Why the Soviet Internet Failed
发布时间 2023-04-16 23:00:19 来源
It is the 1960s and the Soviet economy is stagnating amidst a desperate need for reform a crazy idea. A single nationwide computer network that autonomously gathered and crunched data from all the country's factories and commanded them to produce as needed. The Soviet internet was meant to be the nervous system for an entire nation and usher in a new tech-led future. But that vision never got off the ground. Why did the Soviets turn away from this potential reform? In this video we're going to look at O-GAS, the Soviet internet that never was.
现在是20世纪60年代，苏联经济不景气，迫切需要改革。有一个疯狂的想法——建立一个单一的全国计算机网络，自主收集和分析所有的工厂数据，并指挥它们按需生产。苏联互联网旨在成为整个国家的神经系统，并引领一个新的科技主导未来。但这个愿景从未开始实现。为什么苏联人放弃了这个潜在的改革？在这个视频中，我们将看看O-GAS，这个从未成为现实的苏联互联网。
I would like to start off by talking a bit about sources. When I work on an Asianometry video, I try to stay neutral on a particular topic. This can be pretty challenging in this politically divisive and complicated world. My experience, the most practical way to do this is to read as many sources as you can, coming from a wide range of perspectives, left, right, foreign, domestic. It does not mean you have to accept and believe everything you read, but it helps keep yourself grounded.
我想首先谈一下来源。当我制作亚洲数学视频时，我试图在某个特定话题上保持中立。在这个政治分裂和复杂的世界中，这可能是相当具有挑战性的。根据我的经验，最实用的方法是阅读尽可能多的来源，来自各种不同的角度、左、右、国外、国内的观点。这并不意味着你必须接受并相信你所读到的一切，但它有助于使你保持清醒。
And with that, I'd like to introduce a new website and app that I've been integrating into the workflow as well as the sponsor of this video, our friends at Ground News. The Ground News platform pulls together 50,000 media sources from around the world and across the political spectrum and organizes related articles in one place so you can compare coverage. So, when you come across a news story, you're not sure about, you can copy paste a link into the search tab to see how that news item is being covered around the world.
因此，我想向大家介绍一个新的网站和应用程序，我已经将其融入工作流程，并赞助了我们的好友——Ground News。Ground News平台搜集了来自世界各地和不同政治光谱的50,000个媒体来源，并将相关文章整理在一个地方，可以比较报道。因此，当你遇到一篇你不确定的新闻报道，你可以复制黏贴链接到搜索标签中，查看这篇新闻在全世界范围内的报道情况。
I am particularly interested in the story's marked as high factuality, but I really appreciate the chance to see the same thing written from different perspectives. You can follow topics as well. Right now, I'm following the interest rates topic since recently I've been particularly interested in what rising interest rates are doing to actual people on the ground. Go to ground.news slash Asianometry and try for yourself. Try it with an open mind.
我特别感兴趣的是标记为高可信度的故事，但同时我非常感激有机会从不同的视角看待同样的事情。你也可以关注话题。目前，我正在关注利率话题，因为近期我特别关心上涨的利率对实际人民的影响。请访问 ground.news/Asianometry 并亲自尝试。请心态开放地尝试一下。
I want to give a huge shout out to the book How Not to Network a Nation, the uneasy history of the Soviet Internet by Benjamin Peters and associate professor at the University of Tulsa. If you want additional information, then I highly recommend this book which I greatly enjoyed.
我想要向《如何不联网一个国家：苏联互联网的不安历史》这本书及其作者、来自塔尔萨大学的副教授本杰明·彼得斯表示衷心感谢。如果你想获得更多的信息，我强烈推荐这本我非常喜欢的书。
For much of its history, the Soviet Union ran a command economy, the state owns everything. However, Soviet citizens can own individual items, just don't call it private. Economic activity is coordinated and carried out not through a free market process, but rather directives, quotas and commands.
