, Tan and his colleague convinced the local government to reboot the business as a joint stock company. This relatively new development in China allowed private individuals to take share in this state-owned enterprise.
In 1993, Hainan Provincial Airlines restructured as a corporation and was allowed to sell shares. The sales raised $250 million RMB or about $35 million from 122 stakeholders. That May, the airline began operations. In these early days, H&A established a dual-chairman structure. Co-founder and partner Wang Jian managed the company's internal affairs and strategic direction. He stayed much more in the shadows. Tong Feng, on the other hand, served as the company's external communications man. Much of the time, he was running around telling stories to banks and potential investors to raise money.
$35 million sounds like a lot and I certainly wouldn't mind having that in my pocket. But in the airline world, it is chunk change. So Tan and his team went to the banks, which lent them another $600 million RMB or $84 million. But on what collateral? In these early days, Chinese banks did not know much about how mortgages should work.
Tan told the banks that the money would be used to biplane. A Western bank would then ask to have a claim on that plane, like how a residential mortgage is backed by a house. But the Chinese bank didn't do this. Rather, they assigned the plane's property rights to the borrower H&A group. This allowed H&A to turn around and remorgge the purchase plane again to another bank for even more money. Chinese banks eventually caught on, but H&A never failed to get creative in the way they borrowed money. One remorcaging tactic they used was to borrow against the future revenue streams from the plane's air routes. So every plane was mortgage twice, first as a hard asset backing alone, second with his future revenue streams.
How does that work? Not sure. Anyway, this one plane two-meal approach allowed H&A to double dip their leverage and grow very fast. Plain bank loan terms are very long lived 10-15 years, which gave H&A plenty of time to figure out how to pay back those loans. But you don't need me to tell you that it is a perilous way to scale a business. Many times the only way to pay back that loan was to take out another loan down the line.
In 1995, Chen flew to New York City and pitched hedge fund manager George Soros' Quantum Fund. There he talked about high-nons development prospects as well as the high market potential for airlines in China. Since Soros invested $25 million, it was the first Chinese-American joint venture in the China Aviation Space. Tun later said that the investment and Soros' reputation helped boost the startup airlines' image. When H&A later listed on a Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Quantum Fund-owned vehicle, American Aviation LDC, was reported as his largest shareholder with 21%.
In 2005, Soros doubled his investment to $50 million, using a share swap to acquire a 10% stake in an unlisted unit of H&A Group. Altogether, their ownership was said to be worth something like $110 million. The New York Times reported that the Quantum Fund sold its stake in 2011. One of the reasons why they did so was H&A's lack of corporate transparency and governance. The company is infamously complicated and opaque.
At the IPO, co-founders Tun Fung and Wang Jian personally held a minuscule stake, Tun with 32,000 shares and Wang with 28,000. But the two controlled another shell company with enough shares to be the second largest shareholder. Since then, the group's ownership structure has shifted around but has always remained extremely murky. From 2002 to 2015, H&A Group's controlling shareholder was a high-non-airline trade union. Then it was replaced by a non-profit called the High-non-Tzihang Charity Foundation.
H&A founded the charity in 2000 with a share donation worth 20 million RMB. The foundation is said to support anti-poverty efforts, but it does not seem to do much and employs a variety of company friends and family members. In all likelihood, it is a stealth vehicle through which Tun can control the company. Serving on a sham foundation was not the only way the co-founders friends and family profited from H&A. Tun's little brother set up an American firm to buy engines and spare parts for the airlines fleet. And the airline hired Wang Jian's little brother, Wang Wei, to help build high-end ocean front villas and a golf course at Haikou. These deals and others eventually made him a billionaire.
In 1997, high-non-provincial airlines renamed itself to a high-non airlines. A year later, it established high-non H&A holdings, the predecessor of what would eventually become H&A Group. By the late 1990s, China's airline situation was a bit messy. There were over 30 carriers in the country at the time, and they were all losing money. Some consolidation was required.
