How China Got the Bomb
发布时间 2023-05-28 23:00:11 来源
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On October 16, 1964, 3pm in the afternoon, the People's Republic of China detonated their first domestically produced atomic bomb. With this, China joined the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain as one of the five atomic powers. It took China less than five years to produce a working nuclear weapon. In this video, we look at how China got the bomb.
在1964年10月16日下午3点，中华人民共和国引爆了他们第一枚国产原子弹。这使得中国成为了五个原子大国之一，其他四个为美国、苏联和英国。中国仅仅用了不到五年的时间便成功制造出可运作的核武器。在这个视频中，我们将探讨中国如何获得了原子弹。
Back when America alone had the atomic bomb, Mao Zedong and party leadership feared possible American nuclear intervention in the Chinese Civil War. When he visited Stalin in December 1949 to negotiate China's entry into the Soviet block, he sought the assurance of a nuclear umbrella over his then precarious country. The Soviets, then just a few months removed from breaking the Western monopoly, were reluctant to grant that umbrella even implicitly.
在美国独有原子弹时，毛泽东和党的领导层担心美国可能会在中国内战中使用核武器进行干涉。1949年12月，他访问斯大林，谈判中国加入苏联阵营，并寻求核保护伞的保证，以保护他的国家。当时苏联刚刚几个月打破了西方的垄断，因此对暗示甚至直接给予核保护伞有所犹豫。
In the original text of the Sinosoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, the Soviets wrote, in the event of an invasion of one of the signatory countries by a third country, the other signatory country shall render assistance. Recognizing that this was a bit watered down, Zhou and Li suggested adding the clause, with all means at its disposal. The Soviets initially resisted, but it was eventually accepted. Nothing about nuclear weapons was ever put down in formal writing, leaving the meaning of all these clauses to interpretation by all parties, such things were shortly thereafter tested during the Korean War.
在中苏友好、联盟和互助条约的原始文本中，苏联人写道，如果第三个国家入侵签署国之一，另一个签署国应提供援助。周恩来和李富春认为这个表述有些含糊，建议增加“尽其所能”这一条款。苏联一开始反对，但最终被接受了。条约中从未明确提及核武器的事项，使得所有各方对这些条款的解释留下了很多空间，这些内容在朝鲜战争中很快就被验证了。
As the Americans approached the Ya'lu River, the border between North Korea and China, the Chinese worried that the Americans would also invade Communist China. In such an event, would the Americans use the bomb? Would the Soviets back the Chinese? The Americans eventually did decide to intervene, believing in their manpower advantage, and that the Americans would not risk all-out nuclear warfare with the Soviets. Mao's bet worked out, the Americans did not use nuclear weapons, though they certainly threatened to do so.
当美军接近鸭绿江时，这是朝鲜和中国之间的边界，中国担心美国人会入侵共产主义中国。如果出现这种情况，美国人会使用核武器吗？苏联会支持中国吗？最终，美国人决定干涉，相信他们的兵力优势，并且他们不会冒着与苏联进行全面核战争的风险。毛泽东的赌博计划奏效，美国人没有使用核武器，尽管他们确实威胁要这样做。
But after the hot war in Korea ended, the Americans held the nuclear weapons issue over Chinese heads, such threats had a strong impact on Chinese leadership who called it nuclear blackmail. As like those by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Dwight Eisenhower, who said, the Chinese Communist regime has been consistently and viciously hostile to the United States. And then a wapper from General Curtis Lemay, the commander of the Strategic Air Command, who said in 1954, there are no suitable strategic air targets in Korea. However, I would drop a few bombs in proper places in China, Manchuria, and South Eastern Russia. It is hard to read such a comment as a Chinese and not feel a little alarmed.
在朝鲜热战结束后，美国人利用核武器问题威胁中国，这些威胁对中国领导层产生了很大的影响，称之为核讹诈。就像是乔hn·富斯特·达勒斯，艾森豪威尔总统任期内的国务卿曾经说过，中国共产党一直对美国极具敌意。接下来，是战略空军司令柯蒂斯·莱梅将军在1954年的言论：朝鲜没有适合策略轰炸目标，但我会在中国、满洲和俄罗斯东南部的合适地点投下几枚炸弹。作为一名中国人，读到这样的评论很难不感到一些恐慌。
During the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in late 1954 and 1955, the US military leadership recommended the use of nuclear weapons, though Eisenhower ultimately refrained. Then in December 1954, the United States and the Republic of China signed a mutual defense treaty, which the communists rightly believed would embolden the Guomintan. Even if none of this happened, Mao Tse Dong and the Communist Party probably would have tried to produce an atomic weapon anyway. But this series of crises gave the process a special urgency.
