Hello and welcome to the History Extra Podcast from BBC History Magazine, Britain's bestselling history magazine. I'm Ellie Corporn.
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50 years ago this month, in February 1972, US President Richard Nixon embarked on a trip to China and the meeting proved to be a key moment in the thawing of relations between the two nations. To mark the anniversary, Professor Ron Amitter, who specialises in the history of modern China, spoke to Deputy Editor Matt Elton. They spoke about the importance of Nixon's visit and the extent to which its legacy changed the course of the 20th century.
Ranna, we're talking in the middle of February, which marks an anniversary that I think some people may not be that familiar with. Could you just outline what it is that we're talking about today, I suppose?
Pretty much exactly half a century ago, as we're speaking, in February 1972, a meeting took place in China that I think even now we could say probably was one of the most significant events of the 20th century. That was the meeting between the President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon and the leader, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong.
The reason that this was really so epochal is that these two countries, the most populous country in the world, China and the most powerful country in the world, the United States, had essentially not had any formal links with each other since the revolution of 1949 that had thrown the Chinese nationalist government at the time off China's mainland to the island of Taiwan and seen the ascendancy of the Chinese Communist Party. When the revolution in China had happened, the United States had essentially broken off diplomatic relations and then the two sides basically found themselves unable to find a way to restore them for the best part of more than two decades, in fact.
So the decision by a right-wing anti-communist American president to make the leap of visiting the world's most popular communist state was really a major milestone in its own right. But the reason it's so significant, as I say so, epochal and retrospect, is that it reset the Cold War, it meant the relationship between China, the United States and the Soviet Union changed profoundly and it also set the pathway out for where we are today, the story in which the United States is still the world's most powerful nation.
But today, unlike 1972, the world's second biggest economy, second biggest military, and most important challenger nation to America's supremacy is that same China that was opened up to the Americans by that visit in 1972, so a really important moment half a century ago. And there's so much to unpack there.
I wanted to start by exploring something you just mentioned, which was, I suppose, Nixon's motivations for doing this might externally seem quite surprising. What was the background to him wanting to be the person who did this, who made this move?
If you had to name the most obvious person in America to make a kind of gesture of outreach to communist China in the 1960s, I don't know who you would have picked on there, maybe John F Kennedy or someone, but I don't think which Nixon would have been anyone's choice. Because if you did have to pick the name of a politician who perhaps more than anyone else was associated with the fight against global communism, Nixon probably could have filled that particular slot. He wasn't quite as notorious as Joe McCarthy, whose name has become a synonym for red basing, but Nixon was actually much more powerful and became the vice president of the United States under Eisenhower. And part of essentially what the Eisenhower administration did with Nixon in the 50s, was sending around the world as Mr. Anti-Communism.
So that could be in the dictatorships of South America where he got sent, and he would essentially say words to the effect of even if this is a dictatorship, it's an anti-communist dictatorship, which is much better than the alternative, so he argued. And the iconic moment, the really kind of moment that summed this up, was when he was sent to Moscow and debated with the then Soviet leader, Khrushchev, about whether the lifestyles of the Soviet middle class or the American middle class were better.
He became a kitchen debate because showing the kind of typical items that an American family would have in their kitchen, you know, refrigerator, a kind of high quality other and really nice equipment just couldn't be matched in the Soviet Union. And so Nixon was said to have won the battle against communism in a sense by showing that the Americans had better kitchen appliances, probably a better way to win the battle than nuclear weapons, to be honest.
But in other words, Nixon's credentials as the man who could argue against communism were impeccable. And that of course is one of the reasons why he had the credibility in a way that other leaders might not have done in America to go to China.
It was a pretty radical move for Nixon to decide he was going to go to China, but he didn't come out of the blue. First of all, other politicians, including politicians in the predecessor, Lyndon Johnson administration, had debated whether or not it might be a good idea to open up to China. And Nixon himself had written in the journal Foreign Affairs, the effect of it's not possible permanently to keep China out of the family of nations. So he had sent out some signals. But that having been said, when he got elected in 1968 and a extremely contested, extremely bruising election at that time when America itself was, you know, rioting and up in flames and deeply divided politically.
