The future of war - YouTube

At first glance, the war in Ukraine might look like something from the 20th century. You see a sort of trench-like landscape that would be familiar to soldiers from 1915. But it holds many lessons for conflicts to come. While boots on the ground still matter. Russia has moved to tighten its conscription law, pressing more men to fight. New tech is making a huge difference. There's this idea of revolutions in military affairs, and they're typically attributed to technology. And I think that's why we're here to see the future. The world will definitely be very important in any conflict between Taiwan and China. Has the world entered a new era of increased conflicts? What does the future of combat look like? This may be the moment where war really does become something else.

乍一看，乌克兰战争可能看起来像是20世纪的事情。你会看到一种类似于1915年士兵熟悉的战壕景观。但这场战争带来了许多未来冲突的教训。虽然实地作战仍然很重要，但俄罗斯已经开始收紧征兵法，招募更多的士兵参战。新技术正产生巨大的影响。有一种军事事务革命的概念，通常归因于技术的进步。我认为这就是我们在这里看未来的原因。在台湾和中国之间的任何冲突中，世界将起到至关重要的作用。世界是否进入了一个冲突增加的新时代？未来的战斗会是什么样子？这可能是战争真正转变为其他形式的时刻。

Go back and cut off planes without assist, and turn off weapons. There cannot be a good way to stay out of the war.

回到并割断没有帮助的飞机，并关闭武器。在战争中不可能有什么好的方法保持不参与。

In Ukraine's capital of Kiev, Vatali runs aerologics, a company that makes drones for the Ukrainian military. Today he's testing their flagship product, a reconnaissance drone called the GORE, as well as a smaller loitering munition or kamikaze drone. Over 20 such systems have already been sent to the front line. It's a successful combination of months of research and development. The drones are adapted to be used as weapons or as guides. Both Russia and Ukraine are sending huge numbers onto the battlefield. We're now estimating that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are losing some 10,000 drones a month, so just the extent to which drones are being used is definitely noteworthy. Drones have flown in wars before, but what's different in Ukraine is how they're being used. What I think it's teaching us is that just because drones are being shot down doesn't mean they aren't absolutely indispensable. If the drone is shot down, no problem, it's done its job. These are almost becoming like consumables on the battlefield.

在乌克兰的首都基辅，瓦塔利经营着一家名为Aerologics的公司，为乌克兰军方制造无人机。今天，他正在测试他们的旗舰产品——一种名叫GORE的侦察无人机，以及一种更小的悬停型攻击无人机或者叫做“神风”的无人机。已经有20多套这样的系统被送到了前线。这是几个月研发的成功结合。这些无人机被改装成武器或者导航器使用。俄罗斯和乌克兰都在向战场上投送大量无人机。我们现在估计乌克兰武装部队每月会损失约1万架无人机，所以无人机的使用程度无疑非常值得关注。无人机在战争中已经飞行过，但在乌克兰的不同之处在于它们的使用方式。我认为这告诉我们的是，即使无人机被击落了也并不意味着它们不是绝对必需品。如果无人机被击落，没问题，它已经完成了任务。在战场上，它们几乎成为了消耗品。

A QB- Hitler thing is really good for the quality and gravity. Search and destroy drone missions are a huge part of the new tech dominating the battlefield. But it's artillery batteries flying drones to show them where to aim their guns that are using them with the most effect. Without expandable drones as their eyes and ears, shooters would be nearly blind. Just how many drones are being used is an invaluable lesson for any future conflict. Quantity can really matter in a war and quantity has a quality of its own. That's something that in the West we may have forgotten to some extent. We have relatively shallow arsenals with regard to ammunition and things like that and now we're realizing that in these kind of rather large conventional wars you also just need a lot of drones and a lot of everything really. Whether they're consumable or large and long range Ukraine has demonstrated drones will be regular players in wars of the future.

关于QB-Hitler的事情实际上对战争的质量和重要性产生了很大的影响。搜索和摧毁无人机任务是新技术主宰战场的重要部分。但是，将无人机用于指引炮兵部队的炮兵无人机发挥了最大的效果。如果没有可扩展的无人机作为他们的眼睛和耳朵，射手们将几乎是盲目的。使用多少无人机是对任何未来冲突的宝贵教训。在战争中数量确实很重要，而数量本身也具有质量的特点。这是一种在西方可能在某种程度上已经忘记的东西。对于弹药和其他类似物品，我们的军火库相对较浅，而现在我们意识到在这些相当大规模的常规战争中，你也需要大量的无人机和大量的一切。无论它们是可以消耗的还是巨大的远程型，乌克兰已经证明了无人机将成为未来战争中的常规参与者。

But the intelligence drones collect is only useful if there's a means of communicating it to the wider force. And in the battlefield that isn't always easy. Soldiers like Fevorski are at the forefront of that challenge. They risk their lives training soldiers how to use technology that has become a lifeline for Ukraine. Starlink. Away from the battlefield maintaining the equipment is essential.