在苏联的大部分历史中，它实行的是计划经济，国家拥有所有资源。不过，苏联公民可以拥有个人物品，只是不能称之为私有财产。经济活动不是通过自由市场机制来协调和实施的，而是通过指令、配额和命令来实现的。
How this works in practice was that there were three Soviet state entities. Ghost Plan, Ghost Nab, and Ghost Bank. Ghost Bank handles accounting and records transactions. It isn't so important in this context. First, we have the state planning commission or Ghost Plan. They write up the five year plans and define the economic inputs, including prices. After Ghost Plan sets the plan, the state commission for materials and equipment supply or Ghost Nab implements it, procuring and supplying producer goods for the factories.
怎样实现这个计划是这样的，苏联有三个国家机构。这包括幽灵计划、幽灵采购和幽灵银行。 幽灵银行负责会计和记录交易，但在这种情况下并不那么重要。首先，我们有国家计划委员会或幽灵计划。他们起草五年计划并定义经济投入，包括价格。在幽灵计划设定计划后，材料和设备供应委员会或幽灵采购实施计划，采购和供应厂家生产商品。
In its early years, the command economy grew faster than almost any other country in the world. Technology and social achievements, especially those relating to military and aerospace, garnered much praise. But behind the scenes, the central planning system frequently struggled to properly assign quotas, redistribute outputs and so on. There was immense paperwork, distorted incentives, and frequent miscommunications. Many quotas, especially those outside of the military sphere, were only met thanks to a network of pushers. These were fixer type power centers who worked behind the scenes to get things done. With formal channels to often clocked up, the actual negotiations happened informally in hallways, trains, and summer homes.
在其早期阶段，计划经济比世界上几乎任何其他国家都快速增长。技术和社会成就，尤其是与军事和航空航天有关的成就，受到了很多赞誉。但在幕后，中央计划经济体制经常难以正确分配定额、重新分配产出等。存在大量文书工作、扭曲的激励机制和频繁的沟通失误。许多定额，特别是军事领域之外的定额，只有依靠一群推手才能完成。这些推手是一种秘密的权力中心，他们在幕后工作来完成任务。由于正式渠道经常被堵塞，实际的谈判在走廊、火车、夏季住宅等非正式场合进行。
Attempts that reform only thicken the bureaucracy and made things worse. It is 1953 and Stalin is dead. His passing from apparent brain hemorrhage signaled a turbulent new era for the Soviet Union and its alien economy. After a brief power struggle, Nikita Khrushchev became leader. His reign from 1953 to 1964 saw a series of reforms. One of those reforms was the normalization and adoption of cybernetics.
尝试进行改革的行动只会让官僚机构变得更加臃肿，事情变得更糟。现在是1953年，斯大林已经去世了。他因脑出血去世，这标志着苏联和其异质经济进入了一个动荡的新时代。在短暂的权力斗争后，尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫成为了领袖。他在1953年至1964年期间执政，推出了一系列改革。其中之一是对信息控制理论的规范化和采纳。
At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, the one where Khrushchev famously gave his secret speech, criticizing Stalin's cult of personality, he also gave a far less controversial speech praising cybernetics. Having at one of the major tools of the creation of a Communist society, Khrushchev encouraged the development of computer science and the automation of industry. Originated by Norbert Weiner in the United States, cybernetics had been banned during Stalin's reign due to assertions that information was a substance of its own.
1956年，在苏共第20次代表大会上，赫鲁晓夫发表了著名的秘密演讲，批评斯大林的个人崇拜，同时也发表了一篇远未那么具有争议的演讲，称赞了控制论。作为建立共产主义社会的重要工具之一，赫鲁晓夫鼓励发展计算机科学和工业自动化。控制论最初是由美国的诺伯特·维纳发明的，但在斯大林执政期间因为认为信息是一种物质而被禁止。
As well as for drawing analogies between the neuron in the brain and the electric signals inside a computer, such an analogy encroached on established Russian theories of psychology. Khrushchev's reversal however allowed cybernetics to thrive and from there it grew to encompass a variety of sciences.