In that context, opening up to China didn't seem like the most public thing to be slightly to do. But the politics of America actually made it quite important for him to do so. And there was one particular reason, one word you might say that was absolutely only shoulders. And that word was Vietnam. It's worth remembering quite how much the division in American society of the 60s was based on the conscription of young men, some young women, mostly young men in terms of being forced to go, who fought in a land war in Asia, which fewer and fewer people could see was going to come to any kind of good end by the time that Nixon was elected.
But it wasn't clear to him quite how he was going to end the war, get America out of it without in some way resetting the wider context of the Cold War. And making the decision that by bringing China back into his phrase, the family of nations by opening up to another communist power and showing an act of statesmanship by doing so. He would be in a better position also amongst other things to shut down the Vietnam war, at least in terms of the American participation, which a few years later, and it said to 233, to be fair, he would eventually manage to do even if in slightly murky circumstances.
So the opening to China was at least in part a way of dealing with one of America's most pressing geopolitical problems, which was the need to get out of Vietnam. We've talked about Nixon and about America. We should talk about the other side of this situation. What was China's background at this point and what did it stand to gain from this meeting?
In some ways, 1972 and the months and years leading up to it were not the most obvious time for China to open up to the United States because it was a period right at the heart of the cultural revolution. We now know that the cultural revolution lasted essentially 10 very brutal years from 1966 to 1976, but nobody knew that at the time. There was no end point that was set for it. It was essentially a sort of ideological, but actually not just ideological, also military civil war. China's leader, Chairman Mao, had essentially declared war on his own Communist Party in 1966, arguing that it had become lazy and complacent. And he told, amongst others, China's youth, the famous red guards, to rise up and beat up their teachers, beat up their elders. And of course, it was a way of him purging some of his political rivals too.
So one time he gets to the early 70s, the leadership at the top has changed quite substantially, but also various really murky and disturbing things have gone on. One was the sudden deposition from power, departure from power at high speed of Mao's designated successor, a man named Lin Yao, who was supposed to, he was the minister of defense. Everyone thought he was going to succeed Mao and Mao finally died. And then shocking news in 1971 that Lin Yao had been apparently attempting to coo against Mao, he and his family had bundled into a plane which had then crashed in out of Mongolia, killing him and everyone on board.
Even today, the story is one that isn't entirely transparent to put it to put it mildly. But what it meant was that internal politics in China became very fragile. There were essentially two factions, Joe and I, the relatively pragmatic premier of China, wanted to basically kickstart China's economy, which had been horribly damaged under the culture revolution. He knew the China needed for an investment and probably opening up to the outside world to do it. On the other side, the so-called Gang of Four, they weren't called out of the time, that was a later term that was used for them. But it's a good shorthand for the radical cultural revolution fanatics, including Mao's wife, Jiang Ting, who argued that no, America was this huge ideological enemy. There was no way that opening up to foreign capital, capitalism and capital could ever be permitted.
So those factional battles were raging, the radicals versus the pragmatists, with Mao sort of sitting like kind of emperor quite ill by that stage on top of everything. And meanwhile, the pragmatists won in terms of the invitation being extended to the Americans. And the message being sent out that yes, if you ask for an invitation, we will be likely to accept it.
Yeah, that's really interesting. I'm interested particularly in the fact that China turned to America rather than say Russia, were there reasons that sort of pushed them away from choosing that route? Logically, it might seem that the two biggest communist powers in the world, the Soviet Union and China would find some kind of understanding. But in fact, by the late 1960s, the situation was ironically almost the opposite.
