Chaos & communism: China’s 1949 revolution
发布时间 2021-02-18 12:00:00 来源
摘要
Historian and journalist Graham Hutchings discusses his new book China 1949, which explores the events of a tumultuous year that saw communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the birth of the People’s Republic of China. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
GPT-4正在为你翻译摘要中......
中英文字稿 
The biotapestry ranks as surely one of the most famous pieces of medieval artwork. Yet it's not actually a tapestry and it probably wasn't made in bio. It tells the story of the Norman conquest but misses out some crucial details including two of the three big battles fought in England in 1066. It features sex and violence, myths and fables and even has the hand of God. We don't know how it ends but we do know that it's supposed to be coming to the UK on loan from Normandy at some point in the next few years. So now is the time to really get to grips with the tapestry story in our new history extra podcast series, unraveling the biotapestry. Join me, David Musgrove, tapestry expert, Professor Michael Lewis and a panel of other leading historians including Michael Woods and Janina Ramirez for our exclusive five-part series. Available to listen to now at historyextra.com forward slash tapestry pod.
生物挂毯被认为是中世纪最著名的艺术品之一。然而，它实际上并不是一件挂毯，而且可能并不是在生物制作的。它讲述了诺曼征服的故事，但错过了其中的两个关键细节，包括在1066年英格兰发生的三个重大战役中的两个。它涉及性和暴力、神话和寓言，甚至有上帝的介入。我们不知道它的结局如何，但我们知道它预计将在未来几年中从诺曼底借来英国展出。因此，现在是我们在新历史额外播客系列中真正掌握挂毯故事的时候了，我们将揭开生物挂毯的面纱。加入我，挂毯专家David Musgrove，教授Michael Lewis以及其他知名历史学家，包括Michael Woods和Janina Ramirez，一起听我们的独家五部分系列。立即在historyextra.com/划线/tapestry pod上收听。
Hello and welcome to the history extra podcast from BBC History magazine, Britain's best-selling history magazine. I'm Ellie Corporn.
大家好，欢迎收听BBC History magazine的历史extra播客节目。作为英国最畅销的历史杂志，我们非常荣幸能够为您呈现这一节目。我是Ellie Corporn。
1949 was a pivotal year in Chinese and global history. The nationalist government of Zhang Kai-shek was overthrown by Mao Zitong's Communist forces, creating the regime that still rules China today. The story of 1949 is told in a new book by the historian and journalist Graham Hutchings. And he spoke to BBC History magazine at Rob Atta, about the reasons for Mao's victory and why its legacy is so important today.
1949年是中国和全球历史上关键的一年。张凯思的国民政府被毛泽东的共产党力量推翻，创造出至今仍统治着中国的政权。历史学家和记者格雷厄姆·哈钦斯的新书讲述了1949年的故事。他在Rob Atta接受了BBC历史杂志的采访，谈到了毛泽东胜利的原因以及为什么它的遗产如此重要。
At the start of the year you cover 1949, what is the general situation in China and with the civil war that's raging there? It's the start of year three of the civil war. It's conventionally thought to run between the middle of 1946 to 1949, but in fact it is an issue that has been long running in Chinese history dating from the later 1920s when Mao Zitong's communists, he wasn't in full charge then, but we might call them that for this purpose. And Zhang Kai-shek's nationalists fell out over how to rule China and waged war against each other or be it on a relatively small scale. And that reached a culmination after the defeat of Japan in the second world war when both sides fell upon each other on a large scale.
在这一年的开始，你要涵盖1949年，那时中国的总体情况以及正在进行的内战如何？这是内战的第三年。通常认为内战从1946年中期到1949年，但实际上，它是中国历史上一个长期存在的问题，起源于20世纪后期，当时毛泽东的共产党人（他当时并不完全掌权，但为了这个目的，我们可以称他们为共产党人）和蒋介石的国民党之间因如何治理中国而分裂，并对彼此发动战争，尽管规模相对较小。在二战中日本的战败后，双方在较大规模上互相对抗，达到了顶峰。
Now the first two years or thereabouts of that large-shell conflict had taken place by the start of 1949 and Zhang Kai-shek's nationalist government, the recognized government of the Republic of China was on its uppers. It had lost Manchuria, the industrial heartland of northeast China. It was on the point of losing nearly all north China north of the Yangtzey. So Zhang Kai-shek in his capital of Nanjing at the start of January 1949 is in a real fix.
到1949年初左右，那场大规模冲突的前两年已经结束了，蒋介石的民族政府——中华民国的唯一承认政府处于穷途末路。他们已经失去了中国东北的工业中心满洲，几乎失去了长江以北的全部北方地区。因此，1949年初，身处南京的蒋介石陷入了困境。
And so why have things gone so wrong for the nationalist up to this point? Because they had a lot of western aid, they were the government of China. Why was it everything going against them? It's a complex issue this one. We can isolate some factors and we ought to start perhaps at the top with Zhang Kai-shek's somewhat inept strategic leadership both on the political fronts and especially on the military fronts. He was fighting an insurgency but not fighting it how an insurgency should be fought. He was holding the lines of communications, he was holding the major cities, he was not making forays out into the countryside that would denude Mao Zedong's Communist Party of their military and political support. On the political front he had failed to galvanize the Chinese nation. To be sure he'd done that to some extent with his victory in so far as it was his over Japan, celebrated famously in August 1945. But he'd squander that by mismanaging his cause, failing to rally the people and a third element that we shouldn't neglect. His mismanagement or his governments mismanagement of the economy. It had been racked by inflation. Savings had all but disappeared. Assets were extremely vulnerable. The core support of China's educated urban people on which he might be expected to rely wasn't there.