这个类比不仅可以用于描绘大脑中的神经元和电脑内部的电信号之间的关系，它还触及到俄罗斯心理学领域既有的理论。赫鲁晓夫的态度转变却促进了控制论的发展，随后它发展成为一个包容各种科学的范畴。
Soviet cybernetics became a project to introduce mathematical methods to the life and social sciences. This gave it an aura of truth and objectivity and the Soviets got caught up in that aura. In my video about East German semiconductors, I talked about the wishful thinking in the minds of GDR leadership about the economic role of semiconductors.
苏联的控制论成为了将数学方法引入生命和社会科学的项目。这赋予了它真实和客观的光环，苏联人被这种光环所迷惑。在我关于东德半导体的视频中，我谈到了东德领导层关于半导体在经济中的作用的一厢情愿的想法。
The Soviets eventually fell under a similar technological spell. They saw computers as unlocking a universal method of problem solving. Can such powers be applied to the nation's then-ailing economy?
苏联最终也陷入了类似的技术魔咒中。他们认为计算机可以解锁一种通用的问题解决方法。这种能力能否应用于当时陷入困境的国家经济？
In 1958, news arrived in the Soviet Union of a major undertaking by the Americans. The semi-automatic ground environment or sage was a groundbreaking air defense system. It coordinated raw radar data from many different radar sites to create a single unified image of America's airspace.
1958年，苏联得知美国正在进行一项重大的工程。半自动地面环境（或SAGE）是一种创新的防空系统。它协调许多不同雷达站的原始雷达数据，创造出一个统一的美国领空图像。
After the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb, the United States started developing sage to detect potential Soviet atomic bombers flying over the North Pole. Power by what was then the largest computer ever built, sage costs $8 billion, more than the Manhattan Project, and served as the backbone of the American air defense system. Sage's development and its then classified capabilities greatly alarmed Soviet military planners.
在苏联试爆了第一颗原子弹之后，美国开始开发SAGE，以侦测潜在的苏联原子轰炸机在北极飞行。SAGE由当时建造的最大的计算机驱动，造价80亿美元，比曼哈顿计划还要昂贵，并成为美国防空系统的支柱。SAGE的开发及其当时的保密能力极大地引起了苏联军事规划者的警惕。
In response, the Soviets decided to have three institutes independently built three centralized computer networks focusing on air defense, missile defense, and space surveillance. The air defense network was called System A. Krusha famously boasted in 1962 that its prototype network can quote unquote hit a fly in outer space. It connected two Soviet supercomputers, an M40 and M50 built in 1958 and 1959.
作为回应，苏联决定建立三个独立的研究所，分别建设三个集中式计算机网络，专注于空中防御、导弹防御和空间监测。其中空中防御网络被称为“系统A”。1962年，克鲁斯哈自豪地宣称其原型网络可以“打下外太空中的一只苍蝇”。它将两台苏联超级计算机，1958年和1959年建造的M40和M50连接起来。
This military effort opened people's eyes to the potential that network computers might have for the Soviet civilian population.
这次军事行动让人们认识到，网络计算机对苏联民用人口可能具有的潜力。
In 1958, one of the Soviet Union's early pioneers in cybernetics, Anatoliy Kytov, proposed the first effort to network the nation. A war hero who suffered serious injury on the front lines, he studied math and physics in between firing anti-aircraft shells into the sky. After the war, Kytov became a rocket scientist. He then came across Norbert Wyners' book.
1958年，苏联早期探索控制论的先驱之一安纳托利·基托夫提出了网络化国家的第一个计划。作为一名战争英雄，他在前线受了重伤，但仍在射击高射炮弹的空隙间学习了数学和物理知识。战后，基托夫成为了一名火箭科学家。后来他了解到了诺伯特·温纳的著作。
Reading it, he concluded that cybernetics was not a bourgeois pseudoscience, but rather a tool with high potential for the Soviet Union. He thus authored the Soviet Union's first significant positive article about cybernetics, approved for wide publication, the main features of cybernetics.