在1954年末和1955年的第一次台海危机期间，美国军方领导人建议使用核武器，但艾森豪威尔最终选择了克制。然后在1954年12月，美国和中华民国签署了一份相互防御条约，共产党人正确地认为这会鼓励国民党。即使没有发生这一切，毛泽东和共产党可能也会尝试生产出核武器。但是这一系列危机使得这个过程变得特别紧迫。
Mao's first impulse with their new program was to go to their new ally, the Soviets. The Soviets were China's largest external trading partner. They had given loans and helped China create Soviet-style industrial development projects. They also provided the PLA with missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment. The PRC long knew about the Soviet nuclear program. A few weeks before the first detonation in 1949, a communist party delegation, led by Leo Souchi, visited Stalin and unexpectedly asked him to tour the nuclear installations. Stalin, perhaps surprised, instead arranged to show them a nuclear testing documentary.
毛泽东对他们新计划的第一反应是去寻求他们新的盟友苏联的支持。苏联是中国最大的海外贸易伙伴，他们提供贷款并帮助中国创建苏联式的工业发展项目。他们还提供了导弹、飞机和其他军事装备给中国人民解放军。中华人民共和国早已知道苏联的核计划。1949年首次核爆炸的几周前，一个由肖楚领导的共产党代表团访问了苏联领导人斯大林，并意外地请求参观核设施。斯大林可能很惊讶，反而安排了一部核试验纪录片展示给他们。
The Soviets never transferred any atomic technology while he was alive. The most he was willing to offer was the aforementioned quote-unquote protection of their nuclear umbrella. In 1953, Stalin died, and Nikita Krushchev won a power struggle to become leader of the Soviet Union. We generally believe that Krushchev wanted Chinese support to boost his own domestic influence and help him achieve his goal of cleaning out Stalinism. In September 1954, he said in a speech to the Central Committee, before the event of the 5th anniversary of the foundation of China, if we don't help China to develop its industry, we would miss the historic opportunity to solidify our friendship.
当他还活着时，苏联从未转让任何核技术。他最愿意提供的是所谓的核保护伞。1953年，斯大林去世，尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫赢得了成为苏联领袖的权力斗争。我们普遍认为，赫鲁晓夫想要中国的支持，以增强自己在国内的影响力，并帮助他清除斯大林主义。1954年9月，在中国建国五周年之前，他在中央委员会的讲话中说，如果我们不帮助中国发展产业，我们会失去巩固友谊的历史机会。
A few days later, he led a delegation to the PRC, in a meeting that occurred on October 1954, Mao asked Krushchev to assist China in his nuclear weapons program. This caught Krushchev by surprise, after a pause he sought to dissuade China from taking this path. He wanted them to focus on economic development, pointing out that the Soviets had already provided them a nuclear umbrella. The Chinese insisted, and in the end, Krushchev and the Soviets agreed to cooperate on certain items for peaceful atomic energy use.
几天后，他率领代表团前往中国，参加了1954年10月份举行的会议。在会上，毛泽东请求赫鲁晓夫协助中国开展核武器计划。这让赫鲁晓夫很吃惊，他停顿了一下，试图劝阻中国不要走这条路。他希望他们集中精力发展经济，并指出苏联已经为他们提供了核保护伞。中国人坚持要求，最后，赫鲁晓夫和苏联同意在某些用于和平原子能的项目上进行合作。
In April 1955, the PRC and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet atomic cooperation treaty. In it, the Soviets agreed to give the Chinese, and a few other Eastern European countries, a 6,500-10,000 kilowatt experimental nuclear power plant, and a 12.5-25 mega-electron volt cyclotron, at a cost of 430 million rubles. The Soviets sent a team of nuclear experts, led by the head of the Soviet Institute of Nuclear Physics, to show some movies about atomic energy. We also gave a lecture to a large audience of 1,400 Chinese scientists, and Zhou and Li himself. They would also send several scientists to China to explore China's uranium reserves out in Xinjiang.
在1955年4月，中华人民共和国和苏联签署了中苏原子能合作协议。根据协议，苏联同意向中国和其他一些东欧国家提供一台6,500-10,000千瓦的实验性核电站和一个12.5-25兆电子伏的环流加速器，费用为4.3亿卢布。苏联派遣了一支由苏联核物理研究所的负责人领导的核专家团队，向中国展示了有关原子能的电影，并给中国的1,400名科学家和周恩来、李四光等领导人作了讲座。他们还会派遣若干位科学家前往新疆，探索中国的铀储备。
Any useful uranium would be first used for Chinese domestic purposes, and the surplus exported to the Soviet Union. Later, in February 1956, Krushchev agreed to expand this cooperation, in the form of sending more Chinese students to the Soviet Union, and helping to build nuclear research facilities for China. In these days, Sino-Soviet relations were at a high, yet Mao and his colleagues considered it an alliance of convenience, meaning that it will end at some point, and they had to make the most of what was being transferred while it was still coming.