那么，为什么民族主义者的事情到目前为止出了这么多问题呢？因为他们得到了很多西方援助，他们是中国的政府。为什么一切都反对他们呢？这是一个复杂的问题。我们可以确定一些因素，也许应该从上面开始，张开希在政治和军事领域都有着不够能干的战略领导力。他在与叛乱的战斗中，并没有像应该做那样进行反叛的战斗。他防守着通信线，防守着主要城市，但他没有进入偏远地区，这样就会削弱毛泽东的共产党的军事和政治支持。在政治方面，他没有成功地激发中国民族精神。当然，他通过1945年8月庆祝著名的打败日本，某种程度上已经做到了这一点。但是，他却因管理不善而挥霍了这次胜利，没有成功地团结人民。我们不应忽略的第三个因素是他的政府在经济方面的管理不善。通货膨胀使经济陷入混乱。储蓄已经几乎消失，资产极易受到损害。中国受过教育的城市人民是他所依赖的核心支持者，但却离他而去。
Now we've placed a lot of emphasis on Zhang Kai-shek and his errors and shortcomings. We all not to forget that there is a positive side of the story for Mao's communists. I suppose we ought to focus immediately on the first big thing which Mao promised to the peasants and had done so pretty well from this period of split that we referred to earlier in the late 1920s and that was land. If you sign up to the communist revolution Mao and his senior comrades said you'll get land.
我们一直强调蒋介石及其错误和不足之处，但我们不应忘记毛泽东共产主义事业的积极一面。我认为我们应该立即关注毛泽东在20世纪20年代末的分裂时期所承诺，并且做得相当不错的第一个大事——土地问题。如果你加入共产主义革命，毛泽东和他的高级同志会给你土地。
In land-hungry China, that was a promise to be taken very seriously. If you just think about the armies of the two sides, both of them inevitably formed very largely from country boys. Those who fought for the communists knew that when the war was over, they'd get land. Those who fought for the nationalists weren't sure what they'd get. For the nationalist soldiers, they made us return to the status quo, whereas Mao was promising something new and potentially better. They had what you might say three disadvantages or lack of motivations of which certainly the one you mentioned was important. Alongside that, there was no real cause that they were fighting for a political cause that could inspire them.
在渴望土地的中国，这是一份非常认真对待的承诺。如果你想想两军的兵力，他们都主要由乡村青年组成。为共产党战斗的人知道，战争结束后他们会得到土地。为国民党战斗的人不确定他们会得到什么。对于国军士兵来说，他们让我们回到现状，而毛泽东正在承诺一些新的、潜在的更好的东西，他们缺乏动力，缺乏目标，你所提到的缺乏动力确实很重要。除此之外，他们没有真正的政治事业能够激励他们。
Unlike those generally speaking on the red side of the equation, on the communist side, they were badly treated whilst in the army. Paulie paid, Paulie fed, badly treated by their officers, so there wasn't really much skin in the game for them. And then so when your book opens at the start of 1949, to what extent do you feel the outcome of the war is already decided? There were many observers who thought so and it would really be asking for a lot if one expected Jankai Shek to reverse his fortunes at this stage.
不像通常站在红方的人，共产党这边的人在军队中受到了虐待。Paulie照顾，Paulie喂养，被他们的军官虐待，所以他们没有真正投入这场战争。当你的书在1949年初开始时，你觉得战争的结果在多大程度上已经确定了吗？有很多观察家认为是这样，如果期望蒋介石在这个阶段扭转他的命运，那真的是要求过多了。
But we ought not to move from that premise to the conclusion that it was all done and dusted and that the shape of China at the end of 1949, beginning of 1950, was predetermined. Because Jankai Shek, in January 1949, realizing how weak and vulnerable his position was, essentially decided he'd have to step down and sue for peace. He thought if he sued for peace with the communist, he would gain time. He'd gain time to strengthen the defenses in the south. He'd gain time perhaps of the kind that might persuade the Americans under Truman to bankroll him and provide him with fresh military supplies. He'd gain time more over to perhaps form a coalition government with the Chinese Communist of the kind that left a role, if not for him personally, but for the nationalists as a cause.
我们不应该从这个前提开始得出结论，认为一切都结束了，1949年底，1950年初中国的形势就已经注定了。因为1949年1月，蒋介石意识到了自己的弱点和脆弱的位置，基本上决定他必须下台并求和。他认为如果他与共产党求和，他将获得时间。他将获得时间来加强南方的防御力量。他获得了时间，或许能够说服特鲁曼领导下的美国人提供资金支持和新的军事装备。他获得的时间也可能更多，或许能够与中国共产党形成一个联合政府，这种政府还能留出一个角色给民族主义者成为一个事业的一部分，即使对他个人来说不是很重要。
And therefore it was worth playing for. It was inconceivable, I think, probably even to him that he could recover lost ground, but he could, if not, stop the rot, at least slow it. But on the other side, how prepared were Mao and the other Chinese leaders to accept some kind of compromise, some kind of divided China? They were unprepared to do so, and they realized that they would have to topple Jankai Shek's government, they would have to defeat it, they would have to drive it off the mainland. They had commitment, they had determination, they had a vision, all those things that we've said the nationalist government under Jank did not have.
因此，这场比赛是值得进行的。我认为，即使是他自己，也难以想象他能够挽回失去的领先优势，但他至少可以阻止颓势。但另一方面，毛泽东和其他中国领导人准备接受某种程度的妥协、某种样式的分裂的中国吗？他们没有准备好，他们意识到他们必须推翻蒋介石的政府，他们必须打败它，他们必须把它赶出大陆。他们有承诺、决心和远见，所有这些都是我们所说的蒋介石领导下的国民政府所缺乏的。
Remember that they were certainly the leadership and particularly Mao inspired by the Soviet vision of the future. Mao had not yet met Stalin. Stalin had actually turned down requests by Mao to come and visit him. Stalin, the Soviet leader, wanted Mao to concentrate on the revolution at home and not show too much fealty and alliance with the Soviet unit at this delicate stage of the Cold War. But Mao and his senior comrades were in no doubt about their vision for a socialist, a revolutionary, a united China. And they had the armies and they had the generals who were shown over the last year in particular that they could deliver that and they had no intention of stopping as it were halfway at stopping at the North Shore or the North Bank of the ANGSE.