China was much more worried about the Soviets than it was about the Americans. And the reason for that lay in the events of a decade earlier. During the 50s, China and Soviet Union had been very close to allied, lots of technical operation, ideological affinity, all of that. And then it started to go wrong.
After the death of Stalin, Mao began to feel the Soviets under Christchurch and Stalin's successors were going soft. They were willing to accommodate the West too much. They weren't really true communists anymore. And the language and rhetoric between the two sides became more and more savage until essentially the two sides split. There was a split between the Soviets and the Chinese and the early 1960s.
1960s is the sort of date that's usually given as the moment when joint cooperation in engineering projects stopped, for instance. It didn't mean a break in diplomatic relations. There were always sort of ambassadors between the two sides. But in terms of genuine cooperation, it was a very, very cold break. And that meant that China essentially found itself isolated from the outside world. Because of course, it wasn't friends with the Americans. It now was known as friends with the Soviets either. It didn't really have any other major ideological allies.
And during the proctor revolution, things got even worse. China basically recalled most of its ambassadors, except the ambassadors Egypt as it happened, kind of indoctrinated them and then sent them back out again. But as a sort of ideological warriors, they weren't really ambassadors in the classic sense of that phrasing.
And at the same time, there was also increasingly strong and by no means unreasonable rumors that war might break out with a Soviet Union, particularly over disputed islands in the Suri River on the northeastern border area of China. So the prospect of a war war with the Soviet Union, which would have been potentially devastating, was yet another thing that concentrated minds in Beijing and made them think, well, in this context, weirdly enough, it may be better to talk to the capitalist Americans than those so-called communists in Moscow, who actually are rather more dangerous for our aims than the people in Washington.
So all the players are in place, if you like. How do you go about setting up a diplomatic mission like this? What are the mechanics of actually making this kind of thing happen? And what happened when the Americans did go to China?
So if you'd sum up in one word how this astonishing coup of the Nixon visit was set up, then the one word I'd choose would be skullduggery. And skullduggery might be combined with diplomacy. The two are often quite closely related. And you have to turn to the always intriguing figure of Henry Kissinger.
Henry Kissinger was the national security advisor who Nixon appointed when he been elected president. And it now turns out, you know, we now know from memoirs and recollections. In fact, very early on in Kissinger's time as national security advisor, he was given this task by Nixon of, okay, let's see what we can do about China. And essentially there's not so two and throw, you know, these kind of sort of underground conversations that have already been going on actually before Nixon came in through the embassies of the Americans and the Chinese in Warsaw, which is one of a few capital cities where the diplomats could actually go to meet each other without attracting too much attention.
But once Kissinger got into into high gear, essentially, and a first set of meetings for him was arranged to take place in secret by the Pakistanis, because Pakistan is another country that had good relations with America and with China, mainly because both of them were not that keen on India, but that's a slightly different story.
So basically on a diplomatic visit to Pakistan, Kissinger announces one evening that, oh, he's got a dodgy tummy, he's got something odd, you know, the Islamabad dining table, and he needs to sort of go to bed and deal with the dodgy stomach, but not a bit of it. In fact, he's been whisked out the back into a plane for a secret mission to fly to Beijing.
And essentially, that first undercover mission where he doesn't, he didn't meet Mal, but he did meet Joe Inly and some of the other top Chinese leaders, where they negotiate what the terms of a visit by Nixon to America to China would be, is the sort of starting point. And then after, you know, some diplomacy of that sort, some kind of signals on both sides, the announcement then comes in that essentially, in the summer of 1971, that Nixon will visit China essentially before the next presidential election, which of course he had his eye on in 1972.
So behind the scenes actions by people like Joe Inly, people like Henry Kissinger and others were very much part of the mixture. And of course, it was one of the reasons why Kissinger was one of the key players who actually went on that visit to Beijing along with Nixon and the rest of the delegation.
The visit itself was a week long, and Nixon himself with the kind of slightly hammy rhetoric that he became known for, but in this case, he could probably be forgiven, referred to it as the week that changed the world. And you know, there's something to that actually.