阅读后，他得出结论，控制论并不是资产阶级的伪科学，而是一个对苏联潜力巨大的工具。因此，他撰写了苏联第一篇重要的正面关于控制论的文章，并经过批准广泛发表，介绍了控制论的主要特征。
Later he found it in headed one of the country's first computing centers. In 1956, he wrote a book which talks about how computers can help model and regulate the Soviet economy.
后来他在这个国家的第一个计算机中心担任领导，找到了计算机的应用。1956年，他写了一本书，讨论了计算机如何帮助建立和调节苏联经济模型。
This basic proposal, basically pointing out that computers can replace the tabulating machines that the Soviets already had for counting up economic data gained acceptance. In January 1959, Kytov wrote to the Communist Party Central Committee about this concept.
这项基本提案主要指出计算机可以取代苏联已经拥有的计算机来计算经济数据，已经被接受。1959年1月，基托夫向共产党中央委员会提交了这个概念。
This first letter called on Khrushchev to speed the Soviet economy's adoption of the computer, especially for economic planning. He attached a copy of his 1956 book. This first letter probably also proposed uniting several of these economic planning computer centers into one big network, called the Unified State Network of Computing Centers.
这封第一封信呼吁赫鲁晓夫加快苏联经济的电脑化进程，特别是在经济规划方面。他附上了自己1956年的书的复印件。这封第一封信还可能提议将几个经济规划电脑中心合并成一个大型网络，称为统一国家计算中心网络。
Khrushchev probably did not see this letter, but it reached the right voices within the government and they supported all of his proposals, except for the computer center network. They adopted a resolution called the speeding and widening of the production of calculation machines and their application to the national economy.
赫鲁晓夫可能没有看到这封信，但它传达到了政府内正确的声音，他们赞成他的所有提议，除了计算机中心网络。他们通过了一项决议，称为加快和扩大计算机的生产，并将其应用于国民经济。
Booyed by the successes, Kytov decided to push his aspirations a little further. In the autumn of 1959, he sent another letter in which he proposed the idea of installing large computers at local factories and government agencies. Then you can link these computers together. These automated systems of management, or ASUs in Russian, are reminiscent of local area networks and computer-aided manufacturer.
受成功的鼓舞，Kytov决定把他的抱负再推到更高的层次。1959年秋季，他发了另一封信，提出了在当地工厂和政府机构安装大型计算机的想法，然后将这些计算机链接在一起。这些自动化管理系统（俄语为ASUs）类似于局域网和计算机辅助制造。
Kytov's dreams went beyond the local level. Ultimately, he proposed a future quote-unquote Unified Automated Management System that would serve the entire nation, both military and civilian. He called it an economic automatic management system, or EASU.
Kytov的梦想超越了局部层面。最终，他提出了一个所谓的统一自动化管理系统的未来设想，将为整个国家提供服务，包括军事和民用。他称之为经济自动化管理系统，或EASU。
This system would be run using computer centers filled with powerful military computers buried deep underground for protection. The center would be accessible through terminals. Civilians can use those terminals to send data and use processing power.
这个系统将使用军用计算机拥有的强大性能，并将它们深埋地下以获得更好的保护。使用终端可以进入该中心。民间人士可以使用这些终端发送数据和使用计算能力。
Kytov saw this as a way to maximize the command economy's advantages of centralization. He would also result in immense financial savings for the country, replacing the Soviet bureaucracy's previous tasks of carrying out production. In addition to this bureaucracy-threatening idea, Kytov's letter also criticized several leaders within the Ministry of Defense for their slow speed in computer adoption.