请记住，他们确实是领导层，特别是受到苏联未来愿景的启发的毛泽东。毛泽东当时还没有见到斯大林。实际上，斯大林拒绝了毛泽东来访的请求。苏联领导人斯大林希望毛泽东专注于国内革命，并在这个冷战的敏感阶段不要过多地表示对苏联的效忠和联盟。但毛泽东和他的高级同志们对社会主义、革命、统一的中国的愿景毫无疑问。他们拥有军队和将军，特别是在过去一年中，这些将军展示了他们能够实现这个愿景，他们没有打算停在ANGSE的北岸或北岸。
And then in 1949, what were the key moments on the military side that led to the communist taking over essentially all of mainland China? The big thing, symbolic rather than substantive because they had been besieged for quite a while was the fall of the former imperial capital, now the present-day capital of China Beijing, then known as Beijing for reasons that need not detain us. And the fall of its associated port city of Tianjin. Remember Manchuria had gone and with these two cities which fell in January then all of North China essentially was lost.
1949年，共产党接管了全中国大陆，那时军事方面的关键时刻是什么？最重要的是，象征性的事件是前皇帝之都、现为北京的城市的陷落，虽然已经困扰他们一段时间，但实际上并没有太大的实质性影响。同时，与北京相关联的港口城市天津也陷落了。还记得，满洲已经失去了，并且这两个城市在一月份相继陷落，基本上失去了整个华北地区。
The next big event was the one that Zhang and his allies hoped to prevent and that was the mass crossing of the ANGSE in April 1949. The purpose of peace negotiations was to get the PLA to stand still, to stop them preparing for the great assault across that enormous river that essentially divides China north from south.
接下来的一件大事是张及其盟友希望阻止的事情，那就是1949年4月的ANGSE大规模渡河。和谈的目的是让PLA停止准备通过这个将中国南北分隔的巨大河流进行大规模进攻。
And so what's going on at this point with the leadership of the nationalist because I believe Zhang talked about standing down, how far was he actually in control of that side? He realized that a condition for opening peace talks with the communists was that he would have to absent himself from the scheme of things for a while. So he stopped stepped down as president and he handed over to his vice president which wasn't a great idea from his point of view in one respect because his vice president, a man called Leeds on Ren, was a part of the Guangmung University that had been odds with Zhang for many many years.
在这个时刻，国民党领导层的情况如何？我相信张作霖谈到了下台的问题，他实际上在控制那一方面多少的权力？他意识到与共产党开启和平谈判的一个条件是，他必须暂时退出事务的安排。因此，他辞去了总统职位，并将权力转交给他的副总统。从他的角度来看，这不是一个好主意，因为他的副总统约翰-任立昂是广聚大学的一员，与张作霖多年来一直处于对立状态。
And so was the man called Bai Chong Shi also from Guangxi in southwest China who in fact commanded the best troops on the nationalist side and was sitting in the middle of China and the middle of the ANGSE preparing to ward off a communist attack. So Zhang's house was not only as we've discussed not well-motivated, not well-organized, not well disciplined, it was also a house divided. Zhang, however, was not a man without resource and certainly not a man without guile.
这位名叫白崇实的男子也来自中国西南部的广西，实际上指挥着国民党一方最好的部队，坐落在中国的中部和东南亚国家联盟的中心，准备抵御共产党的攻击。所以，张家不仅像我们之前讨论的那样缺乏动力、组织不善、纪律不严，在内部也是分裂的。然而，张并非没有智谋之人。
He used the period as soon as he stepped down to prepare where he might face his last stand where he might find a place that was impregnable and from which he could ward off the communist threat. Now we know that to be Taiwan but it wasn't always clear throughout 1949 that he'd always set his heart indefinitely on that place but that was one of his principal calculations as he stepped down and handed over the conduct of affairs and especially the peace negotiations to his so-called allies but really rivals within the nationalist camp.
他下台后，立即利用这段时间准备自己的最后防线，寻找一个坚不可摧的地方，以防止共产主义威胁。如今我们知道这个地方就是台湾，但在1949年的时候并不总是清楚他是否永远把心思放在那个地方。但这是他下台时的主要考虑因素之一，他将决定事务的交接和尤其是和平谈判交给了他的所谓盟友，但实际上是国民党内部的竞争对手。
And then so why were the nationalist unable to create some kind of negotiation? Was it just the communist in Transigence? Very largely. The idea of the nationalists as they flew to Beijing in April, ironically I suppose on April the first, for what they believed to be negotiations. They were soon disabused of this because the communist side made it plain that what the nationalists had come north for was not to negotiate but to surrender and it was the terms of surrender, the terms of the dissolution of the nationalist government that the communists were interested in and certainly not a ceasefire, certainly not a co-illusion government in which there was a significant role for Zhang and his allies and so it ran up against a wall of negotiating tactics if one can call them that that many many other people foreigners in particular would come up against once China was firmly under the grip of the Chinese communists.
那么，为什么民族主义者无法达成某种谈判呢？是因为固执的共产主义者吗？很大程度上是这样。四月份，民族主义者飞往北京进行谈判，但他们很快失望了，因为共产党方面明确表示，民族主义者前来北方的目的不是谈判而是投降，共产党对民族政府解散的条款感兴趣，而不是停火或合并政府，其中张派及其盟友扮演重要角色。因此，民族主义者在谈判策略上遇到了障碍，而许多其他人和外国人一样，在中国彻底落入中国共产党掌控下时也会面临类似的问题。
And how did Western powers react to what was going on in China? How concerned were they by the imminent communist takeover? All were concerned for different reasons. The United States was concerned of course because we've got the Cold War taking dramatic shape in Eastern Europe and now apparently if Mao was to sweep the country before him spreading to Asia. The Soviet camp if you like would capture the world's most popular nation. That was a matter of grave concern to Washington. There was also another strand in their thinking stemming from the long-standing missionary cultural educational medical commitment and moral commitment to China over many many years.