In 2000, China's civil air regulator reorganized its state-owned aviation companies, created an oligopoly of three airlines, Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern. By now, high-non airlines' fleet had grown to 31 airplanes, but that was nowhere near big enough to compete with the giants. So they arranged marriages with three other small airlines, China Xinhua Airlines, Tang An Airlines, and Changxi Airlines.
When a Xinhua Airlines in particular was key in turning high-non into a national flagship, Xinhua operated out of Beijing's two big airports, flying over 80 routes to over 50 cities across China. But Xinhua also struggled to make money, with debt ratios reaching as high as 98%.
So in April 2001, they sold themselves to H&A Group for about a billion RMB, though most of that purchase price was not in cash, but real assets like planes. The new four-way entity focused on short and medium-range flights, serving China's regional cities, outside of the major routes dominated by the state-owned airlines. This strategy succeeded, and the airlines in 2001 turned a profit.
But H&A then flew headlong into the first SARS epidemic in 2003. The crisis struck the air and travel business pretty hard. H&A already financially stretched because of its earlier acquisitions, turned a massive loss of 1.5 billion RMB. The company came close to bankruptcy, to survive they turned to the high-non-provincial government, and the government, despite having a relatively small financial stake in the venture, bailed it out anyway.
In 2005, the H&A injected 1.5 billion RMB 10% of its entire revenue that year, essentially saving the airline. Thanks to its white beaches and tropical weather, H&A gained a reputation as a vacation destination. After the 2003 SARS dip, the H&A tourism trade grew steadily over the next two decades.
H&A positioned itself to benefit from those tourists in multiple ways. Over 40% of arrivals to H&A came on a H&A airline's plane. They landed at an H&A-owned airport, stayed at H&A-owned hotels, and were guided around by an H&A-owned travel agency. This diversification is not only a reflection of the company's vertical integration strategy, but also an indication of the scope of its ambitions.
They were the first Chinese airline to purchase and own their own airport. Co-founder Chun Feng said, our dream is to turn high-non airlines into an international enterprise which can compete with the world giants. In 2008, the global financial crisis seemed to impede those dreams. It wrecked the world economy and caused H&A group to fall again to a 1.73 billion RMB loss.
They attempted to raise funds by IPO-ing their airline subsidiary, Grand Air China, on the Hong Kong stock markets. However, the difficult financial market situation in 2009 made this infeasible. The company made it through thanks to two big events. First, the high-non-provincial government injected another 1.5 billion RMB into the company. Second, as the crisis unfolded in November 2008, the Chinese government announced a 4 trillion RMB stimulus package.
In it were new infrastructure projects that caused land prices across the country to skyrocket. This included about 9,000 acres of land in H&A-owned hotels, which acquired when it bought high-coast airport, the airport relocated elsewhere, but H&A held onto the land, ideally positioned in the downtown area for many years. This land became immensely valuable.
On the basis of this development, H&A sold 4 billion RMB of bonds and 2.8 billion RMB of stock, ending the company's crisis. There was one other way H&A group recovered. By moving company assets between subsidiaries at favorable prices, H&A can generate a paper profit.
Most notably in 2004 and 2005, two H&A subsidiaries, including high-non-air lines, invested 600 million RMB to build their HQ Khahong building in Beijing. At the end of 2007, the subsidiaries transferred the building to H&A at cost. A year later, H&A sold a 95% stake in the building back to high-non-air lines, the subsidiary, for about 1.7 billion RMB, recording a profit of about 1.1 billion RMB. But no big deal, right?
Just a little light fraud between friends to boost operating results. Anyway, many normal companies would consider this second-close call as a sign to shrink and deleverage. But H&A was no normal company.
The financial crisis and the recession that followed gave H&A plenty of cheap overseas targets to look at. H&A wanted to take advantage and launched the Super X Plan with the goal of accumulating one trillion RMB of assets in just five years.
From late 2010 to 2017, H&A spent billions of dollars to acquire hotel brands, technology companies, urban real estate, and airports. This frenzy peaked in the three years from 2015 to 2017, where H&A spent 50 billion dollars to make 123 acquisitions.