但智能无人机收集的情报只有在有一种将其传达给更广泛的力量的手段时才有用。在战场上，这并不总是容易的。像Fevorski这样的士兵正处于这个挑战的前线。他们冒着生命危险训练士兵如何使用对乌克兰来说已经成为救命稻草的技术，即Starlink。在战场之外，维护设备至关重要。

Starlink is a satellite constellation owned by SpaceX, an American rocket company. It's made up of more than 4,000 low orbit satellites that provide off-grid internet access. A lifeline when heavy artillery is constantly battering your ground base utilities. And crucially it's allowing soldiers on the ground to share images from drone feeds to connect targets with the nearest artillery team. A kind of Uber for howitzers.

Starlink是SpaceX拥有的一组卫星，这是一家美国火箭公司。它由4000多颗低轨道卫星组成，提供脱网互联网接入。当大炮不断轰击你的地面基础设施时，它成为了一条生命线。而且最重要的是，它使地面士兵能够通过无人机传输图像，将目标与最近的火炮团队连接起来。可以说是火炮领域的优步服务。

I'm not sure if I'm going to be able to do that. Other countries are taking note. Chinese generals have been watching American wars since 1991 when America's lightning fast victory over Iraq woke them up to the power of American intelligence and digital networks. And from that moment on the People's Liberation Army of China realized not only that they had to be able to wage a similar kind of warfare but that if they were going to be able to defeat America and its allies in Asia they would have to take out not just weapons and soldiers on the ground but you take out the systems that they rely on. Taiwan constantly in China's cross says, knows its undersea internet cables could be cut in the event of an invasion. It too sees the value of a star-link type constellation in a future conflict. Satellite communications in the future are going to be that absolutely critical element that allows sensors to be connected to shooters in a timely fashion in a way that ensures if a soldier sees a tank and sends that information back you can hit it in a time scale that is minute not hours by which the tank may be miles away.

我不确定我能做到那件事。其他国家正在留意这一点。自从1991年美国在对伊拉克的闪电般胜利唤醒了中国将军对美国情报和数字网络的实力的关注以来，中国将领们一直在密切关注美国的战争。从那时起，中国人民解放军意识到他们不仅需要能够进行类似的战争，而且如果他们打算在亚洲击败美国及其盟友，他们不仅需要削弱地面的武器和士兵，还需要削弱他们依赖的系统。台湾经常处在中国的关注中，知道在入侵事件发生时其海底互联网电缆可能被切断。它也意识到在未来的冲突中，星链类型的星座的价值。未来的卫星通信将成为绝对关键的元素，使传感器能与射击人员及时连接，以确保如果一个士兵看到了一辆坦克并将信息反馈回去，你可以在分钟而不是几小时的时间范围内摧毁它，而此时坦克可能已经离开了几英里远的地方。

Starlink may help information move quicker and more securely but in wars of the future artificial intelligence will help to make sense of that information.

Starlink可能会加快信息传输速度并提高安全性，但在未来的战争中，人工智能将帮助我们理解这些信息的意义。

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Generals in Ukraine are already adapting AI technology to help them plan what to attack, what resources to use and when. A kind of Google Maps for Armies. It's another glimpse of how new tech will be helping tomorrow's soldiers.

乌克兰的将军们已经开始采用人工智能技术，帮助他们规划攻击目标、使用资源以及时间安排。可以说这是一种军队的谷歌地图。这是新技术将如何帮助未来士兵的又一瞥。

You'll use these virtual simulations for various training or experimental purposes. Jennifer McCarle should know she specializes in training soldiers for future wars.

您将使用这些虚拟模拟来进行各种培训或实验目的。詹妮弗·麦卡尔应该知道她专门负责训练士兵以准备未来的战争。

Ukraine has been a great example of how the ubiquity and proliferation of sensors has allowed them to more effectively close kill chains. Shortening a kill chain means speeding up the time between finding a target and destroying it.