西方大国对于中国正在发生的事情做出了怎样的反应？他们对即将到来的共产主义接管有多担心？每个国家都有不同的担忧。美国当然感到担忧，因为我们在东欧亚正在发生戏剧性的冷战，如果毛泽东能够席卷全国并蔓延到亚洲，苏联阵营就有可能控制世界上最受欢迎的国家。这对华盛顿来说是一个严重的问题。此外，他们的思维中还有另外一个线索，源于多年来对中国长期的传教、文化、教育和医疗承诺和道德承诺。
That of course reached something of a fulfillment and culmination in US support for Zhang during the war against Japan. The trouble they had with him was that he was not strong enough to defeat communism. He was not legitimate enough to be worth supporting but critically he was too important to quite abandon at least in the full sense.
当然，美国在抗日战争期间支持张勋，这在一定程度上达成了某种成就和顶峰。他们与他的问题是他不够强大来打败共产主义。他没有足够的合法性值得支持，但至关重要的是，至少在全面的意义上，他太重要了，不能完全放弃。
If one moves from Washington to Moscow there you see a different perspective as you'd expect. Stalin overall is pleased about the conduct of the Chinese revolution into the red camp of the world is coming this vast nation but Stalin has his reservations on the tactical front they are concerning the extent to which the US would really abandon Zhang.
如果一个人从华盛顿搬到莫斯科，他会看到不同的观点，这是可以预料的。斯大林对中国革命进入世界红色阵营感到满意，但在策略层面上，他对美国到底会不会真正放弃张作霖有所保留。
What if in the last minute during the course of 1949 US troops would arrive in South China and try and stop the communists. More long-term Stalin was concerned about the reliability the ideological orthodoxy of Mao Zedong. What kind of man was this Mao? What kind of Marxist was he? Since the Chinese revolution and the entry as it looked that China's into the into this global camp of socialism would largely be a Chinese made affair unlike the situation in Eastern Europe where the people's democratic states as we came to know them were essentially creatures and creations of the Soviet Union.
如果在1949年美国军队最后一刻来到华南并试图停止共产党，那会怎样？而对于长期打算，斯大林担心毛泽东的意识形态教条主义的可靠性。毛泽东是一个什么样的人？他是一个什么样的马克思主义者？由于中国革命和中国进入社会主义世界大家庭，看起来这将主要是中国自己的事情，不像东欧的情况，那里的人民民主国家实质上是苏联创造的产物。
China was independent. Might Mao seek to bid for leadership of the global socialist camp was one of those fears that also stalk Stalin's mind. He was a man as we well know of some neuralgia and of great fear about his own position.
中国独立了。毛泽东是否寻求竞标全球社会主义阵营的领导权是斯大林心中也存在的担忧之一。众所周知，他是一个神经病患者，对自己的地位非常害怕。
In London the concern was slightly different. Not best pleased about the prospect of Mao's conquest. London in the late 1940s was no friend of communism but there were more material considerations.
在伦敦，人们的关注略有不同。他们对毛泽东的征服前景并不感到十分满意。20世纪40年代末期的伦敦不是共产主义的朋友，但更多的是出于物质考虑。
At least the were in Shanghai China's great global city where British business was prominent where hundreds of millions of dollars were invested where thousands of British subjects were living and working. If you looked further south they had another concern and that was not so much profit but prestige the colony of Hong Kong.
至少，他们在上海，中国的国际大都市，英国的商业影响力很大，在那里投资了数亿美元，有成千上万的英国居民生活和工作。如果你向南看，他们还有另一个关注点，那不是利润，而是威望——香港殖民地。
This had been taken from China a hundred years earlier just over to be precise and the British didn't want to give it up but could they hold it if the PLA was sweeping south at the pace they were throughout in 1949 might they stop at the border might they not seek to reverse a national humiliation and not only liberate the whole of China but kick the foreigners out from Hong Kong as well so that was one of London's concerns.
这个地方在精确地说是一百年前被从中国占领，英国不想放手，但如果解放军如同1949年南下的速度一样，他们能否保住这个地方呢？他们可能会在边境停下来，也可能试图扭转国家的耻辱，不仅解放整个中国，而且把外国人也从香港赶出去，所以这是伦敦的一项担忧。
Three different perspectives from the capitals at that time. And alluding to what you said earlier when you were talking about the Americans was there ever any prospect that the US might throw its formality weight behind Zhang and try to prevent the communist takeover? There wasn't.
当时三个不同的首都有不同的观点。而且，你之前谈到美国时提到了什么，美国是否有可能支持张的形式，并试图防止共产党接管？没有这样的可能性。这句话的意思是，当时美国没有采取任何措施来支持张学良，也没有试图阻止共产党的接管。
There was no serious consideration given to that. It was rather a matter of what kind of demise what kind of decline what kind of withdrawal it would be. Well the communists were determined to do though there was some hesitation in certain parts of the state department for a while was not to recognize Mao Zedong.
当时并没有认真考虑这个问题，而更多是在考虑什么样的衰落、什么样的衰退、什么样的撤退。尽管国务院某些部门存在犹豫，但共产党仍决心不承认毛泽东。
That would be conceived as too much of an encouragement to a revolutionary regime too favorable towards the Soviet Union so best to keep Mao at arms length and best to retain diplomatic recognition with the Republican government and to Shanghai Shake in particular. So not completely to let him go not to support him but not to entirely cut him loose.