These acquisitions are in wildly different industries. We can try to organize them into a few broad categories and go through them category by category. The accounting, however, is nowhere near complete or comprehensive.
The first category is the travel industry, including airlines and travel groups. Some of H&A's earliest acquisitions were airlines. In 2006, H&A acquired Hong Kong Airlines and Hong Kong Express Airlines. Under their ownership, Hong Kong Airlines expanded into cargo shipping.
And Hong Kong Express tried to build up a low-cost carrier model like the old Hainan Airlines did. The Hong Kong purchases gave H&A its first international roots, a major step forward.
Air in 2012 came the purchase of a 48% stake in the Eigel Azer airline, France's second oldest cargo airline. It mostly services North Africa, but also gave the company permission to fly into Europe, including France. Chinese regulations at the time allowed just one Chinese airline per international route, so this was probably them trying to get around that.
In 2015, H&A bought minor stakes in South Africa's calm air and Brazil's Azuo. Now these moves were particularly strange because none of H&A's airlines at the time flew into South Africa or Brazil. Accompanying its airline purchases was a 2015-$2.8 billion purchase of Swissport, a cargo handler, and a 2016-$1.5 billion purchase of gategroup, a Swiss airline catering business.
It makes a lot of sense that H&A group would have a great interest in hotels. It is in line with their business model and you can re-mortgage the properties. Starting in 2011, H&A started buying into NH Hotel Group, a Spanish company that was then Europe's third largest hotel group. Over time, the company rates its stake to about 29.5% with four board seats. The two did a joint venture to build hotels in China.
The signing ceremony was reportedly attended by Premier League Ketchang and Spain's Prime Minister Mariano Rahoy. Then in 2016, the company bought Carlson Hotels, which owns the Radisson Hotels brand for an unknown price. Carlson and the aforementioned NH Hotel Group are direct competitors in Europe. This conflict of interest eventually caused NH Hotel to boot H&A's four members off their board.
This was just sloppy work on H&A's part. Why would you not run this purchase by your other hotel subsidiary? But wait, there's more. In 2016, H&A bought a 25% stake in Hilton Hotels from Blackstone. Blackstone sold the stake at a price three times higher than what they paid for it back in 2007.
The next category of H&A Empire Building includes its logistics and shipping buildup. In 2008, H&A announced plans to create a global container shipping business with a fleet of 200 ships. To back this, they bought Jin Hai Shipyard, a shipbuilder, and Tian Jing Marine shipping, a marine shipping company.
But the most eyebrow-raising acquisition in this sector was Tian Jing's $6 billion purchase of Ingram Micro. Ingram is a global IT equipment distributor with over $46 billion in revenue in 2015. However, the company made just $266 million in net income that year, which translates to a profit margin of less than 1%.
In the very beginning, it was a strange purchase, and its press release, H&A explained that they wanted to deepen Ingram Micro's involvement in the China and Asia Pacific market. 20% of Ingram's 2015 revenue was from Asia. Just 5.4% came from China, though China did account for 23.1% of the company's total profit.
But why would a marine shipper buy into what I presume is one of their customers' businesses? Interestingly, this purchase fell under regulatory scrutiny by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CIFIS. CIFIS approved the deal, one of the few such China-US technology deals to get done in the past decade.
Inspired by GE Finance, H&A wanted to build up a financial sector arm, which they named H&A Finance. H&A Finance wanted to do heavy asset, leasing, and insurance. In 2009, the company acquired the Australian aircraft leasing company Allco. Allco lost $1.4 billion USD and collapsed into insolvency during the financial crisis.
H&A bought the company out of liquidation and moved it to Hong Kong. There, they merged it into a publicly traded affiliate, Bohai Capital Holding. Bohai would be the corporate vehicle for all their heavy asset leasing efforts. In 2011, Bohai spent $1 billion not including debt to buy GE Cico, the 5th largest container leasing fleet. GE Cico buys dry freight, refrigerated, and tank containers and leases them out.