Kytov认为这是最大化计划经济集中化优势的方式。这也将为国家带来巨大的财务节省，替换苏联官僚机构以前负责执行生产的任务。除了这个威胁官僚机构的想法外，Kytov的信件还批评了国防部内的几位领导缓慢采用计算机的速度。
As you might guess, this red letter has it is so called, never made it to Khrushchev. Instead, it reached the military, which did not appreciate Kytov's criticisms, as well as his suggestion of sharing its technology with mere civilians. As Kytov recalls in a later interview, the army will never occupy itself with fulfilling any tasks concerned with the national economy. A show trial was held in which Kytov lost his job, Communist Party membership, and his military honors. I suppose you might even say that he got cancelled.
或许你已经猜到了，这个所谓的“红头文件”从未送达给赫鲁晓夫，反而被送到了军方手中。军方不仅不喜欢基托夫的批评，还不赞成将技术与普通人分享的建议。基托夫在后来的一次采访中回忆道，军队永远不会去执行任何有关国民经济的任务。他参加了一场“秀”审判，失去了工作、共产党成员资格以及军事荣誉。可以说，他被“取消”了。
Kytov was not executed, I mean this wasn't the Stalin days, so he spent the rest of his days advocating for a networked Soviet future. Kytov's fall temporarily stemmed networking's tide in the Soviet Union, but people kept tinkering with the concept. Over in the west, Kytov's idea of having computing power available to everyone caught on, companies like GE had a computer time-sharing service, and American Airlines and IBM worked together to build Saber, a private network for travel reservations.
Kytov没有被处决，这并不像斯大林时期那样，所以他度过了余生来倡导一个互联的苏联未来。Kytov的倒台暂时阻碍了网络在苏联的发展浪潮，但人们继续改进这个概念。在西方，Kytov的思想——让所有人都能使用计算能力——已被接受，诸如GE这样的公司提供了计算机共享服务，美国航空和IBM合作建立了" Saber"，一个用于旅行预订的私人网络。
In 1962, Soviet cybernetuses Aleksandr Karkevich proposed a national unified communications network that he described as like a railway network for storing and sending messages. Another prominent such individual was Viktor Mikhailovich Glushkov, then the head of the Kiev Institute of Cybernetics. He sought to create the aforementioned ASU's that Kytov detailed in his first 1959 letter. Glushkov hired Kytov as a consultant for this new project, and their kids even married one another.
1962年，苏联的控制论学家亚历山大·卡尔克维奇提出了一种国家统一的通信网络，类似于铁路网络，用于存储和发送信息。另一位杰出的学者是维克托·米哈伊洛维奇·格鲁什科夫，当时是基辅控制论研究所的主管。他试图创建据土诸如基托夫在他1959年的第一封信中详细说明的ASU。格鲁什科夫聘请基托夫作为这个新项目的顾问，他们的孩子甚至结为夫妻。
In late 1962, Glushkov sent a letter to Krushchev, discussing the growing technology gap with the west and calling for the acceleration of Soviet computerization. Concerned as always with this gap, in 1963 the Soviet leadership approved research into the idea of economic reform through the use of these automated computer networks or ASU's.
在1962年末，格鲁什科夫给克鲁什切夫写了一封信，讨论西方与苏联的技术差距日益扩大，并呼吁加快苏联的计算机化进程。作为一直以来都关注这种差距的苏联领导层，在1963年批准了通过利用自动化计算机网络或ASU实现经济改革的理念的研究。
Like I mentioned, the ASU's allowed mainframe computers to receive information about the industrial processes going on inside a factory. Like I said, this sounds a lot like local network factory automation. Throughout the early 1960s, Glushkov and his team studied how a system might automatically measure, receive and process information in a factory. In 1963, they visited many real factories throughout the Soviet Union.
正如我之前所提到的，ASU（自动化系统）可以让大型计算机接收有关工厂内正在进行的工业过程的信息。这听起来很像本地网络工厂自动化。在20世纪60年代初期，格鲁什科夫及其团队研究了如何在工厂中自动测量、接收和处理信息的系统。1963年，他们参观了苏联许多真实的工厂。
There were some interesting successes, for instance they managed to have a computer system in Kiev control a steel-smelting factory in one Ukrainian city nearly 300 miles away, as well as a carbonization process in another city 400 miles away. But Glushkov wasn't just interested in factory automation and data management. He wanted to do more here, and thus emerged Ogas.