这将被认为是对一个有利于苏联的革命政权的过度鼓励，因此最好保持与共和国政府的外交关系，并尤其避免与上海帮扯上关系，从而与毛泽东保持一定距离。不完全让他走，不支持他，但也不完全要彻底放手。
And then on the subject of Hong Kong as we know the communist regime didn't then go and try and overrun Hong Kong. Why do you think that was? Were they trying at this early stage to maintain reasonable relations with other global powers? I think there might have been an element of that.
在香港问题上，我们知道共产主义政权并没有试图占领香港。您认为这是为什么？他们在这个早期阶段是在努力与其他全球大国保持良好关系吗？我认为这可能有一定的因素。
There might have been an element of caution about causing too much of a diplomatic rift particularly as they were at odds with the United States the communists. But I think there were two other considerations one much more important than the other. And that is that they had a terrific amount on their plate.
可能存在一定的谨慎，以免造成过多的外交裂痕，特别是他们与美国和共产党的立场相左。但我认为还有两个其他的考虑因素，其中一个要比另一个重要得多。这就是他们已经面临了大量的问题需要解决。
They had just conquered the country. Remember at this stage the Chinese communist army is really a creature of North China and has been operating in North China for a long time they suddenly in a matter of little more than a few weeks find themselves in possession of all of South China or where they are coming across a language, a cuisine, a culture of where of life that they are broadly unfamiliar with.
他们刚刚征服了这个国家。要记住，在这个阶段，中国共产党军队实际上是华北地区的产物，并且在华北地区长期操作，他们突然在几个星期内占有了南方中国或者说，他们面对着一种语言、美食、文化和生活方式，这些他们大体上都不熟悉。
They've just taken over a huge country they have enormous problems on their hands and moving South for all that it has a certain amount of appeal across the border into Hong Kong is regarded as too risky. The other dimension not to be entirely discounted though I don't think decisive is that the British because they were concerned that the PLA Mao's army might want to have a go they had significantly reinforced the colony.
他们刚刚接管了一个巨大的国家，面临着巨大的问题，虽然南移有一定的吸引力，但越过边境进入香港被认为是太冒险了。另外一个不容忽视的因素是，因为英国担心毛泽东的人民解放军可能会进攻香港，所以他们显著地加强了殖民地的防御。虽然我认为这并不是决定性的因素。
They'd moved lots of army in, they'd lose fighter planes in and they'd had a carrier force very close to Hong Kong with the view of raising the bar of acting as a deterrent.
他们已经调动了大量军队前来，他们在此过程中失去了战斗机，并且他们已经在香港附近有了一支航母部队，希望能够提高作为威慑力量的标杆。
Still to come on the history extra podcast you can think of it as a refugee island at the end of 1949 who status or was very questionable because Mao just as he'd been determined to cross the Yangtze was determined to cross the Taiwan Straits and complete his conquest.
在历史额外播客中，即将呈现的是：你可以将它看作是1949年末的一个难民小岛，其地位非常可疑，因为毛泽东决心要穿过长江，也决心要穿过台湾海峡完成他的征服。
Now in October 1949 the Communist Party declared the founding of their Republic to what extent did they control all of mainland China at that point? They hadn't completed the conquest of the country by the first of October.
1949年10月份，共产党宣布新共和国成立，那时他们在中国大陆控制了多少地方？截至10月1日，他们并没有完全征服整个国家。
I suppose this shows that they were all devious. I suppose more realistically it shows that while they hadn't got control it was only a matter of time before they did. There was certainly no going back so they were able on that occasion and the weeks surrounding it to lay out the foundations of the people's Republic in an institutional one might say also a constitutional scent but also a cultural sense because during that period they put together what many of the features of contemporary China still strike us.
我想这表明他们全部都是狡诈的。更现实地说，这表明，虽然他们还没有掌握控制权，但只是时间问题。他们肯定不会回头，因此他们能够在那个时候和周围几个星期内在制度上，也可以说是宪法上以及文化意义上奠定人民共和国的基础，因为在那段时间里，他们组织了许多现代中国特色的特点。
That is to say a political mobilization that is to say an insistence that the Chinese Communist Party is the supreme arbiter in national life, in political life, in personal life that is to say the tearing up of the old legal codes and the creation of new ones that gave formidable power to the executive and generally to the sense of frenzy one might almost call it, certainly mass participation in politics where the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders set the tone.
这意味着政治动员，指中国共产党在国家生活、政治生活和个人生活中拥有至高无上的裁决权，这意味着废弃旧法律法规，制定新的法规，大大增加行政部门的权力，也意味着一种狂热的政治参与，可以称之为群众参与，其中中国共产党及其领导人设定了基调。
Looking at the level of the ordinary people, what was it like to be a regular Chinese person in 1949? How much were these big events affecting life on the ground? One has to think I suppose in answering that, first of all in the cautionary respect, one is talking about between five and six hundred million people and there might not have been five and six hundred million different varieties of opinion but there were certainly many. So let's approach it from the point of view of three perspectives.
看着普通民众的水平，1949年的中国普通人生活是什么样子的呢？这些重大事件对生活的影响有多大？回答这个问题，首先需要谨慎，因为我们要谈论的是五六亿人口，可能没有五六亿种不同的意见，但肯定有很多。因此，让我们从三个角度来看待这个问题。
There were those who were inspired, let's use that word, by the revolutionary enthusiasm and the communist cause. This I suppose had a lot of impact especially amongst young people, patriotic people, people who were fed up with the weakness, the division, the poverty of their country and the way in which they saw it had been pushed around by a foreign was mostly recently the Japanese. The idea that that could never happen again and that the country might be set on a new course, a new China as Mao called it, youth for in its revolutionary enthusiasm was very very attractive so many people were inspired by that.