任何有用的铀都会首先用于中国的国内用途，多余的将被出口到苏联。后来在1956年2月，赫鲁晓夫同意扩大这种合作形式，即向苏联派遣更多的中国学生，并帮助中国建设核研究设施。在当时，中苏关系达到了高潮，但是毛泽东和他的同事认为这只是一种便利联盟，意味着它将在某个时候终止，他们必须在转移仍在进行时尽可能地利用它。
The PRC started by increasing its science research funding from $15 million in 1955 to 100 million in 1956. The Chinese Academy of Sciences received a large influx of money, with most of it going towards purchasing science literature from the West. Talents are critical, and the Chinese nuclear program sought some of China's best talents. The program also benefited from an influx of Chinese-born scientists who were educated or worked in the West.
中华人民共和国开始将其科学研究资金从1955年的1500万美元增加到1956年的1亿美元。中国科学院收到了大量资金，其中大部分用于购买来自西方的科学文献。人才至关重要，中国的核计划寻求中国最优秀的人才。该计划还得益于一批在西方接受教育或工作的华裔科学家的涌入。
One notable example was Dr. Chen Shiyasen, who co-founded the Jet Propulsion Lab. He controversially lost his job due to American accusations of communist sympathies. Chen's persecution was a stain on America and a boon for the PRC. Other notable ex-patriot scientists included Chen Wei-Tang, Chen San-Chang, and Peng Huang Wu. Peng was particularly brilliant, a quantum physicist who earned two doctorates in ten years, and was the first Chinese student to study under Nobel Prize winner Max Born. And San-Chang studied the fissioning of uranium and gamma rays at the Kure Institute in Paris. Upon his return to China, he became the director of the Institute of Physics of the Chinese Academy of Space.
一个着名的例子是陈世颜博士，他协助创立了喷气推进实验室。由于被指控有共产主义倾向，他遭受了美国政府的迫害而失去了工作。陈的迫害是美国的污点，对中国是一大福音。其他著名的侨居科学家还包括陈威堂、陈三昌和彭黄武。其中，彭是一个特别聪明的量子物理学家，在十年内获得了两个博士学位，并成为首位在诺贝尔奖获得者马克斯·伯恩的指导下学习的中国学生。而陈三昌在巴黎的呉阪信核研究所研究铀分裂和伽马射线。回到中国后，他成为中国空间科学院物理学研究所的主任。
Scientists like Dr. Peng and Dr. Chen came back to China to help its development. Despite their patriotism, they were unfairly attacked by far-left elements of the Communist Party of China for being rightist intellectuals. They got so bad that Zhou and Li called in landmark meeting in 1956 to try and end the persecution. But it was not until the scientists were taken away from the cities to remote locations that they found peace. Up until 1957, what the Soviets had transferred over was helpful in accelerating reactor design for peaceful atomic energy. There is little doubt about their sincerity in this aim. But the Chinese largely already knew how to produce accelerators and even nuclear reactors. There was a lot of published literature in the West.
科学家们，如彭博士和陈博士，回到中国帮助其发展。虽然他们很爱国，但因为被视为右派知识分子而受到中国共产党极左派的不公平攻击。情况变得如此糟糕，以至于周和李于1956年进行了里程碑式的会议，试图结束迫害。但是直到科学家被带到偏远地区后，他们才找到了平静。直到1957年，苏联转移的信息对于加速和平原子能反应堆的设计是有帮助的。毫无疑问，他们的目的是真诚的。但中国人已经大多知道如何生产加速器，甚至核反应堆，因为在西方有很多的出版文献。
A nuclear weapon is a different beast, requiring special techniques and a lot of infrastructure to support it. The Soviets resisted the notion of sharing design or production knowledge about the nuclear weapons themselves. But then in late October 1956, came a series of anti-communist protests in Hungary and Poland. The Soviets responded to both with violent repression. Weekend by these protests, the Soviets needed the backing of their primary foreign ally, such friendship came with a price.
核武器是一种不同的动物，需要特殊技术和大量基础设施来支持它。苏联人抵制分享核武器的设计或生产知识的想法。但是，1956年10月底，在匈牙利和波兰爆发了一系列反共主义抗议活动。苏联对两者都采取了暴力镇压的方式进行回应。在这些抗议活动的周末，苏联需要他们的主要外国盟友的支持，这种友谊是有代价的。
Finally in 1957, Khrushchev decided against the advice of the military and Ivan Khrushchev, the father of the Soviet atomic program, that he would transfer atomic bomb technology to the Chinese. Thus, in October 1957, the Chinese and the Soviets signed the agreement on production of new weapons and military technology equipment and establishment of a comprehensive atomic energy industry in China. In it, the Soviets would have provided, among other things, a teaching model atomic bomb, complete with designs and documentation, plus technology for casings, processing uranium and plutonium and testing guidance. This should have been momentous, a technology transfer decision like no other.