他们取得了一些有趣的成功，例如他们成功让基辅的计算机系统控制了近300英里外的一家乌克兰城市中的钢铁冶炼工厂，以及400英里外的另一个城市的碳化过程。但Glushkov不仅仅对工厂自动化和数据管理感兴趣。他想在这个领域做更多的事情，于是Ogas就应运而生了。
Ogas is a shortened abbreviation of all state automated system for the management of the economy in Russian. This in turn stands for all state automated system for the gathering and processing of information for the accounting, planning and governance of the national economy USSR. As originally conceived in the early 1960s, Ogas was ambitious.
“Ogas”是俄罗斯全国经济管理自动化系统的简称，其全称为全国经济计划、统计和管理用信息自动处理系统。早在1960年代初设计时，Ogas就具有雄心壮志。
He was structured as a hierarchy with three tiers. The first tier would be some 20,000 computer terminals and ASU's. The second tier has 100-200 mid-level regional planning decision systems, and finally the third tier rolls up to a central planner in Moscow. Glushkov even envisioned the computerization of currencies and money flows. His initial proposals for Ogas included a money list system of receipts over the network.
他的结构层次分明，分为三个层次。第一层将是大约20,000台计算机终端和自动交换单元。第二层有100-200个中级区域规划决策系统，最后第三层汇聚到莫斯科的中央规划者手中。 Glushkov甚至设想了货币和资金流动的计算机化。他的初始提议包括一个通过网络的收据的货币清单系统。
This idea was probably included in order to appeal to Krushchev himself, who might have appreciated the Marxist ideal of a money-free society, but party leaders advised him to drop it, which he did. In the early 1960s, Glushkov's Institute of Soviet Cybernetics were young and idealistic, like their peers over in the West, the envisioned a utopia enabled by technology.
这个想法可能是为了迎合赫鲁晓夫本人的心理而包含进去的，他可能会欣赏马克思主义理想中的没有货币的社会，但党领导人建议他放弃，他也放弃了。在20世纪60年代初，格鲁什科夫的苏联计算机学院的年轻人和西方同龄人一样理想主义，他们设想通过技术实现乌托邦。
The vision driving their Ogas project was to have a single computer network rationally and automatically plan, optimize and produce the country's national economy as dictated by the party's center. Each Soviet bureaucrat would have his work days and weeks planned out. The computer would produce detailed lists of their duties, the timetable, the chain of responsibility, and even the order in how their documents should be arranged.
他们的Ogas项目的愿景是拥有一个单一的计算机网络，按照政党中心的要求，合理自动地规划、优化和生产国家的国民经济。每个苏联官僚的工作日和周都将被规划好。计算机将制作详细的职责清单、时间表、责任链，甚至是文件排列顺序。
To me, it brings to mind a nervous system. Think of the Soviet Union's factories and workers as like the human body, unable to move well together because of poor to a information transmission with the brain, Soviet leadership. Ogas sought to serve as the nervous system connecting the two, with it the brain can move the body in unison and with ease, coordinating output without concern about bureaucratic inefficiencies.
对我来说，这让我想到了一个神经系统。想象苏联的工厂和工人就像人的身体一样，由于与苏联领导层信息传递不良而无法很好地协同工作。Ogas试图作为连接两者的神经系统，使大脑可以协调整体运动，毫不担心官僚主义的低效率，使产出更加协调无误。
Such a system would have been the Soviet counterpoint to the Western capitalist view of a self-regulating market economy, computers would gather historical information and use that to rationally inform forecasts and production. The single biggest reason why this version of Ogas, first presented in 1964 never develop his plan, was cost.