乌克兰是一个很好的例子，展示了传感器的普及和扩散如何使他们能够更有效地关闭杀伤链。缩短杀伤链意味着加快从发现目标到摧毁目标的时间。

It's a maritime control aircraft. Can you show me their position? Satellite, radar and drones provide an overwhelming amount of data from the battlefield. And sorting through it is hugely time intensive. If you're able to use AI to go through that information and to be able to present information that matters for a decision maker, you have speed. You can work through that decision-making cycle much more quickly than you can right now.

这是一架海上控制飞机。你能告诉我它们的位置吗？卫星、雷达和无人机从战场上提供了大量的数据，浏览这些数据需要非常大的时间和精力。如果你能运用人工智能来处理这些信息，并能将对决策者有用的信息呈现出来，那么你就拥有了速度。你可以比现在更快地处理决策周期。

And AI isn't just helping to make decisions. It's also guiding the machines. Shield AI is a military tech company working to build an AI pilot. It's an intelligent software that can fly unmanned craft during combat. The future of warfare is going to be characterized by thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles. And what is going to be the differentiating factor among all these vehicles is the level of intelligence, the level of autonomy integrated into each one of those vehicles. You'll see unmanned systems outnumber the number of warfighters on the front lines of these conflicts. They will play a key role in any battle of the future.

AI不仅仅帮助做决策。它还在指导机器。Shield AI是一家军事技术公司，致力于构建一个人工智能飞行员。这是一个能在战斗中驾驶无人机的智能软件。未来的战争将由数千架无人飞行器，无人水面舰船和无人水下舰艇所组成。而在所有这些机器中，能够区分的因素将是智能水平和自主性水平的整合程度。你将会看到无人系统的数量超过前线战斗人员的数量。它们将在未来的战斗中发挥关键作用。

Business is booming for military startups. Since 2021, the American Defense Department spending on AI allocated by financial year has more than doubled. NATO is also heavily investing. There has been a wave of venture capital that has gone to defense technology companies. I think it's because you see an industry that is fundamentally transforming the products and capabilities that are going to matter in the next conflict are going to be derived from software capabilities from AI.

军事初创公司的业务兴旺发展。自2021年以来，美国国防部在财政年度上对人工智能的支出已经增加了一倍以上。北约也在大力投资。一波风险投资涌入国防技术公司。我认为这是因为你会看到一个产业正在从根本上转变下一次冲突中将会起到关键作用的产品和能力，这将来自于软件能力和人工智能。

But there are concerns about leaving the decision to kill to an algorithm. There's this worry, I think, in popular culture that AI is going to spawn these terminators. And while I think there is reason to be cautious, I do think it's important we don't engage in hyperbole. In the US and in a lot of Western countries, we have made the deliberate decision that when it comes to decisions around lethality, a human will always be in or on that decision-making loop. And where this, I think, does become a little bit worrisome is that other countries haven't made that same normative decision. Over a hundred countries have military systems with some degree of autonomy.

然而，将杀人决策交给算法引起了一些担忧。在大众文化中，人们担心人工智能将产生类似终结者的存在。尽管我认为应该谨慎对待，但我认为我们重要的是不要夸大其词。在美国和很多西方国家，我们经过深思熟虑做出了这样一个明确决策，即在涉及致命性决策时，必须将人类置于决策的循环中。我认为令人稍感担忧的是，其他国家没有做出这样的规范决策。超过一百个国家拥有带有某种程度自治的军事系统。

It's easy to see how a weapon that thinks for itself could be an advantage. If you are a commander and you launch the weapon, let's say an aircraft and its communications are jammed, if it spots a target on the ground, are you going to wait for your communication link to be restored by which time a target may have gone away? Or are you going to give the weapon the authority to take the shot itself? From a purely military perspective, that independence is hugely valuable under those kinds of comms-denied environment. But for now, humans largely maintain lethal control.

很容易理解拥有自主思考能力的武器可能是一种优势。如果你是指挥官并且发射了某种武器，比如一架飞机，然后它的通信被干扰了，如果它在地面上发现一个目标，你会等待恢复通信，而这个时候目标可能已经消失了吗？还是会给武器授权自行开火？从纯粹的军事角度来看，在这种通信受阻的环境下，这种独立性是非常有价值的。但目前，人类在很大程度上仍然保持着对致命武器的控制。

I'm skeptical that AI on its own can turn the tide of war. I think we have to be very cognizant of the fact. AI remains incredibly brittle. It struggles to adapt to unexpected situations and scenarios. And warfare is just full of the unexpected. It's replete with fog and friction.