有些人被革命热情和共产主义事业所激励。我想，这对青年人、爱国者、对国家的弱点、分裂、贫困以及他们看到它曾经被外国（最近主要是日本）欺压的方式感到厌倦的人产生了很大的影响。毛泽东称之为新中国的新方向、新的革命热情，对青年人来说非常具有吸引力，因此许多人被其激励。
There were those of course who did not like communism, didn't know much about it, didn't like it, knew quite a bit about it and still didn't like it, people who had something to lose, something to fear, assets that they had been able to build up and those in the cities who treasured intellectual freedom for all the Jankai-Shek's government was repressive and authoritarian, it wasn't very good even at being a dictatorship and so the press, the academic world, even areas of law there were spaces for freedoms to operate of the kind that seemed very unlikely to flourish once the communist took over, those people had much to fear.
当然有些人不喜欢共产主义，他们或者对它不了解，或者认为它不好，或者对它有所了解但仍不喜欢。这些人中，有些人有东西可以失去，害怕失去；有些人积累了财富，有些人在城市里推崇知识自由。因为蒋介石政府是压制和专制的，但并不是一个好的专政政府，所以媒体、学术界，甚至部分法律领域，还是有自由的空间。一旦共产党上台，这些类型的自由似乎很难得到发展，所以这些人很害怕。
There were those who were neither pro communist nor necessarily pro-Gwomendang but who were caught up in the fighting and who wanted to preserve their family and such assets as they had and of course it was many of those people hundreds thousands of them indeed who took to the roads, the railways, the ships and if they could get seats on such aircraft as were available and the planes to escape wherever they could, always moving south, always moving to the ports many of them ending up in Taiwan, many in Hong Kong, many further afield, this is another aspect of 1949, alongside the movement of troops from north to south we see the movement of millions of people to escape the fighting displacement as you always see in a civil war is a very marked feature of the conflict in China.
有些人既不支持共产主义也不一定支持国民党，但却被卷入了战争之中，想要保护自己的家庭和所有资产。当然，正是这些人中的成千上万人投奔了路上，乘坐铁路、轮船，如果能够在可用的飞机上找到座位，他们也会乘坐飞机逃离，在向南不断移动，不断向港口前进，许多人最终到达了台湾，许多人到了香港，许多人更远地方，这是1949年的另一个方面，除了军队从北向南的移动，我们还看到数百万人为逃离战争而移动，而这也是内战中的一个显著特点。
How much of a hunger was there within China just for peace after so many years of war with Japan and now civil war, was there an element of people just wanting all to be over? Absolutely, it was a very strong cry reflected in all sorts of ways among the populists. That reminds us I think since that cry was really not adhered to by the protagonists on either side the determination of the leadership, both the nationalist, the woman, Dong and the communists to fight to the end.
在经历了长达数年的与日本的战争以及现在的内战之后，中国人民内心渴望和平的程度有多大？其中是否有一部分人仅仅想让所有的战争都结束？确实是这样的，这种内心的呼声在民间以各种方式反映出来。这让我们想起，由于双方主角都没有遵循这种呼声，国民党和政治家董必武以及共产党的领导层都决定要战斗到底。
It reflected in the personalities of Zhang and Mao but there must have been other factors at work. These men felt that compromise was worse than peace. Let me put another way, compromise was worse than fighting to the end. They would rather do that. And so the determination of these two men plunged their countrymen and country women into this desperate gruesome civil conflict until it reached a critical outcome with the flight of Zhang to Taiwan and the collapse of his government.
这反映在张和毛的个性中，但肯定还有其他因素在起作用。这些人认为妥协比和平更糟糕。换句话说，妥协比拼到底更糟糕。他们宁愿这样做。因此，这两个人的决心陷入了他们的同胞和同胞女性的绝望的可怕的内战，直到张逃往台湾和他的政府崩溃的一个关键的结果。
Now Taiwan's come up quite a few times in this conversation already. And so as we know that Zhang's regime ended up that was their last stronghold in Taiwan. What was it like for the people already living in Taiwan to suddenly have this Chinese government decamping there and essentially taking over the island? It was very problematic. Taiwan had not been part of the Chinese world in a sense between 1895 and the defeat of Japan after the Second World War in 1945. It was a Japanese colony.
在这次对话中，台湾已经被提到了很多次。我们知道，张的政权最终终结于台湾。对于已经居住在台湾的人们来说，突然有中国政府营地设在那里并接管整个岛屿是什么感受呢？这是非常有问题的。在1895年至二战后的1945年日本战败之前，台湾并不属于中国世界。它是一个日本殖民地。
Curiously, many of the Chinese in Taiwan rather liked what the Japanese had done in the sense that they built infrastructure, raised living standards, increased educational levels and such like. And when with the defeat of Japan, they were re-incorporated into Zhang's Republican administered part of China, it wasn't a happy occurrence. What came after was even worse for them because they were subject to a massive ingress of soldiery, of desperate civilians and were preparing indeed for the attack that they believed would eventually come from the communists as Mao and his men got control of maritime China.
有趣的是，台湾的许多华人对日本人所做的事情颇为满意，因为他们建设了基础设施，提高了生活水平，提高了教育水平等等。当日本战败后，他们重新并入张的共和国管辖的中国部分，这并不是一个愉快的事件。接下来发生的事情对他们来说更加糟糕，因为他们遭受了大量的士兵和绝望的平民涌入，他们确实在为他们所相信的共产党接管海洋中国最终会发动的攻击做准备。
On the other hand, there was another sense at work because what Zhang could not do in the mainland, he seemed better able to do in Taiwan. For example, they introduced the new currency. For example, they controlled the rate of inflation and amongst the poor, the distressed, the battle weary and indeed the defeated among the XRs were people of talent, of educational accomplishment from the mainland. So here were the ingredients, not apparent necessarily by 1949, of the recreation of Taiwan, henceforth to be the base of the Republic of China still uses that name today to rise as a Chinese tiger or Chinese dragon economy, which it did, of course, several years later. That was in the future, but you can think of it as a refugee island at the end of 1949, whose status was very questionable because Mao, just as he'd been determined to cross the Yangtze, was determined to cross the Taiwan Straits and complete his conquest.