Then in 2015, Bohai bought an 80% stake in Cronos Group Limited, which they merged into Cico to add more scale to their container leasing business. A year later, Bohai paid $7.6 billion to buy the Irish leasing company Avalon. This made H&A the 4th biggest airplane leaser. Finally, in 2017, they purchased the IT Group's aircraft leasing business for $10 billion. Morgan Stanley financed $8.5 billion of that $10 billion purchase price.
在2015年,渤海海洋集团买下了Cronos Group Limited的80%股权,并将其合并入Cico,以增加其集装箱租赁业务规模。一年后,渤海以7.6亿美元的价格收购了爱尔兰租赁公司Avalon,从而使H&A成为第四大飞机租赁商。最后,在2017年,他们以100亿美元收购了IT Group的飞机租赁业务。根摩根士丹利为这笔100亿美元的购买价格提供了85亿美元的融资。
Altogether, the combined company had 910 aircraft in its fleet and was the third largest such company in the industry.
总的来说,合并后的公司在其机队中拥有910架飞机,是该行业第三大公司。
And then there are the purchases that do not fit into any of the above categories.
接下来说的是不属于以上任何一类的购买。意思指的是一些没有归类的购买。
A 2016 $1.1 billion purchase of the land under the former Kai Tuk Airport in Hong Kong.
2016年,以11亿美元的价格购买了香港旧启德机场土地的所有权。
A March 2017 purchase of a majority stake in the money leasing Frankfurt, Han Airport, and Germany's first and only international airport acquisition.
Very early on, H&A devolved from a traditional corporation that most people would be familiar with to a complex intertwined web of China-based investment entities.
H&A公司从最初的普通公司逐渐演变成一个复杂的、交织在中国投资实体中的网络。
Some of these are privately held, but a great deal are public, including 10 on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets and 7 on the Hong Kong markets.
其中一些是私人持有的,但大部分是公开的,包括深圳和上海证券交易所的10家公司和香港市场的7家公司。
As H&A acquired entire companies or stakes and companies during its acquisition frenzy, even as they borrowed more and more money to acquire it, they can inject those acquisitions into their web and then remorgge them out for even more money.
Though the company seems to be run and operated by its management in the core H&A group corporation, the stock ownership and debt ownership links are so complicated that it is hard to tell who owns what.
That's not a real jellyfish, but an agglomeration of smaller creatures.
那不是真正的水母,而是由许多小生物聚集而成的。
They band together as a clump consuming anything in its way.
它们结成一堆,无所畏惧地吞噬着它们路径上的一切。
The other thing about the man of war is that it is entirely dependent on the season currents for survival.
关于水母,另一个重要的事情是它完全依赖于季节洋流来维持生存。
If the waves were to suddenly push this beast onto the shores, they would not survive for very long.
如果海浪突然将这个巨兽推到海岸上,它们将无法生存很长时间。
In mid-May 2017, H&A issued $500 million in bonds for its 245-park avenue purchase.
在2017年5月中旬,H&A发行了5亿美元的债券用于购置位于245公园大道的房产。
It would be one of H&A's last overseas M&A financing transactions.
这将是H&A的最后一项海外并购融资交易之一。
On June 22, 2017, the China Banking Regulatory Commission ordered several banks to conduct wrist checks on the amount of overseas borrowing and investing by H&A and other conglomerates like Anbang and Dalianwanda.
In July 2017, H&A subsidiary Shiroko canceled their in-process purchase of a 34.9% stake of the American In-flight Entertainment Company Global Eagle Entertainment.
在2017年7月,H&A旗下子公司Shiroko取消了他们正在进行的购买美国机上娱乐公司Global Eagle Entertainment 34.9%股份的交易。
At that month, it was reported that Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Bank of America stop taking any more shares of H&A Group companies has pledges for new loans.
当时有报道称,摩根士丹利、花旗银行和美国银行已停止接受H&A集团公司的新股份抵押获取新贷款的承诺。
Goldman Sachs followed suit a few months later in September 2017.