The visit itself was a week that combined a certain amount as you'd expect of sort of ceremony with quite a lot of really hardcore negotiation. So the ceremonial was what the rest of the world tended to notice. And you know, Nixon was very insistent.
There must be full TV cameras everywhere. So in his play in the spirit of 76 as in 1776, the American independence landed at the airport in Beijing. He was actually a bit disappointed because he hoped there'd be like crowds of, you know, thousands and thousands of Chinese waving American flags for something to meet a bit like the cultural revolution, but, you know, but not. But in fact, there was a small and significant honor guard to meet him, quite an honor, but at the same time, it was quite quiet. And they were driven through these empty streets in Beijing.
But even the first meeting was symbolic because Nixon shook the hand of the Prime Minister, Jo and Li, who'd come to the airport to meet him. And that was very important because in 1954, less than 20 years before, when Jo and Li had visited Geneva to try and negotiate chords on an arrangement for Vietnam, the then Republican Secretary of State, who had been in the same administration as Nixon, of course. Nixon was Vice President, and the Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles.
And there was a sort of slightly staged attempt to get Jo and Li in a position where he could shake hands with John Foster Dulles. And John Foster Dulles very, you know, ought to slightly staged a way, very impromptuly refused to shake his hand because he didn't acknowledge that communist China was a legitimate state and didn't recognize the PRC. So by going stepping, coming down the gangway steps and then shaking the hand of Prime Minister Jo and Li, Nixon in a sense was making up for the snub that had been placed upon the encounter between Foster and Jo a couple of decades previously.
And then the visit itself continued in fine style, you know, lots of opportunities to visit schools and farmers and say, of ortho and Pat Nixon, actually Mrs. Nixon was a big part of those those visits and we really got to talk to some relish, I think, you know, sort of this very, very bright red coat, which some might have thought was politically slightly pointed, which was where, but of course, February and China, North China is really cold. It's a very, very chilly place, no question of sunshine. And so it was necessary to be as as as wrapped up as possible.
And there's sort of image of this American first lady in her prominent red coat at a sort of collective pig farm, and you know, a school, a school session where people are chanting it of English, the children are chanting English of her. All of these made for great television, which certainly helped boost Nixon's statesman image back at home, as it was, you know, relayed back on the news.
But behind the scenes, a whole bunch of lower level but very important negotiators were coming together and really putting forward some tough, you know, arguments of both sides. The end point was clear. They wanted to get to full diplomatic recognition of the PRC and United States, but there were many, many issues that had to be overcome. And you know, one of the ones that's still with us today is Taiwan.
Taiwan was where the Nationalists and the Chiang Pei Shui, the Gourmiedang, had fled in 1949. They're still there. They had their own, you know, non-recognized but autonomous government there. And the question, so I say non-recognized, it was by that stage not recognized by the PRC, but technically at that point, the United States still recognized the Republic of China government on Taiwan as the government of all of China, even though most other Western countries had shifted their recognition by that stage, France, UK and Japan, which shifted that year as a watch, if moved to kind of full relations in that year as well. So the US was a bit of an outlier by that stage.
And eventually they got to the end point at the end of the visit with something called the Shanghai Communique, which is still very much seen as a turning point moment, in which it was stated that the intention was that the two nations would find ways to recognize each other. And that some issues with Taiwan was certainly amongst them.
There might be an agreement to disagree for the moment and find a way to accommodate the different views of both sides. So the Shanghai Communique was not the end of the process, but it was the end of the beginning, as Winston Churchill might have said, of that reconciliation that then took most of the 1970s before it actually came to fruition.
So it was an important starting point, but it's sometimes regarded the Nixon visit was on the end of the process. In one sense it was, but it was the beginning of another one. Was it also the beginning of a broader cultural process of engagement between these two nations? Absolutely.