最终，在1957年，赫鲁晓夫决定不听从军方和苏联原子计划之父伊万·赫鲁晓夫的建议，将原子弹技术转移给中国。因此，1957年10月，中苏双方签署了生产新武器和军事技术装备以及在中国建立综合性的原子能产业的协议。在此协议中，苏联将提供包括教学型原子弹在内的设计和文档，以及核弹壳、铀和钚的加工技术和测试指导等。这应该是一个具有重要意义的技术转移决定。
But there is a big question, one very hard to answer. And just how helpful the Soviet Union's transfers eventually were for the Chinese nuclear weapons program.
但是有一个很大的问题，很难回答。苏联向中国转让的核技术最终对中国的核武器计划产生了多大的帮助，这仍是一个未解之谜。
Khrushchev and other members on the Soviet side felt that they transferred some of their deepest secrets. Nikita later said in his self-serving memoirs, before the rupture in our relations, we given the Chinese almost everything they asked for, we kept no secrets from them. Khrushchev wasn't being entirely truthful here.
赫鲁晓夫和其他苏联方面的成员感觉他们泄露了一些最深的秘密。尼基塔后来在自己为了个人利益而写的回忆录中说，我们与中国的关系破裂之前，我们几乎给了他们所有要求的东西，没有对他们保留任何秘密。但赫鲁晓夫在这里并不是完全真诚的。
The Soviets did tell their scientists to limit themselves and never brief them on what the limits were, so they tended to be extremely passive. But on what they were allowed to say, they were open and genuinely sought to teach, though the Chinese did not seem to be so impressed with what they got, at least on the specific issue of nuclear weapons design.
苏联曾经让他们的科学家限制自己，并不告诉他们具体的限制是什么，因此他们往往非常被动。但是在他们被允许说的方面，他们是开放的并且真诚地寻求教导，尽管中国人似乎在核武器设计的具体问题上并不那么满意。
One such Soviet lecture on July 15, 1958 covered the theory, structure and assembly of a nuclear weapon. The Soviets thought they revealed many top secrets there. But there were no documents given, just one basic sketch on a blackboard, and the audience were mostly administrative personnel, not scientists.
1958年7月15日，苏联的一场讲座涵盖了核武器的理论、结构和组装方式。苏联认为他们在这场讲座中揭示了许多顶级机密。但是并没有提供文件，只有一个基本的黑板草图，而观众大多是行政人员，而不是科学家。
No parameters nor formula were given, nor were notes allowed, the reasoning for this being that this would come with the sample teaching bomb, more on that later. The Chinese also claimed that the 1958 Soviet lecture had completely wrong data that ended up misleading the Chinese scientists later down the line.
没有给出参数或公式，也不允许笔记，其原因是这将随样品教学炸弹一起提供，稍后再详细介绍。中国还声称，1958年苏联的讲座完全错误的数据最终误导了中国的科学家。
Dr. Chen San-Chang, already familiar with the working theoretical concepts of a nuclear weapon, thanks to his time in the United States, had been in attendance, and later said, what they told us is the same as the information we can get from other capitalist countries, but with a few more details. Sorting out these opposing claims is made more challenging by the subsequent Sino-Soviet split, both countries were incentivized to play up or downplay their contribution to the Chinese nuclear weapons program.
陈三昌博士已经熟悉核武器的理论概念，这要归功于他在美国的时候。他参加了会议，之后说：“他们告诉我们的信息和其他资本主义国家得到的信息一样，但是有一些更详细的细节。”由于中苏分裂后，两国都有动机夸大或淡化他们对中国核武器计划的贡献，因此对这些相反的说法进行筛选更加具有挑战性。
Regardless and other things of nuclear weapons development, the scale of technology transfer from the Soviets to the Chinese was massive, none of this should be discounted. For instance, the two countries closely collaborated on prospecting and mining efforts. China's uranium mines and Xinjiang were quite substantial. The Soviets helped with aerial surveys and prospecting labs.
尽管在核武器发展方面有着种种不同，但是苏联向中国转让的技术规模非常巨大，这点绝不应该被忽视。例如，两国密切合作进行地质勘探和矿产开采。中国在新疆的铀矿相当可观。苏联帮助进行了空中勘测和勘探实验室的工作。
So again here, the Chinese claim that Soviet aid was not particularly helpful. They pushed China to prospect and sedimentary soils, but as it turned out, China's best uranium deposits were found amidst granite and igneous rock.
在这里，中国人声称苏联的援助并没有什么特别的帮助。他们推动中国前往沉积和沉积岩地区勘探，但结果表明，中国最好的铀矿床都在花岗岩和火成岩中发现。
And finally, the Soviets handed over some of their best missiles, most critically there are 12 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which their scientists spent many arduous years developing. The Chinese got it for free. Sergey Krushchev, Nikita's son, recalls, let them take the R-12. 2,000 kilometers is not that long a range. Then father became silent. Perhaps he had realized that this weapon could be turned against us. After a short pause father went on, let them take the R-12 and everything else too.