This shook confidence in the company's vaunted government connections.
这动摇了人们对该公司所吹嘘的政府关系的信心。
A few days later, in late November 2017, H&A reported its core financial data.
在2017年11月底的几天后,H&A报告了其核心财务数据。这意味着H&A公布了自己的财务状况数据。
The show's stopper was H&A's estimated current loan balance of $637 billion RMB, or $94 billion USD, using 2017 exchange rates, up 36% from the previous year. If you were to include the company's unlisted subsidiaries, estimates went as high as $1 trillion RMB, or $148 billion. Yet, even these estimates fell short of the eventual actual number.
This made H&A group a just most indebted company, standard and poor and other credit rating agencies rushed to downgrade the company's debt. Generate 2018 began with a series of reversals. H&A management met with its creditors. They told them the company planned to unwind its build-up and return to its core airlines business.
They would sell 100 billion RMB of assets in the first half of the year. A third of H&A's publicly traded affiliates had their share suspended. This included H&A's tourism service business, Bohai leasing, its leasing business which had once been the third largest in the world, Tianjin Tianhai, the shipping slash logistics company that owns the American IT distributor in Grim Micro, Hainan Airlines holdings which held the company's original airline businesses as well as the others it created over the years, and CCOP Group, which owns and runs a large chain of retailers like supermarkets and department stores in northern and central China.
For some of these companies, H&A had pledged up to 60% of the total share circulation for loans. That had been one of the company's key sources of cash keeping the whole group together. Throughout 2018, H&A began the process of selling off the various assets that it purchased only a year earlier. This rapid selldown took place in the midst of great personal tragedy.
In July 2018, Wang Jian, one of H&A's co-founders and the inside man said to be running the company's day-to-day operations, fell to his death in a tourist area of France. He had climbed a wall so that his family can get a photograph of him and then accidentally fell about 15 meters. There are some dubious reports that he deliberately jumped off the wall but the French authorities don't seem to believe that.
Wang's 15% state passed to the American nonprofit that now controlled the majority of H&A's shares. Wang Feng's son, Tong Xiaofeng, was appointed the new deputy CEO and the asset sales continued. Slowly, the assets melted away. Two plots from the Kai-Tok airport site in Hong Kong were sold to Henderson Land for $2 billion, a rare recorded gain. A bit of the stake in Deutsche Bank sold off in 2019. They are still selling it down today.
Swiss port was swapped away to its senior creditors in August 2020 and the massive Ingram Micro IT subsidiary was sold to platinum equity in the December 2020 sale. It seemed like the company might actually make it through, but the devastating effects that COVID had on H&A's core airline and travel businesses sparked a final crisis that the company could not overcome.
And thus, on February 2021, H&A finally entered bankruptcy proceedings. When the filing came in, the company had acknowledged $170 billion of debts from creditors. The company will likely be split into four businesses after all the bankruptcy procedures are done. And as for Tong Feng, on September 2021, he and his chief executive Adam Tan were detained by the Chinese government for suspected crimes.
In a 2012 investor presentation reported by the Financial Times, a banker tried to reassure potential investors with the following line. To outsiders, this seems opaque and confusing, but investors should take comfort from close government relationships at many levels, both above and within the H&A umbrella.
What held together the whole enterprise were mountains of debt and the unspoken implication of close government involvement. The notion floated around that H&A can only have gotten so far, borrowed so much and bought so much because it had the backing of or was even a vehicle for the Chinese government. This caused a lot of anxiety for people in the West. Was it real? Who knows for sure?
Perhaps on some level, H&A and his fellow conglomerates did have that approval. People have made those claims. But one can make an equally strong argument that the company's incredibly complex structure existed for a reason, and that was a dodge oversight. At least until it no longer could.
Alright everyone, that's it for tonight, thanks for watching. My thanks to my intern researcher Adam Kim for his work on this. Subscribe to the channel, send up for the newsletter, and I'll see you guys next time.