The engagement between China and the US proceeded as much on kind of cultural and exchange terms in the next few years as it did diplomatically. In some ways the diplomacy was a bit stopped start. Nixon of course has had a couple of troubles within a few years and had to resign over Watergate. Henry Kissinger was promoted to Secretary of State and remained in that job under the successor president Gerald Ford. And Ford actually visited China as well.
They're Ford in China doesn't have quite the glamour of Nixon in China. Being the second president to go is never as good as the first as these things go. But in that context there was diplomacy continued. Norths on the Jimmy Carter came afterwards and eventually it came off but it was quite grinding and slow in various ways. So in between there were a whole variety of attempts to try and build up relations at kind of lower tier levels.
And in that an organization called the US National Council on Relations with the PRC which was very very much led by people who were proper China experts. I mean a very significant figure called Jan Barris who you know still very much part of the organization and remembers as you know a younger official hosting Chinese communist allocations of you know cardraise coming to the US. And she's told the great stories and in fact I suppose you'd like to say BBC sounds podcast called Archive on For the Great Wall which have interviewed Jan and various other people involved with the US China relations in which they all tell fantastic stories about trying to build this relationship up.
And for Jan one of the best stories she tells is having to take Chinese communist officials to Disneyland which turned out to be one of the kind of top destinations that we wanted to go. One point there went a bit wrong because she took a pile one to them to the haunted house ride and was told sternly afterwards that in communist China you know ghosts were not committed because they were a feudal relic of a superstitious past that didn't exist in China. So after that Disneyland was always on the agenda but never in the haunted house. So that sort of encounter did quite a lot in a slightly weird way to build up a kind of network of relationships even when the very very top negotiators were sort of slowly but surely and slightly grudgingly and grindingly making their way towards that big diplomatic breakthrough that finally took place under under Jimmy Carter at the end of the 1970s.
And what was that big breakthrough? Well the breakthrough that really made the difference was the full declaration of diplomatic relations between the peoples of public of China and the United States of America which took effect from the 1st of January 1979. It wasn't smooth and it wasn't without controversy supporters of Taiwan in the US Congress as well as of course in Taiwan itself were pretty unhappy with the whole arrangement.
It's one of the reasons why something was passed through Congress called the Taiwan Relations Act still very much with us today in the 2020s which authorizes the US not to recognize Taiwan as the country doesn't do that but it does give the US the right to provide means for Taiwan to defend itself against attacks from whoever it might be but of course the suspicion is it would be the mainland of China. So you know that side of things remained quite controversial but overall particularly from the momentum that had been created since the Nixon visit in 1970, 1972 it was clear that the direction of travel was towards full recognition and at some level it clearly was a moment of logic because there was no way that a country the size and importance of China could continue to be an unrecognized state in the global community particularly since the United Nations have granted the PRC the China seat on the UN Security Council as early as 1971.
I think one quite simple one which is that in the end the gains that were made from the Nixon visit came from dialogue in all its forms came from dialogue that meant that people had to meet and sit and eat and talk with each other whether it was presidents or chairman of parties or table tennis players or you know communist cardraids you know riding the rides at Disneyland they all had to meet and talk with each other they also learned at least at that point to find ways to disagree without coming to blows.
Do we get a sense of how the meeting and the process more generally changed the view of the two nations amongst the populations of both nations.
我们能否了解到这次会议以及整个过程是如何在两个国家的公众中改变了对彼此国家的看法。
The Nixon visit and the subsequent visits by diplomats and you know by a kind of civil society actors between both societies. I think did a lot to change perceptions of both countries amongst the population of each other.
In China one of the things that became much more commonplace was encouraging people to learn English and the opportunities that really emerged in the 1980s onwards for young Chinese women and men to go to America and actually study there became much more commonplace and this could be offered to study English but it could also be to learn in areas where China desperately needed to develop its own standing such as technology and science. And so the sense for instance in China which still you know has some standing I think that America was the found of the most globally significant science whether it was going to the moon or you know vaccines or you know by medicine that would change the world or computers that was all very much something that was hugely understood and admired in China at that time was made clearer by the ability of Chinese students to go back and forth between China and America at that time. And so one of the reasons why China today is so proud of the fact that in the last few years it too has become an innovatron technology in a way that was simply unimaginable in the 1970s and 80s.