另一方面，还有另一种感觉在起作用，因为张在大陆无法做到的事情，在台湾似乎做得更好。例如，他们引进了新货币。例如，他们控制了通货膨胀率，在XRs中的穷人、困难的人、战斗疲惫的人，确实包括了来自大陆的具有才华和教育成就的人。因此，这里有了未必在1949年时就显而易见的条件，来重建台湾，并因此成为今天中华民国的基地，它至今仍以该名称存在，并最终崛起为中华老虎或中华龙头经济体。当然，这是在未来，但你可以将它视为在1949年底的难民岛，其地位非常可疑，因为毛泽东像他当初决心越过长江一样，决心跨越台湾海峡并完成他的征服。
And am I right to say it was actually really the Korean War that in the end led to Taiwan surviving? That's absolutely right. Mao Zedong had many promises for his people as he created the People's Republic of China. In fact, nearly the first thing he did was to take them to war in Korea in November 1950 because of fears about US-led UN forces having moved through Seoul up north towards the Chinese border and presenting a threat to his infant regime. It was when the Americans saw Mao do that and realized that this was a potentially disastrous outcome, the loss of Korea, and potentially the loss of Taiwan in terms of the broader Cold War that they decided at last that they would rescue Jankai Sheph. Not restore him, they didn't want him to return to the mainland, but they were determined now that Taiwan should not be part of the People's Republic of China. They moved in June 1950, the seventh fleet into the Taiwan strait and made it clear that Mao's advances in that area would have to stop. So it was events outside China as you say that rescued Taiwan. For Jank who would always believe the Americans would eventually come to his aid, it came too late. He'd lost the mainland, but it did mean he could retain Taiwan.
我说，最终导致台湾存活下来的实际上是朝鲜战争，这话说的对吗？ 是的，完全正确。毛泽东在创建中国人民共和国时向他的人民许下了许多承诺。事实上，他几乎最先做的事情就是在1950年11月将他们带到朝鲜战争中去，因为他害怕美国领导的联合国部队经过首尔向北朝鲜边境推进，对他的婴儿政权构成威胁。当美国人看到毛泽东这样做，并意识到这是一个潜在的灾难性结果，即失去朝鲜，以及潜在的在冷战上更广泛的层面上失去台湾，他们最终决定营救蒋介石。他们没有恢复蒋介石的地位，他们不希望他返回大陆，但他们现在决心台湾不应成为中国人民共和国的一部分。他们在1950年6月把第七舰队派入台湾海峡，明确表示毛泽东在那个地区的进攻必须停止。所以正如你所说，是在中国以外的事件拯救了台湾。对于一直相信美国最终会来营救他的蒋介石来说，这来得太晚了。他失去了大陆，但这意味着他能保住台湾。
And how long did the nationalist regime in Taiwan retain realistic aspirations to return to the mainland? Well, they never gave it up because it was a key part of their legitimacy. The idea was that we are in Taiwan due to a particular set of circumstances, largely our own failures, they were prepared to admit, but reforms in the military and in political life were all conducted with some rigor and some success with a view to taking back the mainland at some point. And there were crises, the Taiwan straits crises in the 1950s over the island of Kumoi, quite close to the mainland, very close indeed, which the nationalist also retained, though it was merely a garrison, not a human settlement in the conventional sense. So the woman Dung had never given up the idea of returning, but never at any time were they in a position to accomplish it. And the Americans anxious to preserve the status quo were always dissuading them from having a go and curbing their adventurism.
台湾的国民党政权有多长时间保持了回归大陆的现实愿望？他们从未放弃，因为这是他们合法性的关键部分。这个想法是，我们在台湾是由于特定的一系列情况，主要是我们自己的失败，他们愿意承认，但军事和政治生活中的改革都是以某种严格和一定的成功进行的，以便在某个时候重新夺回大陆。而且还有危机，1950年代的台湾海峡危机，涉及鸭绿江岛，该岛离大陆非常近，国民党仍然保留了该岛，尽管它只是一个驻军，而不是常规意义上的人类定居点。所以董女士从未放弃回归的想法，但在任何时候，他们都没有能够实现它的能力。而美国急于维护现状，总是在劝阻他们采取行动，并遏制他们的冒险主义。
Now how much do you think the legacy of 1949 still shapes China in the region today? I think it does in a host of respects. The institutions, the political patterns of behavior, the apparatus set up in 1949, has of course over the years been subject to changes, but the way in which China is controlled, domestically and run as a country, has its origins in what was unfolded in those weeks surrounding the foundation of the People's Republic in October 1949.
现在你认为1949年的遗产在多大程度上仍然影响着中国在该地区的形象？我认为它在许多方面都有影响。虽然1949年建立的机构、政治行为模式和设立的机构在多年来经历了变化，但中国在国内的控制和作为一个国家的运作方式，其起源可以追溯到1949年10月人民共和国成立周围的那几周所展开的目标。
The other dimension, of course, and a very significant one, is that 1949 not only changed China, it gave us two Chinas, because Zhang in Taiwan insisted that that was the seat of the Republic of China, that it was the legitimate government of the whole of China, and many countries around the world, not including Britain, but certainly including America and many other Western allies, recognized Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, as the seat of the Chinese government. So that conflict between the two Chinas not only persisted and at times, as the Taiwan Straits Crisis suggested, looked like resuming in a significant way on the military front, that remains the situation today.