最后苏联移交了他们最好的导弹之一，最关键的是12枚洲际弹道导弹，这些导弹是他们的科学家花费多年心血开发而成的。中国得到了它们，是免费的。尼基塔的儿子谢尔盖·克鲁什切夫回忆道，让他们拿去R-12导弹吧。2000公里并不是非常长的射程。然后父亲沉默了。也许他已经意识到，这种武器可能会被用来对付我们。短暂的停顿之后，父亲继续说，让他们把R-12和其他所有东西都拿走。
A 1950 style nuclear bomb works by mashing together, fizzle material into supercriticality, an uncontrollable series of nuclear chain reactions. So to start, we need a lot of fizzle material. Originally the Chinese sought to dual track up bomb using uranium-235 and plutonium fizzle material.
1950年代风格的核弹是通过将花生酥状物质压缩到临界状态，产生不受控制的一系列核链反应来发挥作用的。因此，我们需要大量的花生酥状物质。最初，中国试图使用铀-235和钚花生酥状物质来双重跟踪研制核弹。
A bomb made with uranium-235 would require the use of a gaseous diffusion plant to separate uranium-235 from uranium-238. The Soviets deeply influenced this part of the production line, particularly the production of the uranium-235. Gaseous diffusion is a now outdated procedure where we force gaseous uranium hexafloraide through a pore laid in barrier. U-235 is a little lighter than its 238 cousin, so it moves faster and is more likely to go through a pore.
用铀-235制造的炸弹需要使用气态扩散装置将铀-235与铀-238分离。苏联在生产线的这个部分深受影响，特别是铀-235的生产。气态扩散是一种现在已经过时的程序，其中我们强迫气态六氟化铀通过放置在障碍物中的孔。U-235比它的238表兄轻一点，所以移动得更快，更有可能穿过孔。
China's gaseous diffusion plant was located in Nanzhou City, in the Gansu province in northwest China. US aerial reconnaissance had spotted this plant as early as August 1959. A plutonium bomb on the other hand requires the construction of a nuclear fuel reactor to produce the material.
中国的气体扩散工厂位于中国西北的甘肃省南洲市。早在1959年8月，美国的空中侦察就已经发现了这个工厂。然而，制造钚原子弹需要建造核燃料反应堆来生产材料。
This reactor turns uranium-238 isotope fuel into plutonium-239. When the fuel is taken out of the reactor and cooled, it contains a mix of plutonium, uranium, and other stuff. After cooling, we need to separate out and process this plutonium to turn it into a metal, a dangerous and toxic process.
这个反应堆能够将铀-238同位素燃料转化为钚-239。当燃料从反应堆中取出并降温后，它包含一些钚、铀和其他物质的混合物。在降温后，我们需要将这些钚分离并加工处理，将其转化为金属。这是一个危险和有毒的过程。
China built an integrated plutonium fuel facility, also utilizing an early Soviet design for its reactor and chemical separation plant in the Zhou-Tren prefecture, again in the Gansu province. This period of deep military technology cooperation, regardless of how helpful it ultimately was, went from 1957 to 1960.
中国在甘肃省周至县建造了一个集成钚燃料设施，同时利用苏联早期的反应堆和化学分离工厂设计。尽管最终帮助有限，但这一时期的军事技术合作始于1957年，并持续到1960年。
The Sinosoviet split is a long and complicated thing, and I'm not going to cover all of it here, but as early as 1956, there were issues. That was the year Khrushchev made his secret speech, criticizing Stalin's cult of personality, the speech infuriated Mao Zedong who considered it an indirect attack on him.
中苏分裂是一个漫长而复杂的事情，我不打算在这里涵盖所有内容，但早在1956年就存在问题。那一年，赫鲁晓夫发表了他的秘密演讲，批评斯大林个人崇拜，这次演讲激怒了毛泽东，他认为这是对他的间接攻击。
Then in November 1957, Mao Zedong said at the Moscow Conference of World Communists and Workers' Parties, if worse came to worse and half a mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would remain while imperialism would be raised to the ground and the whole world would become socialism. In a number of years, there would be 2,700 million people again and definitely more.
1957年11月，毛泽东在世界共产主义者和工人党莫斯科会议上说，如果情况变得更糟，一半人类在核战争中死亡，剩下的一半会存活下来，而帝国主义将被摧毁，整个世界都将变成社会主义。在几年内，全球又会有27亿人口，数量肯定会更多。
Reddit edge lords and Elon Musk say this stuff all the time now, but it really did have an impact back then and it got the Soviets thinking. One of the big deliverables in the October 1957 agreement was a teaching bomb prototype, but Mao's flippant comments made just a month after the Soviets and Chinese signed that agreement cause Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet leadership to grow dismayed.