Now the other way round clearly it was not quite going to be the case that Americans at the 70s and 80s would look to China for technology but there was a stronger understanding of China as a major significant global power that of course we sometimes forget was also a sort of unstated friend against the Soviets in the 70s and 80s.
It's worth remembering the 70s and 80s in particular were a really really cold period of the cold war between the Soviets and the Americans you know Ronald Reagan's rhetoric about the evil empower was not about China it was about the Soviet Union and all of the debates of that era about Star Wars defense systems and so forth very much about Reagan's America and the Soviet Union pre-Gorba Chauve squaring up against each other often in a very dangerous way.
So the irony became for many Americans both in terms of the top leadership and in wider society more broadly defined that China was seen as yes a communist country but it's the friendly communist country if you can imagine such a thing and perhaps a symbolic moment of that in 1984 was the Los Angeles Olympics. The Soviets boycotted it because of course the Americans had boycotted the Moscow Olympics of 1980 because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but the Chinese went to both and the Chinese presence at the LA Olympics was one of the milestones in terms of what we see today which is China becoming one of the one two or three greatest Olympic nations in the world and they did that in large part also by engaging with America rather than standing away from it.
It's so interesting you mentioned the 84 Olympics there because as we're talking the Winter Olympics are happening at the moment and the situation globally is obviously quite different now from what it was then.
What do you think of the long-term legacies of this episode and do you think they've really stayed with us given how much more fraught I suppose things seem to be now?
你认为这个事件的长期遗产如何?考虑到现在的情况变得更加紧张,你认为这些遗产是否确实留给了我们?
There's good out the relationship between American China today is extremely problematic and hostile in many aspects.
如今美中关系存在很多问题和敌意,但也有一些好的方面。
In some ways that is the inheritance of what happened 50 years ago when Nix and visited China and the former Secretary of State of the US might Pompeo made a big speech in 2020 in the last year of the Trump presidency in California in which very politely but very firmly he basically said that you know Nixon and the others after him had got it wrong in terms of opening up to China as much as they had.
I have to say that that's a view that's been pushed back against both by Republicans and Democrats. People on both sides of the political spectrum in the US who feel that engagement with China was necessary in a sense unavoidable in that sense.
But I think that the legacy that we have today for good or real I think is just a fact of life is that the globalized China out today wouldn't exist how it not been for that opening because think about the places in the 2020s where China has either a major role or dominance. In technology much of which of course it drew on and has adapted from what it learned you know from all the student study in Silicon Valley or in terms of global capital you know China benefited hugely from the investment markets, the investment opportunities that came from being in the New York markets or indeed being able to export huge numbers of goods to an America that was willing to buy that of course you know help create the Chinese economic miracle that you all know about in that sense.
China's presence in the world trade organization you know very important act in there today that was done with American help and assistance people like Probezelec who became president of the World Bank but as the assistant secretary of state under the Bush administration, Bush number two, the public and of course was very much about completing the business that Clinton the Democrat had started of getting China as an actor in the world trade organization. Again many figures wouldn't have perhaps predicted that China would become in some ways a very confrontational actor in those international bodies but you then have to make a counter-argument that China being excluded and externalized from all these organizations would have made it a more compliant and benevolent actor and I'm not sure that that's an argument that can logically logically hold.
So in a sense part of that story over 50 years is about a legacy of decisions that were made but I think it shouldn't be forgotten that there was a level at which which I think Nixon understood with his comment about having to bring China into the family of nations eventually that beyond a certain point it would have been impossible not to make such a gesture and that the bringing of China into the international community was by that stage probably long overdue rather than something that shouldn't have been attempted at all. Do you think that studying this episode changes or should change our impression of the politicians involve Nixon for instance? Do you think we need to have a different impression of him given his role in this?