当然，另一个非常重要的方面是，1949年不仅改变了中国，还让我们拥有了两个中国，因为台湾的张伯伦坚称那里是中华民国的所在地，是中国的合法政府，并且包括美国和许多西方盟友在内的许多国家承认台湾（即中华民国），作为中国政府的所在地。因此，这两个中国之间的冲突不仅持续存在并且时不时地在军事方面出现，例如台湾海峡危机，而且这种情况直到今天依然存在。
China's civil war is, I think, the longest running, unfinished conflict of its kind, and it so happens that the issue has been brought to renewed salience by the present Chinese ruler Xi Jinping, who has warned on more than one occasion that this problem of China's national unification cannot be left indefinitely, and we've seen in, as recently as the last few weeks, increasing maritime and aerial incursions into Taiwan, threats that the island must bend its knee and accept some sort of arrangement whereby it loses its independent status and returns to what the mainlanders regard as the motherland.
我认为中国内战是同类冲突中最长、最没有结果的，现任中国统治者习近平多次警告，中国的国家统一问题不能无限期地拖延。近几周我们看到，中国对台海的海上和空中侵犯日益增多，威胁台湾必须屈服并接受某种安排，失去其独立地位并重返大陆人所认为的祖国。这让这个问题重新引起关注。
So the legacy of 1949 is not only very apparent from a glance at the current international news headlines, there is a strong sense in which it might re-emerge as a major issue, not just in Chinese politics, but in international relations, because the Americans are still interested in the status of Taiwan. Japan is as well, and the last thing many Asian countries and indeed countries further afield want is an extension of Chinese political, economic, and military influence of the kind that would come if they were able to overcome Taiwan.
因此，从目前国际新闻头条可以清晰地看到，1949年的遗产不仅在表面上明显，而且在很大程度上可能重新出现，不仅在中国政治中，而且在国际关系中成为一个主要问题，因为美国仍然对台湾地位感兴趣。日本也是如此，许多亚洲国家甚至更远的国家最不愿意看到中国政治、经济和军事实力的扩张，如果中国能够克服台湾的话，这种扩张就会到来。
And actually, in Taiwan itself, what is a popular view there? Do people want to be part of China? Do they still have aspirations to be the legitimate China or do they see themselves as a separate independent country? There's a wide diversity of opinion in Taiwan, as you'd expect, given that it's a vigorous democracy. I think I'm right in saying that the overall view, the overriding view, is that the status quo should be preserved, that there is not a yearning in any realistic sense for unification with China.
实际上，在台湾本身，流行的观点是什么？人们想成为中国的一部分吗？他们仍然希望成为合法的中国，还是将自己视为一个独立的国家？在台湾，意见多样，这很正常，因为它是一个充满活力的民主国家。我认为，总体上，压倒性的观点是应该保持现状，没有在任何现实意义上对与中国统一的渴望。
If it means Chinese Communist Party influence and perhaps even control, so you might say that the Taiwanese would like to be left to get on with their lives, they would like a set of arrangements to be in place which gave them breathing room, not only at the personal level, but allowed their state to function as an international actor in some way without being excluded from every diplomatic fora and prevented from having diplomatic relations with third parties. That prevention being largely the work of the government in Beijing.
如果这意味着中国共产党的影响，甚至控制，那么可以说台湾人希望有一套安排，让他们有空间自主发展。他们希望这套安排不仅可以让个人生活得更好，在某种程度上也让他们的国家可以作为一个国际行为主体，而不被排除于外、无法与第三方建立外交关系。而这种防止主要是由北京政府所做出的。
And seven decades on from the Communist Revolution, how would you evaluate the successes and failures of that regime? It's an enormous topic and one has to consider so many factors. I suppose I would look at it this way. On the one hand, you have bystanders of individual wealth, individual health, longevity, gender equality, and many other measures, quite considerable progress. The situation of China in 1949 was poor, was weak, life was precarious, and for the majority rather unpleasant.
从共产主义革命至今已有七十年，您如何评估该政权的成功和失败？这是一个巨大的话题，需要考虑很多因素。我认为我会这样看。一方面，您可以看到个人财富，个人健康，寿命，性别平等等因素的旁观者，取得了相当大的进展。 1949年的中国情况很糟糕，很弱，生命是不稳定的，对大多数人来说很不愉快。
You have to, though, consider that in the context of the costs, the communists have wreaked revolution in China, indeed, clinging close to destroying much of life in the country. Whether you look back at what happened immediately after 1949 with the elimination of the landlords, or you turn to the denuding of intellectual life in the mid-1950s, or the collectivization of land in the Great Leap Forward and the famine, or the all-custrated destruction of cultural and intellectual life right across the country and the cultural revolution.
然而，你必须考虑到在成本的背景下，共产主义者在中国造成了革命的破坏，并且几乎摧毁了国家的许多生活。无论你回顾1949年后立即发生的事情，如消灭地主，或者你转向上世纪50年代中期剥夺知识分子生活，或大跃进和饥荒中土地的集体化，或者在整个国家范围内文化和知识生活的广泛破坏、文化大革命。
You have to ask yourself this question, okay, China has achieved successes in a number of measures, was it ever really necessary to reach those achievements by those memes? I think the answer has to be no, it wasn't necessary. That was Graham Hutchings. China 1949, Year of Revolution, is out now published by Blooms Reacademic. Thanks for listening.
你必须自问这个问题，好吧，中国在许多方面取得了成功，但是是否有必要通过那些手段来取得这些成就呢？我想答案必须是否定的，这是Graham Hutchings的意见。他的新书《中国1949：革命之年》现已由Blooms Reacademic出版。感谢您的收听。
This podcast was produced by Ben Youitt and Jack Fateman, tune in tomorrow for a panel discussion on LGBT plus history.
这个播客由本·尤伊特和杰克·法特曼制作，明天要收听的是有关LGBT历史的小组讨论。