这样的系统将成为苏联对西方资本主义观念的对立面，它将建立在自我调节的市场经济基础之上，计算机将收集历史信息并用于合理地预测和生产。然而，这个版本的Ogas从1964年开始提出，但从未得到实施的最大原因是成本问题。
This original vision with its three tiers and thousands of computer centers would have taken 30 years to pull off and cost a stupifying total of 160 billion rubles, or about 1.4 billion USD in 2016 dollars. Proponents argued that the cost savings would have paid off this investment, regardless that is more than both the Soviet space and atomic bomb programs combined. Second, the technology was not quite there.
这个最初的设想包括三个层级和数千台计算中心，需要30年的时间才能实现，并花费惊人的总价值1600亿卢布，约合2016年的14亿美元。支持者认为，成本节约会弥补这笔投资，尽管它比苏联太空计划和原子弹计划的总和更高。第二，技术还没有完全成熟。
The computers in the Soviet military had world leading capabilities, for instance computer networks with nationwide coverage and messaging switching. The civilian computer technology in the Soviet Union lacked far behind the military, and has previously demonstrated the military was very unwilling to transfer any of that over to civilians. Even if they did, those computers were too specialized and custom to be useful.
苏联军队中的计算机具有世界领先的能力，例如具有全国范围的计算机网络和消息交换。与此相比，苏联的民用计算机技术远远落后于军用技术，并且军方曾表现出非常不愿意将任何技术转移到民用领域。即使他们这样做了，这些计算机也过于专业化和定制化，无法发挥实用性。
Third, and finally, various players also objected to the idea that they might be replaced by or have their work dictated to via a computer. This included both Communist Party bureaucrats and Goss Plan and industrial managers. People in the central statistical administration in particular recognized that the computer's quote-unquote objective collection of data would restrain their own power to control the flow of information within the country.
第三个问题是，各种参与者也反对他们可能被电脑取代或被强制执行工作的想法。这包括共产党官僚和Goss计划及工业经理人。特别是中央统计管理部门的人们认识到，电脑所谓的客观数据收集将限制他们自己控制国内信息流的权力。
Worse yet, Glishkov's plans were all or nothing. If it was not delivered in whole, then none of its benefits can be realized. It would have required a complete reformation of the country's management system of revolution. 1964, the year of Glishkov's first proposal also softened new change in the country. Krushchev lost power, it was replaced by Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev eventually reversed many of his predecessors' economic reforms.
更糟糕的是，格利什科夫的计划要么全面实现，要么一点都不能实现。要彻底实施这些计划，需要对国家的革命管理体系进行完全改革。1964年，格利什科夫首次提出这些计划的年份，也是国家经历了新的变革。赫鲁晓夫失去了权力，取而代之的是列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫。勃列日涅夫最终扭转了其前任的许多经济改革。
But the directive for an economic restructuring via computer remained on the agendas thanks to high-level backing from power brokers like Premier Alexei Kosegian. Goss Plan and the central statistical administration thoroughly rejected the project's utopian vision. They went back and forth on what the project would eventually be, eager to control its resources to further their own power.
但是得益于像总理谢延科茨金等有权势的支持，通过计算机进行经济重组的指令仍然被列入议程。Goss计划和中央统计管理机构彻底反对该项目的乌托邦愿景。他们在项目最终会成为什么，反复讨论，渴望控制其资源以进一步巩固自己的权力。
In the end, if Ogas was to be implemented by the Soviet government, it had to eventually conform to the Soviet way of doing things. The Ogas of imagination could never happen, but what about something closer to reality? Then in 1969 came widespread news of Arpanet, the network we most closely associate has been the predecessor of today's internet.
最终，如果Ogas被苏联政府实施，它必须最终符合苏联的行事方式。想象中的Ogas永远不可能发生，但现实中有些什么呢？1969年，Arpanet广泛传播，这个网络最为人熟知的是今天互联网的前身。
Arpanet, going online, caught the Soviet leadership by surprise. That competitive factor helped move the Ogas project forward. With the Arpanet news in mind, Glishkov changed what Ogas was to do. This new iteration had Ogas has a universal information bank, accumulating and moving information between various national agencies.