I don't know about different but I think it is important to note that one can look at people in the round. Some of the things that Nixon did particularly domestically still I think you know don't stand up to any kind of moral scrutiny the Watergate break-in being an example of that although again perhaps in recent years we've seen that other presidents also have their own flaws that are noticeable. I won't name names but I think everyone can guess where we might look for for some of that more than one president as well but at the same time and internationally you can also see areas like for instance the subversion of the Chilean government in 1973 and the overthrow of the LNDA government and essentially facilitating a military coup you know a bombing of Cambodia saying that we can know all sorts of things the mix of administration did that I think sit pretty badly to the present day.
However you can also look at the big strategic gains that came from the height of Nixon's also undoubted capacity in a way that very few leaders even of America have managed to do to think genuinely geostrategically and I've point up to I think I think can still be flagged up on the positive side. One is the opening to China. One is absolutely the opening to China because as I say I think it was inevitable and I think the argument that a US president shouldn't have used the huge political capital he had as a right winner and used it to open up to communist China was not in some ways quite a bold act but also one that in the end sent the US-China relationship at least for a while in the right direction but the other one that links to it is state-owned.
It is notable that the early to mid-1970s was a relatively less tense time in some ways in terms of the Soviet US confrontation certainly less so than the times very very cold cold war of the early 1980s that I mentioned and also of course many of the confrontations of the 60s that came miss our crisis the Soviet invasion of Czechs to Vakia a whole variety of other things that look like they might be the moment for you know real configurations now
it's not that things were entirely all peace and light and happiness during the 70s certainly not but they thought was real the discussion with the Soviets of reducing nuclear arsenals during that period was real and I think that one of the reasons not the only reason but one of the reasons why Nixon and Kissinger and you know Bill Rogers and the other people involved had credibility in actually reducing tension with the Soviets was that they were a anti-communist enough that people believed that they they could do it with credibility but be that
the other great threats the Vietnam War and the possibility of a hostile China basically you know coming up against the United States along with the Soviets were definitively defused at least for that decade or so and that opened up all of other opportunities such as such as data on so I think in retrospect that period does have some aspects that do look as if they were a genuine move forward in terms of the ultimate ending of the Cold War.
Thank you so much finally are there any other lessons or I suppose legacies of this period that we should bear in mind today in 2022? I think one quite simple one which is that in the end the gains that were made from the Nixon visit came from dialogue in all its forms came from dialogue that meant that people had to meet and sit and eat and talk with each other whether it was presidents or chairman of parties or table tennis players or you know communist cardrails you know riding the rides at Disneyland they all had to meet and talk with each other they also learned at that point to find ways to disagree without coming to blows you know on Taiwan again it would be an example of that sort of question that was never really resolved but could be you know placed in a place where other things could be done.
There are signs that sometimes the capacity to create that sort of dialogue and forums in which both sides can understand where the other side is coming from have been less obvious in recent years I think there's been a bit more of a move back towards it in the last year or two but there is no doubt that US-China relations today are in a very fragile state so learning how one can actually have and move forward dialogue I think is one of the things that we should look back to the Nixon visit for half a century later we're in a very different situation and one which has a very different America as well as a different China but that having been said the basic principles of understanding that big powers have to learn how to talk to each other remains quite constant.
That was Rana Mitter you can read more from Rana about Nixon's trip to China in the March issue of BBC History magazine which is on sale now thanks for listening this podcast was produced by Ben Ewitt Jack Bateman and Brushing E. Coli.
这是Rana Mitter,您可以在BBC历史杂志的三月版中了解更多有关尼克松访华的内容,该杂志现在已经出售。感谢您收听本播客,本期播客制作人为Ben Ewitt,Jack Bateman和Brushing E. Coli。