我对人工智能单独扭转战争局势的观点表示怀疑。我认为我们必须非常清醒地认识到这个事实。人工智能仍然非常脆弱。它很难适应意料之外的情况和场景。而战争充满了意外，布满了阻力。

And in wars of the future, like now, not all fighting will be done with bullets and missiles. Over 8,000 km from Ukraine in the South China Sea, there may be fewer trenches, but a few risks struggle is still underway. China has long claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, a democratic self-governing island that it sees as a breakaway province. But geography is on Taiwan's side. For China to launch a straightforward invasion of Taiwan, there are many difficulties, including launching the largest ever amphibious operations since Normandy. This will be extremely difficult for China. The landing itself is also extremely difficult because China hasn't actually conducted any kinetic military operations since 1979. So this is a big gamble.

未来的战争不会像现在一样，不是所有的战斗都会用子弹和导弹进行。在距离乌克兰8000多公里的南海，可能没有像战壕那样的障碍，但某种风险斗争仍在继续进行。中国长期以来主张对台湾拥有主权，将其视为脱离省份的民主自治岛屿。但是地理位置对台湾是有利的。中国要发起对台湾的直接入侵存在诸多困难，包括进行自诺曼底登陆以来最大规模的两栖军事行动。这对中国来说极其困难。登陆本身也非常困难，因为中国自1979年以来实际上没有进行任何动态军事行动。所以这是一个很大的冒险。

In the face of such challenges, China may try a different tack if it invades Taiwan. The post-loburial army believes in the three warfare doctrine, which requires communication with your potential audience in order to achieve a psychological effect. Cyber provides a very powerful means for them to extend their concept such as propaganda, such as united fund operations. If they could do that, and this is relatively cheap, you could conduct an entire year's worth of operations and the cost would not nearly be as much as one bull's sickness out.

面对这样的挑战，如果中国入侵台湾，可能会尝试不同的策略。 后陆军相信三战理论，该理论要求与潜在受众进行沟通，以达到心理效应。网络空间为他们提供了非常强大的手段，可以延伸他们的宣传概念，比如统一筹备行动。如果他们能做到这一点，而且这相对便宜，他们可以进行一整年的行动，成本几乎不及一头牛生病的费用。

And cyber warfare isn't just a psychological weapon. They could cut off power supplies, critical military infrastructure such as surveillance radar stations, and keep Taiwan blind, deaf to facilitate further kinetic operations. It may sound like a cleaner version of future war, but when it comes to conflict, there's no escape from attrition.

网络战争不仅仅是一种心理武器。它们可以切断电力供应、破坏关键军事基础设施，例如监视雷达站，使台湾陷入失明、失聪的状态，以促进更进一步的动力作战。这听起来可能是未来战争的一种更干净的形式，但在冲突中，不可避免地会有消耗战。

In Kyiv, Favoski and his partner are preparing for him to return to the front. It's very easy to get caught up in the heart of the world. It's very easy to get caught up in the hardware of this conflict, the drone, the tanks, the satellites. But it is very important to understand, ultimately, this is still people. Mostly men, often very young men, holding guns, firing at the enemy and suffering trauma, life-changing injuries and death. Even in a war with high levels of technological sophistication, in the end, we still need to be prepared for the 18-year-old dying somewhere in the mud. The fundamental nature of war as a human conflict with humans killing each other, I don't think that that is going to go away.

在基辅， Favoski 和他的伙伴正在为他返回前线做准备。很容易陷入这个世界的混乱之中。很容易陷入这场冲突的硬件中，比如无人机、坦克和卫星。但是我们必须明白，最终这依然是关乎人的问题。大多数是男性，通常是非常年轻的男性，他们手持枪支，向敌人开火，遭受创伤、改变一生的伤害和死亡。即使在技术水平高度发达的战争中，我们仍然需要为那些在泥泞中丧生的18岁年轻人做准备。战争作为一个人与人之间相互残杀的人类冲突的基本本质，我认为这不会消失。

War is still ultimately irreducibly about that clash of arms, waged often at close quarters in which bodies pile up, the societies are ravaged and each country's youth, the most talented of their young generation, are lost in huge numbers.

战争始终不可避免地归结为武器的对冲冲突，通常在近距离进行，导致无数尸体堆积，社会遭受蹂躏，每个国家最有才华的年轻一代也在大量失去。

Thank you for watching. So read more of our coverage on the future of warfare, please click on the link and don't forget to subscribe.

感谢您观看。如果想要阅读更多关于未来战争的报道，请点击链接并不要忘记订阅。