Arpanet的上线让苏联领导层感到意外。竞争的因素推动了Ogas项目的进展。有了Arpanet的消息，Glishkov改变了Ogas项目的目标。这个新的版本将Ogas打造成一个通用信息库，将信息积累和在各个国家机构之间传递。
So rather than running and controlling the entire economy like a human nervous system, this new Ogas would only organize and control the flows of data. Like a system of canals controlling the flow of water running between a country's reservoirs, he argued that such a management system would make the Soviet Union more efficient.
因此，这个新的奥加斯不再像人类神经系统一样运行和控制整个经济，而是只组织和控制数据的流动。就像一个控制国家水库之间水流的运河系统一样，他认为这样的管理系统将使苏联更加高效。
At a momentous meeting on October 1, 1970, Glishkov presented his new Ogas to the Polic Bureau in a dramatic meeting. For a brief moment it seemed like a Soviet internet could have happened. Several higher ups in the Polic Bureau spoke positively about the project. Hardliners like Mikhail Suslov did not say anything against the project, which was another good sign.
1970年10月1日的一次重要会议上，格利什科夫在一个戏剧性的会议上向警察局呈报了他的新OGAS系统。短暂的一刻似乎苏联互联网即将实现。几个警局高层对这个项目表示了积极评价。像弥哈伊尔•苏斯洛夫这样的强硬派没有对这个项目提出任何异议，这是另一个好的迹象。
Soviet leaders Kosegian and Brezhnev were not present, often other business, but the former manager to convey his support through deputies. But the Ministry of Finance Vasily Garbazov, interested in recognizing that this new Ogas could command immense political gravity and potentially erode his ministry's power, he dismissed Ogas as a silly project good enough only to make hands lay more eggs.
苏联领导人科塞金和勃列日涅夫通常不会出席这种活动，可能因为有其他事务。但前任经理通过副手传达了他的支持。但是，财政部长瓦西里·加尔巴佐夫认为，这个新的OGAS可能具有巨大的政治重力，并有可能削弱他的部门的权力，他表示OGAS是一个愚蠢的项目，只能让鸡下更多的蛋。
He then proposed a far more conservative counter-proposal, dialing back the ambitious Ogas plan which won over the Polic Bureau. In the end the full Ogas proposal was neither fully accepted nor rejected, the worst type of existence. Throughout the 1970s several ASUs would be built in individual factories. How many is hard to tell?
然后他提出了一个更加保守的反对方案，缩减了曾赢得警方局青睐的雄心勃勃的奥加斯计划。最终，完整的奥加斯计划既没有被完全接受也没有被拒绝，这是最糟糕的存在方式。整个20世纪70年代，将在个别工厂建造几个特种部队。这些部队的数量很难确定。
One source says that about 100 were built between 1971 and 1985. Other sources contend that the Soviet Union built thousands of ASUs. However many there were, networking them would be impossible. They were built haphazardly and without thought to any standards.
有一种说法称，在1971年至1985年间大约建造了100个ASU。其他来源认为，苏联建造了数千个ASU。不管有多少，把它们网络化是不可能的。它们建造得零散不整，并没有考虑任何标准。
The nationwide United Network of ASUs in the way Glushkov envisioned never happened. The approximate cause for why the Soviet Internet failed was bureaucratic infighting, various leaders and power centers throughout the country, objected to its capabilities and hijacked it for their own needs.
格鲁什科夫构想中的全国统一ASU网络从未实现。苏联互联网失败的主要原因为官僚内斗，全国各地的领导和权力中心反对其功能，并将其劫持为自己的需要。
But the real reason why Glushkov's Soviet Internet could never take off was that it challenged how the Soviet Union ran things. You cannot separate an invention from its place and that place was just a couple decades away from implosion.
但格鲁什科夫的苏联互联网真正不能取得成功的原因是因为它挑战了苏联的统治方式。一个发明是无法与其场所分离的，而苏联距离解体仅仅几十年。
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