Reddit的狂热分子和埃隆·马斯克现在经常这么说这种话，但当时它确实产生了影响，并让苏联人产生了思考。1957年10月协议中的一个重要成果是一种教学用原子弹的原型，但就在中苏签署协议一个月后，毛泽东的轻率评论让赫鲁晓夫和苏联领导人感到失望。
So in early 1958, the Soviet leadership decided to reneg on this deliverable, Khrushchev said. They put the thing together and packed it up, so it was ready to go to China. At that point, our minister in charge of nuclear weapons reported to me. He knew our relations with China had deteriorated hopelessly. In the end, we decided to postpone sending them the prototype.
1958年初，苏联领导层决定不履行此项交付承诺，赫鲁晓夫说。他们组装好并打包好了该物品，以便寄往中国。这时，我们负责核武器的部长向我汇报。他知道我们与中国的关系已经无望恢复。最终，我们决定推迟将原型发送给他们。
Throughout 1958, endless delays, Moscow security advisors were dissatisfied with the room housing the bomb and demanded one modification after another. For the next year, Chinese workers would go to the train station to pick it up, only to come back empty handed. Finally, the Soviets postponed the bomb transfer indefinitely, telling the Chinese that would strain relations with the West.
在1958年期间，由于无休止的延迟，莫斯科的安全顾问对存放核弹的房间感到不满，并要求进行一次又一次的修改。接下来的一年里，中国的工人们将前往火车站取核弹，但每次都是空手而归。最终，苏联无限期地推迟了核弹的转移，告诉中国人这将会对西方关系造成紧张。
Then there was the second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958. Mao started shiling the Dynmen and Matsu Islands off mainland China in an attempt to get the nationalist retreat. The ensuing confrontation threatened nuclear war. Again, Stalin had long believed that Mao was consciously trying to provoke World War III, hoping that the Soviets and Americans would simply forget about China and Taiwan and fight one another.
1958年，发生了第二次台海危机。毛泽东试图通过轰炸离中国大陆最近的金门和马祖岛来逼迫国民党撤退，但随之而来的对抗威胁到了核战争。斯大林长期以来一直认为，毛泽东有意挑起第三次世界大战，希望苏美两国会忘记中国和台湾，而互相开战。
But this series of events Kruishan realized that he had made a horrible mistake. In June 1959, he sent a letter informing the Chinese of the termination of the military cooperation. His military advisors were called back, most of them left within a month, but it was not until July 1960 that the last Soviet advisor packed up and left. In the end, 40% of the equipment and raw materials promised by the Soviets never arrived, of the 30s' Soviet nuclear industry projects only a minority had been completed and nine had to be shut down entirely, forcing the Chinese in many cases to start all over again.
在这一系列事件中，克鲁谢夫意识到他犯了一个可怕的错误。1959年6月，他发送了一封信，通知中国终止军事合作。他的军事顾问被召回，其中大部分在一个月内离开，但直到1960年7月，最后一名苏联顾问才收拾行装离开。最终，苏联承诺的40％设备和原材料没有到达，苏联30年代的核工业项目仅完成了少数，其中九个完全关闭，迫使中国在许多情况下重新开始。
The withdrawal of the Soviet advisors was a blow, but it was not entirely unexpected. Nier Rong Zhen, one of PLA's top leaders, told the Central Committee that the Soviets aimed to maintain a technical gap between itself and China. Thus, their technical aid was untrustworthy. I suspect that some of this rhetoric is face-saving sour grapes.
苏联军事顾问的撤离是一个打击，但并不完全出乎意料。中国人民解放军的高级领导之一聂荣臻告诉中央委员会，苏联的目标是维持与中国之间的技术差距，因此他们的技术援助是不可靠的。我怀疑这些言论中有些是为了保全面子而说的酸葡萄。
In January 1960, the Chinese kicked off the 596 project, so named to remind them of the quote-unquote shameful day when the Soviets withdrew aid. I don't think you would name it that if it wasn't so important. Don't lie, told his cohorts in a speech that they would use their own hands, achieve a breakthrough in three years, master the technical know-how in five years, and have a stock pile of bombs in eight years.
1960年1月，中国启动了名为“596计划”的工程，名称意在提醒人们那个“污辱”的日子，也就是苏联撤回援助的那一天。如果它不是如此重要，我认为你不会给它这样的名字。毛泽东在一次讲话中告诉他的同僚们，他们将用自己的双手，在三年内取得突破，五年内掌握技术知识，八年内储备足够的核弹。
In broiled in economic and social pressures associated with the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese decided to abandon the dual track, postpone the plutonium bomb method, and move forward only with the uranium-235 design. The last Soviet advisors left the Lanzhou facility in July 1960, desperate to absorb whatever possible plant leader Wang Jiefu personally escorted the last five to the airport.
在经历了与大跃进相关的经济和社会压力之后，中国决定放弃双轨道计划，推迟钚核炸弹的研发，并仅以铀-235原型为基础继续前进。苏联的最后几位顾问于1960年7月离开兰州设施，急于吸取尽可能多的经验，工厂领导人王杰夫亲自护送最后五人前往机场。
Their departure forced the technicians there to pick up the slack, sorting through and sourcing tens of thousands of raw materials and supplies for the U-235 production line across all of China. Despite being so remote, the prevailing political atmosphere affected the plant. Caught up in Great Leap Forward, the technicians had actually started disassembling the Soviet provided electrical equipment in the name of quote-unquote technological innovation. Minister of mechanical industry in future general Song Ren Chong had to make a direct appeal to Mao Zedong to get them to stop.
他们的离开迫使那里的技术人员接手所有的工作，筛选和寻找数以万计的原材料和供应品，为中国各地的U-235生产线服务。尽管地点偏远，但环境政治氛围的影响仍然给工厂带来压力。在大跃进运动的影响下，技术人员实际上以所谓的技术创新之名拆除苏联提供的电气设备。机械工业部长宋任穿将军不得不向毛泽东直接呼吁，才让他们停止这种行为。
Mass turmoil regardless continued. Food shortages hit the plant staff in 1960, but Wang refused to slow progress, cut rations across workers and their families, and personally went foraging for herbs with his fellow cadres. Slowly over time there was progress, and by the end of 1961, some 700 difficult days after the Soviet severance of aid, the Lanzhou's plants machinery was successfully installed.
尽管遭遇大规模的混乱，但王在食品短缺的1960年，拒绝减缓进展，对工人及其家庭的配给也没有削减，并亲自与其他干部去寻找草药。随着时间的推移，逐渐取得了进展，到1961年底，苏联中断援助已经过去了艰难的700天后，兰州工厂的机械设备成功安装。
The Chinese were able to find reasonable substitutes for many Soviet components, most notably a special lubricant for the gaseous diffusion pumps which the advisors kept in a locked room and took with them when they left. By mid-1963, the Lanzhou scientists were successfully isolating uranium-235 and mass, and by January 1964, the ministry had 90% enrichment. Mao Zedong was given a report and scribbled noise in the margin. Sorry I lied, he actually wrote very good.
中国人能够找到很多苏联零部件的合理替代品，其中最显著的是气体扩散泵的特殊润滑剂，这些顾问将其锁在房间里，离开时带走。到1963年中期，兰州的科学家已经成功地分离出了铀-235和质量，并在1964年1月，该部门实现了90%的浓缩。毛泽东看完报告后，在边角处乱写了一些东西，对此表示歉意。对不起，我撒了谎，他实际上写了“非常好”。
Once you have the enriched uranium, the next step is to design and assemble the bomb itself. A nuclear explosion is the end result of an uncontrolled vision chain reaction, a uranium atom splits and creates more neutrons, those neutrons go on to hit other atoms causing more splits until it is self-sustaining.
一旦您拥有富集了的铀，接下来的步骤就是设计和组装核弹。核爆炸是一种不受控制的链式反应的结果，铀原子分裂并产生更多的中子，这些中子继续撞击其他原子并造成更多的分裂，直到这一反应变得自持。
The first American nuclear bomb the one dropped on Hiroshima was a gun design which shot one piece into another, but that was superseded by an implosion design, where we use specially shaped explosives to crush a piece of subcritical plutonium into supercriticality. This type bomb was the one dropped on Nagasaki and the one the Chinese eventually chose as it required less fizzle material, but instead of using plutonium as the Americans did, they used uranium-235.
第一颗美国核弹——投放在广岛的那颗核弹——是一种炮式设计，将一个零件射入另一个零件中。但后来，这种设计被一个压缩设计所取代，即我们使用特别设计的爆炸装置将亚临界钚压缩成超临界。这种类型的核弹是投放在长崎的那颗，也是中国人最终选择的一种，因为它需要较少的未爆物料，但与美国人使用的钚不同，他们使用铀-235。
The key issue the Chinese bomb design needed to do was to properly synchronize the high explosives so to kickstart a series of nuclear chain reactions, a bad timing issue means stray neutrons running around, a premature neutron burst resulting in an overall unsatisfactory performance. The British nuclear weapons program enjoyed the advantage of having some of their scientists working at Los Alamos. The Chinese did not have such a luxury, but they did know that a bomb was possible and the theory of how to achieve it.
中文翻译：
中国原子弹设计的关键问题是正确地同步高爆药，以启动一系列核链反应。如果时间不当，可能会导致中子偏离，提前中子爆炸导致整体效果不佳。英国核武器计划享有在洛斯阿拉莫斯的科学家的优势。中国没有这样的奢侈，但他们知道原子弹是可能的，并掌握了实现它的理论。
By the time the Soviets left in 1960, the Chinese had finished their theoretical work and was ready to embark on the actual design. They were aided by some sloppy shredding on the part of the Soviets, putting together some critical papers, one by one. Working in the Beijing suburbs, the team used hand calculators to work through complicated equations and simulations. By the end of 1962, they had mastered the theory behind implosions. A year later, they had the final design for their implosion mechanism.
在苏联人1960年离开后，中国已经完成了他们的理论工作并准备开始实际设计。苏联人的一些粗略撕碎的文件使他们得以一步步地将一些关键的文件凑在一起。工作在北京的郊区，这个团队使用手动计算器来处理复杂的方程式和模拟。到1962年末，他们已经掌握了内爆理论。一年后，他们拥有了内爆机制的最终设计。
In late 1963, the uranium arrived at the nuclear component manufacturing plant in Subei in Gansu Province. There, a team of master craftsmen machined it into a ball of highly enriched uranium and then finally packaged it together into the 596 bomb. The successful nuclear test caught both the Americans and Soviets off guard.
1963年末，铀到达了甘肃省肃北地区的核部件制造工厂。在那里，一支熟练的工匠团队将其加工成高浓缩铀球，最后将它们打包到了596号核弹当中。这次成功的核试验出乎了美国和苏联的意料之外。
The American government knew about the Chinese nuclear weapons program as early as 1959 and considered intervening to stop it. President Kennedy in 1961 told a journalist that China acquiring nuclear weapons would mean all the Southeast Asia falling to the communists. And then in the early 1960s, Kennedy put out feelers to Krushchev about military intervention to stop the program.
美国政府早在1959年就知道中国的核武器计划，并考虑干预以制止该计划。肯尼迪总统在1961年告诉一位记者，中国获得核武器将意味着整个东南亚都会落入共产主义者手中。然后在60年代初，肯尼迪向赫鲁晓夫发出信号，希望军事干预制止该计划。
Krushchev never broke the idea and several members of the Kennedy administration pushed hard against it, downplaying the supposed military consequences of a nuclear China. China's decision to go with an implosion-type bomb using uranium rather than plutonium considerably confused the American spymasters. In 1964, the Americans saw the Chinese preparing a bomb test, but seemingly without a proper plutonium fuel plant.
赫鲁晓夫从未放弃这个想法，而肯尼迪政府的几位成员则极力反对它，淡化了中国拥有核武器所带来的所谓军事后果。中国选择使用铀而非钚来制造压缩核武器，这让美国的间谍主管们感到相当的困惑。1964年，美国人看到中国正在准备一次核试验，但似乎没有一个适当的钚燃料工厂。
They knew about the gaseous diffusion plant in Nanzhou, but mistakenly thought it too small for a real nuclear weapon. In the end, the Americans simply underestimated the Chinese nuclear effort, and they did not realize their mistake until the eve of the actual test.
他们知道南洲气体扩散工厂的存在，但错误地认为它太小而无法制造真正的核武器。最终，美国人简单地低估了中国的核武器努力，并直到实际测试前夕才意识到自己的错误。
The People's Republic of China's Indigenous Nuclear Bomb Program was one of its biggest ever undertakings. It involved several hundred thousand people in 900 plus factories, research institutes and schools across 20 provinces. It also costs a staggering amount for an undeveloped nation. It are estimates fine, but the 10-year nuclear weapons program cost in total about $10.7 billion RMB or $4.1 billion in 1957 prices.
中华人民共和国原始核武器计划是其历史上最重大的项目之一。这个项目涉及20个省份900多家工厂、研究机构和学校，动员了数十万人。对于一个欠发达国家来说，这也是一个巨额开支项目。虽然估算有些模糊，但这个历时十年的核武器计划总成本约为107亿元人民币或1957年价格下的41亿美元。
Many of these costs came during economically difficult years of the Great Leap Ford and the early 1960s, forcing cuts in other projects elsewhere in the government.
这些成本大部分发生在大跃进和上世纪60年代初经济困难的日子里，迫使政府在其他项目上进行削减。
Scholars and keyboard warriors argue to this day about how much the Chinese program benefited from Soviet technology transfer. The true answer is probably somewhere in between.
学者和键盘侠至今争论着中国计划在苏联技术转让方面获益了多少。真正的答案可能在两者之间。
In 1966, Deng Xiaoping told the Romanian ambassador that if the Soviets hadn't broken the tree, then the Chinese wouldn't have been able to build the bomb so fast. So the Soviets gave a lot, but when they left, there was still much more to do.
1966年，邓小平告诉罗马尼亚大使，如果苏联没有打破这棵树，中国就不能那么快地制造出原子弹。虽然苏联提供了很多帮助，但当他们离开时，仍有许多事情要做。
However, the sting and shame of the abrogated treaty gave the Chinese the force of will to finish the job.
然而，被废止的条约所带来的刺痛和耻辱让中国人拥有了完成这项工作的意志力。
Something to think about.
值得思考的事情。
Alright everyone, that's it for tonight, thanks for watching, subscribe to the channel, and I'll see you guys next time.
大家，今晚的节目到这里就结束了，感谢你们的收看，记得订阅我们的频道哦。下次再见！